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## THE MONSTER PLOT

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## Introduction

On 5 June 1962 Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, a Soviet official temporarily assigned to Geneva, contacted an American Foreign Service Officer in a move that was eventually to lead to Nosenko's defection. This act was the first in a chain of events that is unequaled in complexity by any other Soviet operation handled by the Central Intelligence Agency since its establishment. Because the case still has important implications for the overall Soviet intelligence effort of the United States, and because it raises many basic questions about the techniques of handling Soviet agents and defectors, a reinvestigation of the case was commissioned by the Agency in June 1976. The results are embodied in this report and its annexes.

Although United States officials of many agencies, up to and including a president of the United States, were briefed on the case and either played some role in making decisions concerning it or actively participated in running the operation, it does not now appear that, between 1962 and 1976, any single individual has ever been fully informed as to all its aspects. The complexity of this investigation therefore stems in large measure from the fact that the case has proceeded along at least two, and often more, compartmented tracks. Thus, the effort to get a total picture of what transpired has involved an unusual amount of research in the files of various components of the Agency, plus personal interviews with a large number of present and former Agency employees.

The actions taken in regard to Nosenko were not the result of decisions made by a unitary Agency acting as a corporate entity; rather, in this case more than in most, decisions were made by a number of senior individuals on the basis of their own strongly-held views, which sometimes conflicted with the equally strongly-held opinions of other senior colleagues. Thus, this report must, if it is to be comprehensible, attempt to depict the decision-making process in all its complexity by referring when necessary to the individual participants.

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The quintessential quality of a report such as this is that it be objective. We have not, on the other hand, refrained from expressing our opinions. Even to have tried to do so would have been futile for two rather obvious reasons. First, into the reconstruction of events of the complexity herein described there always enters a degree of selectivity and judgment; in this sense, "opinion" provides the essential matrix of our product. Secondly, we have viewed our task as one of constructive criticism.

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CHAPTER I

Organizational Background: CIA's Handling  
Of Soviet Positive Intelligence and CI Matters

The history of the Nosenko case can only be comprehended within the framework of the organization and day-to-day functioning of the Central Intelligence Agency as a whole. In fact, opinions regarding the handling of the Nosenko case may differ substantially according to individual's differing views regarding internal Agency organization and functioning. This being the case, it is useful at the outset to make explicit our understanding of how the Agency actually functioned in the relevant period, the 1960s, as distinct from how it might theoretically have functioned according to Agency organizational charts and regulations.

The two instrumentalities for the conduct of day-to-day operations in the Soviet field were the Soviet Bloc Division (known successively by this and several other names\*) and the Counterintelligence Staff. In the nature and interrelationship of these two organizations we find the key to much of what was to happen in the Nosenko case.

Although the SB Division was considered a "line" organization, the CI Staff's name would imply (if the Agency's formal organization were to be taken at face value) that its function was limited to advising a command echelon. In fact, such a distinction was never enforced.

"CI Staff" was actually a misnomer, because the organization carrying this name did not even concern itself to any appreciable extent with the counterintelligence function of the Agency on a worldwide basis. Rather, it concentrated on the USSR and Soviet Bloc countries.

Within the SB Division, there was lodged the so-called Soviet CI Group, which was in many respects a competitor of the CI Staff. It concerned itself, during most of the period to be covered in this report, primarily with information

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\*This area component during the period of this report was known as Soviet Russia Division (1952-1966) and Soviet Bloc Division (1966-1974). The two names are often used interchangeably.

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on the intelligence and counterintelligence organs of the USSR, and as such was inevitably somewhat redundant, since the same field was the major preoccupation of the CI Staff. Nevertheless, as will emerge later in this report, there was during most of the period with which we are concerned a substantial congruity of views between the SB/CI Group and CI Staff that militated in favor of coherent operational policy, even though the two organizations might disagree on matters of detail.

One curious aspect of the organizational problem should be mentioned at this point because, while seemingly minor, it may have played a significant role. While the SB Division understandably had a number of competent Russian linguists, the CI Staff did not have a single Russian linguist who could be brought to bear on either the Nosenko or Golitsyn case. The staff was therefore dependent for its data on translations of Nosenko material and, in the case of Golitsyn, on information obtained from discussions conducted with him in English, a language in which he was not fully fluent.

A third organizational participant in the Nosenko case was the Office of Security. This office had overlapping jurisdiction with CI Staff and, to a lesser extent, SB Division in any matter that involved a suspected Soviet or Soviet Bloc penetration of the Agency. While not usually a problem, the overlapping jurisdiction was considerable in both the Golitsyn and Nosenko cases because so much of the activity in connection with both operations revolved around allegations that the Soviets had penetrated the Agency at a high level.

Although allegations that the Soviets had recruited Agency staff employees did not first originate with Golitsyn, it was he who lent special force to them by spelling out a complicated theory of Soviet intentions and modus operandi. He thus provided a detailed conceptual framework within which to develop a hypothesis towards which some members of the Agency were already predisposed. Golitsyn thus became the ideologue's ideologue.

Prior to Golitsyn's defection, the Agency as a whole had been hard hit by its dealings with high-level Soviet penetrations of Western governments. There is no need to go into detail on them, since they have been well documented elsewhere, but they included British representatives such as Kim Philby and George Blake. Another important penetration was Heinz Felfe, who rose to be Deputy Chief of Soviet

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Counterintelligence in the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND). The Felde case is particularly significant because it was believed by a number of counterintelligence specialists in the Agency that Felde's career had been systematically promoted by the Soviets through what came to be known as the "throw-away" technique. According to the theory of this group, a considerable number of valuable and productive Soviet intelligence operations in Germany were made available to Felde so that, by detecting them and signaling their presence to the West German authorities, he could build up his reputation as a counterintelligence specialist. While there is debate about the value of the assets the Soviets made available, there appears to be enough substance to this theory for it to have had a strong impact within the Agency, particularly upon those persons who were members of the former Eastern European (EE) Division of the Plans Directorate.

In the course of time, the continuing record of KGB success in penetrating Western governments made it the more feared of the two principal Soviet intelligence services. Although we had had our successes also in penetrating the Soviets, they were primarily through GRU defectors-in-place such as Popov and Penkovskiy. The defection of Anatoliy Golitsyn on 15 December 1961 was thus a major event.

Once again, it is not necessary here to go into details regarding Golitsyn, because this case has been covered extensively in a recent study. However, two points are worth noting:

1. First, Golitsyn was diagnosed early in 1962 as a "paranoid personality." Although account was taken of this psychological problem, it was considered in the light of a threat to the continuity of the debriefing process rather than as a factor reflecting on the validity of the purported intelligence he gave us. It was apparently felt that, if we could maintain his stability, we could depend not only upon the objectively verifiable facts he gave us but also upon his often very theoretical generalizations.

2. Secondly, Golitsyn presented us right from the beginning, continually elaborated throughout the years, a complicated rationale for believing that the KGB was successfully pursuing a mammoth program of "disinformation" to the detriment of the

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United States and its Western allies. This rationale is covered in more detail in Chapter VI of this report.

It is against this background that we view the approach to CIA by Nosenko and his subsequent handling. In doing so, we shall for ease of reference from time to time allude to the thesis regarding KGB operations and intentions--elaborated by Golitsyn and others--as the "Monster Plot." In fairness, it must be allowed that this term was in common usage not by the thesis' proponents but rather by its detractors; yet no other name serves so aptly to capsulize what the theorizers envisaged as a major threat to United States' security. If the term carries with it emotive connotations, the latter were certainly shared by both sides to the controversy; and this fact alone is enough to justify including "Monster Plot" in the lexicon of this study.

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## CHAPTER II

### Biographical Data: 1927-1962

Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko was born 30 October 1927 in Nikolayev, Ukrainian SSR, son of Ivan Isidorovich Nosenko and Tamara Georgiyevna Markovskaya. His father was born in 1902 and died on 2 August 1956. At the time of his death, the senior Nosenko was Minister of Shipbuilding, a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU, a deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and recipient of a number of the highest Soviet awards and medals. He received a state funeral, and he is commemorated by a plaque on the Kremlin wall. Young Nosenko's brother, Vladimir, born in 1944, was a student at the Institute of International Relations as of 1964.

From his birth until 1934, Nosenko lived in Nikolayev. In 1934 he and his mother joined the senior Nosenko in Leningrad, where the latter was working as chief engineer at the Sudomekh shipbuilding plant. Nosenko continued his schooling in Leningrad until late 1938, at which time he and his mother followed the senior Nosenko to Moscow, where he was to serve as Deputy People's Commissar of the Shipbuilding Industry.

In 1941, shortly after the war broke out, Nosenko and his mother were evacuated to Chelyabinsk in the Urals. Nosenko stated that he and a friend tried to run off to the front, but they were caught and returned home. At age 14 Nosenko entered a Special Naval School that, in August 1942, was relocated to Kuybyshev. Later, this school was forced to relocate again, this time to Achinsk in Siberia. Nosenko did not want to go to Siberia and, through the influence of his father, was accepted at the Frunze Naval Preparatory School in Leningrad (not to be confused with the Frunze Higher Naval School, also in Leningrad), which by this time had been relocated to Baku.

Some time after August 1943, Nosenko tried on two separate occasions to get to the front, but failed. He and a friend did succeed in returning home to Moscow without authorization. These escapades seem to form part of a behavior pattern that was eventually to culminate in defection.

By August 1944, Nosenko had resumed his studies at the Frunze Naval Preparatory School, which had returned to its

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original location in Leningrad. Cadets from this school were sent to a forest (some two hundred kilometers from Leningrad) on a wood-cutting detail. In about November of that year he wounded himself, seemingly accidentally, and was hospitalized. He decided not to return to the Frunze Naval Preparatory School and again, through his father's intervention in about January 1945, entered a shipbuilding college (tekhnikum) in Leningrad.

At the end of World War II, Nosenko returned to Moscow. He had meanwhile obtained a certificate from the director of the shipbuilding college that attested to his study in, and the completion of, the tenth class.

At some time prior to July 1945, Nosenko accompanied his father, who went to East Germany with a group of engineers. For purposes of that trip, Nosenko received temporary rank as an Army senior lieutenant, with appropriate documents and uniform.

Nosenko entered the Institute of International Relations in Moscow in July 1945. Upon completion of the second year at the Institute, and by virtue of his participation in a military training program roughly equivalent to the ROTC, Nosenko received the rank of junior lieutenant in the "administrative service" (sic). (The exact meaning of this term is unclear.)

In 1946, according to Nosenko, he married, against his parents' wishes, a student whom he had gotten pregnant. He obtained a divorce almost immediately following their marriage. In about 1947, he married the daughter of Soviet Lieutenant General (Major General, US-style) Telegin. This marriage, too, was neither successful nor long-lived. Nosenko reported he had found his wife in bed with her brother. A girl was later born with a harelip and a cleft palate. Nosenko insisted that this was not his child.

Nosenko completed a four-year course at the Institute of International Relations, but he actually received his diploma a year later, in 1950, because he had failed the examination in Marxism. He had had to wait an extra year in order to retake this examination.

In March 1951, Nosenko was assigned as an English language translator in naval intelligence (Naval RU), serving first in the Far East. While on leave in Moscow

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(late April 1952), he developed an illness that caused him to cough up blood, and he entered a tuberculosis sanatorium near Moscow for treatment. For reasons of health, he did not return to the Far East but was sent instead to the Baltic area.

While on leave in Moscow in late 1952, Nosenko accompanied his parents to a New Year's Eve party at the dacha of a certain General Bogdan Zakharovich Kobulov. When Nosenko indicated interest in changing jobs, the general made a vague offer of help in getting employment with the Ministry of State Security (MGB). In March 1953, while again in Moscow, Nosenko was called to Kobulov's office. Kobulov had just returned from Germany to become the First Deputy Minister of the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs). Nosenko did not see Kobulov personally but was referred by the latter's assistant to the deputy chief of the Second Chief Directorate (internal counterintelligence), hereafter referred to as SCD, by whom he was hired.

His first MGB assignment was in the First (American embassy) Section of the First (American) Department of the SCD.

In March 1953, following Stalin's death, Lavrentiy Beriya emerged from the resultant reshuffling of the top leadership as chief of both the MVD and MGB. In March 1954, the new "Committee" for State Security--the KGB--was formed.

In June 1953 Nosenko married his third wife, Lyudmila Yulianovna Khozhevnikova, who was a student at the Moscow State University.

Nosenko, a member of the Komsomol since 1943, was elected secretary of the SCD Komsomol unit in June 1953 and served as secretary of that unit until about June 1954. However, earlier in 1954, Nosenko had contracted venereal disease and gone to a clinic; to disguise his identity, he used operational documentation in alias in applying for treatment. When he did not go back for final treatment as instructed, the clinic sent a letter to his ostensible place of work as shown on the alias document. The MVD found out about this improper use of alias documentation and reported it to the SCD. Nosenko was not only disciplined by the chief, SCD (reprimanded and placed under arrest for 15 days), but the Komsomol also removed him as secretary and expelled him from its organization.

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In early spring 1955, Nosenko received a poor kharakteristika (performance evaluation), which described him as unsuitable for work in the First Department. Nonetheless, he was neither dismissed nor transferred.

Although Nosenko survived the 1954 episode as well as the poor performance report, these events caused him to go on what he has described as a "big drunk," which resulted in his having to spend a month under hospital care. To keep Nosenko out of further trouble, his mother intervened by making a telephone call to Petr Vasilyevich Fedotov, chief of the SCD. Seemingly as a result of her efforts, Nosenko was transferred in the latter part of May 1955 to the Second Section (which operated against tourists) of the Seventh Department, SCD. In late 1955, Lieutenant General Oleg Mikhaylovich Gribanov was appointed chief of the SCD. From a number of indications, Nosenko's relationship with Gribanov developed, despite the difference in rank and position, into a social relationship involving evenings on the town together, heavy drinking, and women. Despite numerous indiscretions, Nosenko's survival within the KGB and his subsequent promotions to increasingly responsible positions may well have resulted in part from Gribanov's patronage. To a considerable degree, of course, his rise must also be attributed to his being the son of a highly-placed member of the Soviet government.

At this point in his KGB career, Nosenko had lost his Komsomol membership and not achieved CP-member status. It was not until 1956 that he was accepted as a candidate member of the CP, and only in 1957 that he was admitted as a full Party member. Once this happened, according to Nosenko, the Komsomol removed its reprimand from his file.

In December 1959, Nosenko was promoted to the rank of captain. He held this rank until his defection in February 1964, despite having been promised he would be promoted and the fact that he had held several positions that were usually filled by officers of higher military rank.

Nosenko worked in the Seventh Department, SCD until January 1960, when he was transferred back to the First Section (American embassy) of the First Department. Then he held the position of a deputy chief of the First Section. He was retransferred back to the Seventh Department as of late December 1961-early January 1962. In July 1962, he was appointed deputy chief of the Seventh Department. He

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continued in this position until 18 January 1964, the date he left Moscow on TDY to Geneva.

Nosenko defected in Geneva on 4 February 1964, leaving behind in Moscow his wife, Lyudmila, and two daughters. His prior travels to the West had included two TDYs to England in 1957 and 1958, a TDY to Cuba in 1960, and the first TDY to Geneva from mid-March until June 1962. He also went on TDY to Bulgaria in 1961. Details of his defection and subsequent developments are covered in Chapter III.

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CHAPTER III

Chronicle: 1962-1969

A. Initial Contacts

When Nosenko first approached the CIA on 9 June 1962, he had been assigned, as a representative of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, to be security officer of the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference being held in the Palais des Nations in Geneva. Taking advantage of the fact that he was the watchdog for the delegation whereas its members could not watch him, Nosenko used his freedom of movement to approach the Agency, ostensibly for personal financial assistance.

As he told it, Nosenko had recently slept with a Swiss woman who had stolen 900 Swiss Francs of official funds that he had on his person at the time; inability to reimburse this relatively trivial amount (about US \$250 at the time) would jeopardize his career. In exchange for 2,000 Swiss Francs, he therefore proposed that he provide us with two items of information. These items, subsequently verified, related to:

1. KGB recruitment of a US Army sergeant while he was serving in the American embassy in Moscow as a "code machine repairman."
2. A Soviet official whom the Agency had ostensibly recruited but who was being run against us under KGB control.

At this time Nosenko was not forthcoming in response to general intelligence requirements on which we tried to quiz him, excluded the possibility of becoming an agent, and flatly refused to consider meeting Agency representatives inside the USSR. Nevertheless, he "agreed 'perhaps' meet us when abroad" again at a later date. For our part, our interest in him was whetted by his identification of his deceased father as a former minister of the USSR. In addition, such information as he gave about himself indicated that he would be of high operational interest. Inter alia his most recent assignment in Moscow was as head of a KGB sub-section working against American tourists.

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## B. Bona Fides

By 11 June, the two case officers (one a native Russian speaker) who were handling Nosenko sent a cable to Headquarters that read in part:

SUBJ CONCLUSIVELY PROVED BONA FIDES. PROVIDED INFO OF IMPORTANCE AND SENSITIVITY, SUBJ NOW COMPLETELY COOPERATIVE. WILLING MEET WHEN ABROAD AND WILL MEET AS OFTEN AND AS LONG AS POSSIBLE UNTIL DEPARTURE 15 JUNE.

With the question of bona fides seemingly resolved, the principal case officer flew to Washington carrying the tapes of the meeting. His arrival and sojourn at Headquarters were described by Chief, CI on 23 July 1976 as follows:

Chief, CI: . . . we got the first message . . . on Nosenko from Geneva, and [the principal case officer] was ordered back, and we had a big meeting here on Saturday morning, and [the principal case officer] thought he had the biggest fish of his life. I mean he really did . . . and everything I heard from him was in direct contrast from what we heard from Golitsyn. I mean, we had no agents, this, that and . . . yet here was a Second Chief Directorate man in Geneva peace talks on disarmament. So I got hold of [the principal case officer], and I brought him in here on a weekend.

Q: What you're saying is that it was unreasonable for a Second Chief Directorate man to be there . . .

Chief, CI: Under the circumstances, getting drunk and needing \$300 to . . . "not to be recruited but to give us three full, big secrets" for an exchange for the money in order that he could replenish the account from which he embezzled the money on a drunk. So I brought [the principal case officer] in here one evening, I think it was Friday, Saturday and a Sunday, and I brought about

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10 to 15 volumes of Golitsyn's interrogation, without prejudicing him in any way, just to read it, and he had all the books out, and at the end of it all he said that there was no question about it, that they were being had. I mean, mind you, he was of split motivation because this was the big case of his entire life and yet there he was reading material, etc. So we went to Dick [Helms, then DDP] and we put up a proposition that we should permit Golitsyn to read the real material, I mean the transcripts and everything from Nosenko. And he wouldn't agree to that, but we made a compromise and that was to take the material and falsify it as though it was an anonymous letter sent to the embassy by an alleged KGB person. So the anonymous letter was drawn up, and [the principal case officer] interviewed Golitsyn with the anonymous letter, and Golitsyn's statement was that "this is a person under control, I want to see the letter" which created a situation because we didn't have a letter. But he began to point out in some detail exactly what was instigating and inspiring-- in terms of what he'd already given to us and he very wisely stated that he wanted everything on tape, because he knew that as time passed in hundreds of interviews and their counteraction took place, there would be people accusing him of not having divulged certain information.

The principal case officer's review of the Golitsyn information had indeed converted him to the view that Nosenko's defection was bogus. Equally convinced, as clearly indicated by a number of documents that he drafted, was his superior, the person who had become Chief, SR Division in December 1963. The reasons for Chief, SR's conviction may not have been the same as the principal case officer's, but for all practical purposes the views of the two men at the time were identical.

A joint CI Staff-SR Division recommendation was therefore made to Richard Helms, the Deputy for Plans,

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that the transcripts of the Nosenko debriefings be made available to Golitsyn for comment. Helms agreed, with the single reservation that Nosenko not be identified by name as the source. As a result, a number of items of information from Nosenko were embodied on a letter ostensibly stemming from an anonymous KGB source; in this form, it was assumed, the information could be shown to Golitsyn without disclosing the source. (This ruse seemed plausible enough, since a previous defector, Michal Goleniewski, had written CIA a number of anonymous letters before eventually defecting and disclosing his identity.)

In carrying out the plan, the principal case officer made his own views clear to Golitsyn:

I told [Golitsyn] that . . . I thought it quite possible, in view of his own statements about disinformation, that this was the beginning of a disinformation operation possibly relating to [his] defection.

Golitsyn felt, in general and without having the full details necessary to an assessment, that there were indeed serious signs of disinformation in this affair. He felt such a disinformation operation, to discredit him, was a likelihood, as he had earlier said. A KGB officer could be permitted to tell everything he knew, now, if he worked in the same general field as Golitsyn had. When told that so far this source had not done anything to discredit Golitsyn, and had in fact reported that the KGB is greatly upset about Golitsyn's defection, and asked what he thought the purposes of such a disinformation operation now might be, Golitsyn agreed that kidnapping was a likely one, "to arrange an exchange for me." Also, to divert our attention from investigations of his leads by throwing up false scents, and to protect their remaining sources. He also added, "There could be other aims as well. The matter should be looked into. It seems serious to me." He thought the KGB might allow a first series of direct meetings with the KGB officer, to build up our confidence, and then in the next session do whatever the operation's purpose

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might be (discredit Golitsyn, kidnap, pass serious disinformation items, etc.).

C. The Case Against Nosenko

During the remainder of 1962 and 1963, SR Division continued to build up a case against Nosenko. Virtually any information provided by Nosenko, or action taken by him, was interpreted as part of a KGB "provocation." If his information was in accord with that from other sources, this fact not only confirmed our suspicion of Nosenko but was interpreted as casting doubt on the other sources as well.

While the above aspect will be covered at length in Chapters V and VI, one example will serve to highlight the attitude that prevailed. Nosenko had, during our meetings with him in 1962, contributed information that materially aided in the identification and arrest of William John Christopher Vassall, a British Admiralty official who was also a KGB agent. Because Golitsyn had previously provided similar, but less specific, information, the usefulness of Nosenko's intelligence was discounted; once Vassall had been identified, it was concluded that Nosenko had been allowed to expose him in order to support his own bona fides. The argument ran that Vassall would in any case have been identified sooner or later on the basis of Golitsyn's leads.

In January 1964, Nosenko reappeared in Geneva accompanying another Soviet delegation. By now, the case against him had been well established in the minds of those dealing with the matter, and the record is therefore replete with manifestations of suspicion. A particular example of our tendency to interpret unfavorably almost anything Nosenko said is provided by notes that Chief, SR forwarded to Helms on 27 January 1964, with the suggestion that they "convey very well the flavor of the man . . . and the complexities of the operation." By way of background, although Nosenko's cryptonym at this juncture was AEFOXTROT, he had previously been designated AEBARMAN. This bit of history led to the following incident during a safehouse meeting:

I cannot attribute to coincidence a bizarre remark AEFOXTROT made on 24 January. As I went

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behind a bar which stands in the apartment, to serve drinks to AEFOXTROT . . . AEFOXTROT saw me standing there behind the bar and his face lit up and he said with a smile, "Ha. You are the barman." Now this could be an idle pleasantry about my standing there like a bartender, but it is not funny as AEFOXTROT (ex-AEBARMAN) seemed to think it was and I am afraid it means that he knows his own CIA cryptonym.

The above incident exemplifies a main theme that CIA was itself penetrated. This fear had existed before Golitsyn defected, but it was fed constantly by the latter's allegations that information concerning him was leaking to the KGB, and the conclusion that the leaks must have originated within the Agency.

Thus it was that a memorandum from Chief, SR on 27 January 1964, submitted to and approved by Helms, began as follows:

Our goal in this case must be eventually to break Subject and learn from him the details of his mission and its relation to possible penetrations of US intelligence and security agencies and those of allied nations as well as to broader disinformation operations in the political sphere. Ideally, our interests would be best served if Subject were broken as early as possible but since this is unlikely, our actions must be conceived and carried out in a manner which contributes to our basic goal without alerting Subject unduly at any stage.

Far from "alerting Subject unduly," on the surface the Agency welcomed Nosenko with both cordiality and generosity. The following excerpts from a 30 January 1964 meeting make the point clearly:

Nosenko: . . . the only thing I wanted to know and I asked this question, "What should I expect in the future?"

Principal case officer:

The following awaits: As I presented it, you wanted to come to the United States and

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have some job, some chance of a future life, which gives you security and if possible the opportunity to work in this field which you know. Is that correct?

Nosenko: Absolutely.

Principal case officer:

Mr. Helms said yes, flatly absolutely yes, in fact I would say enthusiastic . . . that's the only word to describe it. We talked about, and since this was a business discussion I'll repeat all of it whether it was pleasant or unpleasant. So the next thing will be some details that we spoke about. We talked about the means by which [you] could have a solid career with a certain personal independence. Because of the very great assistance you've been to us already and because of this desire to give you a backing, they will give you a little additional personal security . . . [salary details follow].

D. Defection

As might be expected, the principal case officer devoted a good deal of effort during the second Geneva visit to persuading Nosenko to stay in place. Nosenko, however, dismissed out of hand the possibility of remaining in contact with CIA from within the Soviet Union, and he became increasingly anxious to defect immediately. When the principal case officer continued to press him to remain in Geneva long enough to effect an audio penetration of the local rezidentura, Nosenko forced the issue. At a meeting on 4 February, he announced that a cable had been received from Moscow ordering him back home for a "tourism conference." Though this claim was subsequently to be the source of almost endless controversy, it was accepted at the time without apparent question. Preparations therefore immediately began for evacuation to the United States.

A layover in another country en route to the United States lasted about a fortnight. It was used for further

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debriefing and assessment, but, while useful from the operational handlers' standpoint, the delay raised problems as their charge became impatient:

CAN EASILY CONTINUE DEBRIEFING FOR ANOTHER FEW DAYS ALONG ABOVE LINES. SUBJ IS CARRYING MANY NOTES OUTLINING DETAILS ALL SCD OPS KNOWN TO HIM WHICH HE WANTS TO CARRY PERSONALLY AND PRESENT TO HEADQUARTERS IN ORDER TO AVOID ARRIVING WITH EMPTY HANDS. WORKING ON THIS MATERIAL WILL OCCUPY US PROFITABLY BUT SUBJ NEEDS SOONEST SOME EXPRESSION OF HEADQUARTERS REACTIONS AND PLANS FOR ONWARD MOVEMENT. HIS VIEW OF CURRENT SITUATION IS THAT IT IS NECESSARY TRANSITION. HE WILL NOT UNDERSTAND INDEFINITE DELAY. REMEMBER THAT SUBJ HAS JUST MADE AN ENORMOUS DECISION AND FACED A TURNING POINT IN HIS LIFE. SIMPLY TO MOVE THE LOCALE TO ANOTHER COUNTRY AND SIT WITH THE SAME CASE OFFICERS FULL TIME IN A SAFEHOUSE IS HARDLY WHAT HE EXPECTS. REQUEST URGENTLY THAT HEADQUARTERS PROVIDE SOME RECOGNITION TO SUBJ. AMONG ALTERNATIVES WE CAN SUGGEST ARE:

- A. [CHIEF, SR] TRIP WITH ONE OR TWO DAYS DISCUSSION OF LONG RANGE OPS PLANS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PREPARATIONS FOR ONWARD MOVE . . .

The above cable triggered a visit by Chief, SR. Nothing that happened during this visit modified his already well-formed views. After a conference with the two principal handlers he wrote:

Both . . . were unanimous in their view that Subject was not a genuine defector. His contact with us in Geneva and subsequent defection were, according to these officers, clearly undertaken at the direction of the KGB. I was particularly interested in [one officer's] statement that he had suspected Subject from the very first meeting on the basis of Subject's emotionless and mechanical delivery of his statement announcing his intention to defect.

After my talks with the case officers, I had my first visit with Subject at the safehouse.

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This lasted from 2000 to 2230 and included dinner with Subject and the case officers. Conversation during this first meeting was general in nature and followed no special agenda. However, it did give me an opportunity to take Subject's measure. I started by telling Subject that I had come to form my own impressions of him as a person and an intelligence officer who desired to place his knowledge and experience at the disposal of the United States government. I added that I wished to determine for myself why Subject had come to the West, a most serious step which neither we nor Subject should underestimate in terms of its lasting effect on Subject's own life and those of his family left behind. Subject rose to this opening by first assuring me in a most fawning manner that he, as an intelligence officer, fully understood the need for a senior officer to make his own judgments on the spot. He then went on to explain his motivation for first contacting us, his reasons for defecting and his intense desire to collaborate with us in Soviet operations since he has no specialty other than intelligence. These remarks were repetitious of his original statements delivered in the same mechanical fashion, the major difference being that Subject was intensely nervous at the outset, calming down only after it appeared that I was accepting his statements at face value.

By the end of the evening I had come to the same conclusions reached by [the principal handlers]. The totality of our conclusions are treated in detail in a separate memorandum. However, in reaching them, I was beset by a sense of irritation at the KGB's obvious conviction they could pull off an operation like this successfully and by a feeling of distaste for the obvious and transparent manner in which Subject played his role.

Chief, SR's distaste was sufficient to overcome any interest he might otherwise have had in a recruitment opportunity suggested by Nosenko:

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One other subject touched upon . . . was the possible recruitment of Vladimir Suslov, Under-Secretary in the UN Secretariat and top-ranking Soviet in the UN organization . . . Subject [described] Suslov as a playboy who liked liquor and women and who could be easily blackmailed into cooperation for fear of hurting his career in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I objected to the blackmail angle saying that it could cause a tremendous political flap if it backfired. Undaunted, Subject modified his position to assure us that it would not have to be "crude blackmail" in which we would have to get directly involved. I certainly got the impression that Suslov's recruitment is part of the plan and that we would succeed no matter how half-heartedly we tried.

Despite his misgivings, however, Chief, SR remained convinced that the Agency must continue to dissemble:

It will be necessary to maintain an effective degree of secrecy with regard to our knowledge of Subject's true status and our plans to try to secure from him a full confession. If Subject, or the Soviets, become aware of our intentions, we will probably be forced to act prematurely.

With these considerations in mind, he therefore renewed the commitments previously made by the principal case officer:

I informed Subject that I was satisfied that he was genuine. Based on this and assuming his continuing "cooperation," I said we would proceed to make arrangements to bring him to the States. Second, I confirmed our agreement to pay him . . . [financial details follow].

On 12 February, consistent with the above commitments, Nosenko was flown to the Washington area and lodged in a safehouse, under close supervision of the Office of Security. Now that he was in the United States, the Agency (and the US government as a whole) found themselves faced with a seeming dilemma, much more crucial than the problems facing them while he remained abroad.

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The Agency's perception of the dilemma, and the possible solutions to it, are covered in paragraphs 3, 4, 6 and 7 of a memorandum written by Chief, SR and approved by Helms on 17 February 1964:

While admitting that Subject is here on a KGB directed mission, it has been generally agreed by both us and the FBI that he still possesses valid information which we would like to obtain. At the same time, we, at least, believe that Subject must be broken at some point if we are to learn something of the full scope of the KGB plan, the timing for its execution, and the role played by others in it. In addition, we must have this information if we are to decide what countermeasures we should take in terms of counter-propaganda, modifications in our security practices, and planning for future operations against the Soviet target. Admittedly, our desire to continue debriefing to obtain additional information may conflict with the need to break Subject. Clearly, the big problem is one of timing. How long can we keep Subject, or his KGB controllers, ignorant of our awareness of this operation and how long will it take us to assemble the kind of brief we will need to initiate a hostile interrogation in conditions of maximum control?

If we are to proceed along the lines indicated above we should accept in advance the premise that we will not be able to prevent Subject from evading our custody or communicating with the Soviets unless we place him under such physical restraint that it will become immediately apparent to him that we suspect him. This may not be an acceptable risk and if it is not, we should so determine right away and decide on a completely different course of action. If this is to be the case, we should agree to forego additional debriefings, place Subject in escape-proof quarters away from the Washington area under full-time guard and commence hostile debriefing on the basis of the material we already have (although the prospects for success would not be great). Disposal would probably be via Berlin followed by a brief press

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release to the effect that Subject had confessed to being a plant and had been allowed to return to Soviet control. [In the meantime, SR Division would:]

- Advise Subject that during this phase he will continue to live and work in the safehouse and will be escorted at all times when on shopping trips, visits to movies, etc., because of his faulty English and unfamiliarity with the country, customs, etc. While we can explain this regime as needed for his security, we cannot keep him locked up in the house 24 hours a day.
- Provide Subject with "flash" documentation in another name to be carried on his person during excursions from the house. They may also help persuade him he has been accepted.
- Make available to Subject a portion of the [money] promised him which he can use for purchases of clothes, cigarettes, personal effects, etc.
- Agree that whenever this first phase is over (four to six weeks) that he be permitted to take a two-week vacation with escort.

The vacation period will be of greater benefit to us since it will provide us with an opportunity to review and make judgments on the value of the information already obtained and also to consider the progress made in the other aspects of the case outlined below. During the vacation we can decide whether we should proceed to the second phase or are ready to commence hostile interrogation under controlled conditions. If it is the former, we will have to reckon with the need to modify the living and working arrangements for Subject in a way which will inevitably give him some additional freedom. At the same time, we would be expected to move forward with Subject's legalization, i.e., final decision on a name he will use, securing an alien registration card, establishing a bank account, etc. Therefore, it

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will be terribly important to make the proper decision at the end of phase one.

This decision will depend not only on our evaluation of the material obtained during the debriefings but on how far we have been able to go in clarifying other cases which are related to Subject case and form an important part of any explanation of the KGB's goals in this operation.

Thus, Nosenko was surrounded from the first with ambivalence and uncertainty. On the one hand, he was housed in circumstances that his principal day-to-day handler describes as "our typical, luxurious style . . ." He continues by saying that "there was all the food and drink one could possibly want . . . I remember all of the effort and the money we spent to get a billiard table . . ." On the other hand, this handler, who was assigned to this case after having worked on the Golitsyn affair, was told at the outset that Nosenko was "dirty, that he had been sent by the KGB . . ."

Writing of his first meeting with Nosenko on 13 February, the handler recorded his first impressions of Nosenko:

In this brief meeting lasting actually less than two hours, I couldn't prevent myself from putting him in three successive categories. In the first few minutes I put him in the category of a Cuban exile living in the Harlem section of New York City. This impression came to my mind strictly on the basis of his clothing (dark trousers and sport shirt, black elevated shoes, sharply pointed and with a design) and his mannerisms . . .

Half way through the session I put him in the category of a big city but small-time con man. While dictating . . . from his notes, he knew exactly what he wanted to say and how he wanted to say it. But when I had brief conversations with him on other topics, or when I saw him stealing glances in my direction to size me up, I could almost see the con man's wheels turning rapidly in his head. I had an urge to check my wallet just to make sure it was still safe.

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As the session ended and we moved into the living room I put him in a third category. Before leaving the debriefing room I noticed how he touched [another case officer] on the shoulder. When [that case officer] went downstairs for a few minutes, [Nosenko] and I walked into the living room. During that brief walk I decided to give him a President Johnson handshake (hand and elbow grasp, Texas style) on departure and a few sincere words about how pleased I was to meet and talk with him, but his actions soon changed my mind. As soon as we reached the middle of the living room he gave me an unexpected and prolonged hug around the shoulders and waist, the type that one man gives another well known to him only after some achievement such as making the decisive point in a football game. His embrace really took me by surprise and I had to pull away from him without hurting his feelings. At this point I realized that I couldn't go through with the President Johnson handshake; he'd have to settle for less. In this, the third category, I saw him as a jazz musician who sells heroin on the side and has homosexual tendencies.

A week later, on 20 February, however, the handler reported more favorable impressions, those of the Office of Security personnel assigned to guard Nosenko at the safehouse:

Subject is not at all concerned about his own security or the threat of assassination or kidnapping. He seems to think the present security system is fine . . . [This was in marked contrast to Golitsyn's behavior.]

Subject is not a heavy drinker and is never "under the influence" . . .

Subject is not a heavy smoker . . .

At mealtime Subject sits at the dining table with the guards and acts as if he is one of the boys. He does not sit at the head of the table but to the side. He always offers the

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boys a drink, asks them to take more food, and kids them . . .

He does not play cards, has shown no interest in chess, and has not mentioned checkers. He does not gamble and doesn't seem to have any hobby or inside activity to keep himself busy. He has shown a desire to play pool . . .

Subject does not say anything for or against the USSR or the Communist Party. Even when viewing the Olympics on TV Subject never once commented on how good the Soviets were and how poor a showing the Americans made. The same could not be said for . . . [Golitsyn] . . . On the contrary Subject wants to be an American as soon as possible.

Subject's sexual desires appear to be normal . . . Subject has made several joking references to their all going together to a house of prostitution . . . Subject definitely wants a woman and the sooner the better . . .

Subject has not commented one way or another, for or against, any person associated with him, including the housekeepers. Compared with other cases he is ideal. He is polite, likes to kid, doesn't have a drinking problem, doesn't have a mental problem, and wants to become an American and work like and with Americans as soon as possible.

Subject became angry only once and even then it was not a loss of temper in the true sense. The day that [the principal case officer] discussed the schedule with him, Subject became moody and started to drink alone. He told the guards that he wants to use his brains and work hard as Americans do. He feels that the present schedule does not utilize his talent to the fullest.

The "schedule" referred to above had been outlined to Nosenko in a 17 February meeting, during which the principal case officer had assured him that "both [Chief, SR] and myself are enthusiastically optimistic about

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future cooperation with him in operations against the USSR." Nosenko greeted plans for a period devoted to systematic debriefing with the statement that this "might represent an attempt to extract all his information from him, after which he would not be needed." He also said he needed a vacation at "an early date in order to help him forget and get over the strain and worry of his abrupt change of situation, particularly the strain of leaving his family behind."

E. The Problem of Disposition

Far from being optimistic about our "cooperation" with Nosenko, SR Division was discussing the possibility of forcibly returning him to the Soviets if the "overall effort to break him" came to naught. In addition, an alternative plan was being developed for the incarceration of Nosenko, so that "there can be no question of [his] escaping after he becomes aware of our attitude." Finally, it was agreed that Golitsyn, who had meanwhile recognized Nosenko as the author of the ostensible "anonymous letter" of 26 June 1962, would be brought into the operation to back up our interrogation. Helms originally had some misgivings about this procedure but appears eventually to have agreed to giving Golitsyn "full access" to material from Nosenko, but not to Nosenko himself.

The FBI viewed Nosenko much more favorably than did CIA. As early as 8 February 1964, Chief, CI had sent a cable reading in part:

. . . . [FBI liaison officer] STATED . . . . THAT  
FRIEND OF HIS WHO IS EXPERT IN, FBI QUICKLY  
SCANNED AEFOTROT PRODUCTION AND CAUTIONED  
US THAT "IT LOOKS VERY GOOD" IN TERMS OF CASES  
KNOWN TO THEM.

Later, in a memorandum to Helms on 9 March, Chief, SR stated that "the FBI personnel on the case have so far indicated they believe Subject to be a genuine KGB defector." By implication, both Chief, SR and Chief, CI regarded this divergence of view as a serious problem. Their concern is understandable, because a subsequent paragraph of the Chief, SR memorandum contained plans for the following action, to be initiated around 1 April

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1964, which would not be appropriate if CIA were forced, as a result of inter-agency consultations, to treat Nosenko as a bona fide defector:

a. Subject to be moved to a high security safehouse under maximum guard.

b. The DCI to inform the President, Secretary of State, Director, FBI, and USIB principals that Subject is a KGB plant whom we intend to return to Soviet control after (1) trying to break him, and (2) publicizing his case.

c. Retain Subject incommunicado for about three weeks during which time we will continue efforts to break him.

d. At the same time, commence the publicity campaign which will precede Subject's deportation. As a first step, there will be a brief official announcement probably by a State Department spokesman to the effect that Subject has confessed to having faked his defection at KGB direction in order (1) to penetrate US intelligence and security agencies, and (2) to discredit the act of defection by Soviet citizens. At the same time, a press backgrounder will be made available which will characterize this KGB operation as an act of desperation following a decade of defection and disloyalty to the regime on the part of a score of senior Soviet intelligence officers . . .

F. Erratic Behavior and Its Aftermath

While planning was going on for his confinement and hostile interrogation, Nosenko was taken on a trip for two weeks' relaxation, beginning on 12 March. During this period, his consumption of alcohol was enormous, and his behavior became increasingly erratic. Prior to his departure, he had on several occasions been violent; on one occasion he took a swipe with his fist at the principal case officer and on another tried to strangle one of the Office of Security escorts.

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The handler who spent the first part of the vacation with Nosenko recorded these impressions:

In my opinion Subject is under extreme tension and pressure. Any man who skips breakfast and starts the day off with alcohol is on his way to becoming an alcoholic. He drinks not for the enjoyment of it, but with an attempt to erase or lessen problems of a serious nature. I suspect that these tensions are the result of two things: one, fear on his part that he cannot follow through with his assignment; and, two, his homosexual desires. I predict that the situation will not improve but grow worse.

Yet the handler concluded on the following note:

Despite our oral arguments and the various incidents we experienced, Subject and I parted on the best of terms. He gave me an affectionate embrace on the night of my departure, and in front of [the principal case officer] thanked me for my attention to his needs and patience in dealing with him. We agreed to see each other upon his return to Washington.

During the last half of the vacation, the principal case officer arrived and took charge of the escort team. Nosenko was more restrained in his presence than he had been previously, but the principal case officer had no success in eliciting information from him during this period. Not only was Nosenko uninformative, according to the principal case officer, but he was also very tense and unable to sleep more than a few hours at a time.

Although debriefing was resumed upon returning to Washington, it cannot have been very successful. Nosenko was still drinking enormously and had by now discovered unfettered night life; it is doubtful that he was physically able to respond meaningfully to interrogation during the day.

On 30 March 1964, Chief, SR wrote a memorandum to Helms entitled "Final Phase Planning," which Helms initialed and returned without written comment. Inter alia, Chief, SR had this to say:

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We have concluded that there is little to be gained by prolonging the status quo beyond next weekend and every reason to suspect that if Subject learns we doubt him, he will try to escape. Accordingly, we have instructed the security guards to be alert to any attempts on Subject's part to elude them . . .

Further scheduling must depend in considerable degree on the results of the interrogation. However, since we do not anticipate that Nosenko will ever break to the point of becoming completely cooperative, and since we must assume that within five or six days after the confrontation begins, news of our action will have leaked out through the briefings (however necessary they may have been), we should be ready to take this action:

Have State Department spokesman issue low key statement indicating that Nosenko is plant with mission to seek out and report on bona fide defectors living in the United States.

Mail letter in Moscow (or from Helsinki to Moscow) addressed to Lieutenant General Oleg Mikhailovich Gribanov which makes it clear that we were on to operation all along but also that choice of Nosenko as key figure in operation was a mistake. To emphasize latter point include as an attachment a description of Nosenko behavior. This would be couched in dry, almost clinical, language . . . Aside from the not inconsiderable satisfaction we will have in preparing it, this letter will serve to dissuade the Soviets from an overly hasty reaction to our press stories and should also make them reasonably anxious to get Nosenko back to determine what happened.

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Since failure to "break" Nosenko--i.e., force him to admit that he had come to us not as a genuine defector but as a KGB-dispatched agent--was considered virtually certain, plans were also being laid to return him to the Soviet authorities. Before doing this, however, it would be necessary to:

. . . Discuss with Legal Counsel the legal problems which might be encountered in arranging Nosenko's deportation. The simplest method still appears to be [flying him] to Tempelhof in Berlin. Thence to S-Bahnhof Tiergarten where Subject, in his best civilian clothes, with diplomatic passport, would be placed on an S-Bahn which then stops inside East Berlin only at the control point S-Bahnhof Friedrichstrasse.

G. The Decision to Incarcerate

Although Nosenko had already contributed considerable intelligence of value (see Chapter IV), including information that led directly to the arrest of Vassall in 1962, there is no indication in the files from this period that the possibility of his being a bona fide defector was given any credence whatsoever, either within the Agency or in discussions with other parts of the government.

On the contrary, Nosenko was treated as one whose guilt had been established. Nevertheless, even while Chief, SR was registering with certainty his lack of hope for a favorable resolution, plans were drawn up for an "arrest," strict confinement, and hostile interrogation.

The long-delayed polygraph evaluation was administered on 4 April 1964. It did not, however, take place under standard conditions. In his report of 8 April 1964, the polygraph operator stated:

During the pre-polygraph conferences with representatives of SR Division, the undersigned was informed that the polygraph interview was part of an overall plan to help break Subject and elicit the truth from him. SR Division's

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instructions were that, regardless of whether Subject passed his polygraph test or not, he was to be informed at the termination of his polygraph interview that he was lying, and had not passed his polygraph interview.

## H. First Polygraph Examination

To raise Nosenko's level of apprehension and reduce his supposed defenses against the polygraph interrogation technique, an additional mechanism was also attached to him, which he was told was an electroencephalograph (EEG). Chief, SR later commented that "Nosenko was completely confident of the polygraph when told that it would be used until he discovered that an electroencephalograph was used at the same time. The unexpected addition of the EEG to the polygraph was successful and materially aided the interrogators. Nosenko proved to be an excellent reactor . . . "

Despite the unusual circumstances surrounding the examination, the polygraph operator's conclusions, as stated in his report of 8 April 1964, were categorical:

It is the undersigned's conclusion that Subject is not a bona fide defector, but is a dispatched agent sent by Soviet Intelligence for a specific mission or missions.

According to the pre-agreed upon plan, the different phases involving various pertinent areas were covered with Subject polygraphically. Challenge of Subject's reactions was indirect and "soft." On no occasion did Subject even attempt to volunteer any explanation of the possible causes for his polygraph reactions. He continually denied and refused to admit that there was anything to any of the questions which were asked of him. When the final test questions were completed and a record was obtained of all of Subject's polygraphic responses, the nature of the challenge and probing was changed.

Subject was told that he was lying to numerous pertinent questions and was accused of being

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a dispatched agent. Subject's only explanation to the undersigned's direct accusation was that he could not be a dispatched agent because of the amount of information he had volunteered to American Intelligence.

Subject, who before and throughout testing reflected complete self-control and composure, now exhibited a completely different picture. His composure was nonexistent, his eyes watered, and his hands trembled. Prior to being confronted with the undersigned's opinion that Subject was a dispatched agent, when Subject was asked on one of the last test runs (a) if he was sent to penetrate American Intelligence, and (b) if Subject received instructions from the KGB on how to attempt to beat the polygraph, his answers were given in a voice that actually trembled.

After completion of the interview, the SR representative at the safesite was informed, in front of Subject, of the undersigned's opinion that Subject was lying and was a dispatched Soviet agent. The Subject was taken into protective custody and escorted to his new place of residence.

Once arrived at the place of confinement, Nosenko was confronted by the principal case officer who broke the news that Nosenko had been under suspicion since 1962. The record of the meeting, a stormy one, is too long to reproduce here, but the following excerpt will convey its tone:

Principal case officer:

. . . Everything you have said in 1962 and 1964 is prepared, based on disinformation . . . All disinformation is true in parts. That's all right, we know that. Now if we can talk--what I want to do is talk the real truth . . . We want to talk about the operation which sent you and others to us . . .

Nosenko: (In Russian) . . . I don't understand. What has happened? What has happened? What's the matter? I don't understand.

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Principal case officer:

What happened in 1962?

Nosenko: What happened in general?

Principal case officer:

Your operation was known from the beginning.

Nosenko: (In Russian) I can't understand anything. I give you my word, but then my word means nothing to you. I can't understand anything. All that I could do I tried to do. I tried to do it for my soul.

Chief, SR reported these subsequent developments as he saw them to Helms on 7 April:

The results of the polygraph were reviewed with the DDP on the basis of our sessions on 6 April with the polygraph examiner. He obtained significant reactions on those areas in which we were convinced Subject was withholding information or passing deception but also uncovered for us that Subject is somehow concerned about his biography.

The first interrogation after the polygraph was conducted on the afternoon of 6 April . . . [We] monitored the interrogation through a two-way mirror in an adjoining room. It was agreed before beginning this first interrogation that its purpose was to determine whether or not Subject would respond to questions or simply clam up after making some sort of statement. The areas we planned to hit as tests were some of those on which we knew he was passing deception material.

We were all gratified by the fact that Subject was ready and eager to explain himself and in responding to questions under tense cross-examination, particularly with regard to the sourcing of some of his information, he became quite erratic, contradicted himself many times and became upset physically.

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As a result of this session, we know that Subject can be thrown off balance by aggressive questioning in those areas which we know to be important parts of the entire KGB operation. Thus, we will continue along these lines for several days with a specific interrogation plan mapped out for each session.

At the end of the first interrogation session, Subject noted that he had not harmed the United States in any way and that if we did not believe him, he would consider going to a third country because as he put it, "I could not return to the USSR." When we begin the next session with him, we will tell him that his statement with respect to not having harmed the US is erroneous. We will refer to his direct participation in the Barghoorn case and to the fact that his very mission itself is directed against US internal security. If he again raises the third country approach (but only if he raises it), we will advise him that were he to go to a third country at some point in the future that country would be fully apprised to our information concerning his mission to the West and the details of his personal behavior.

Whether Helms was informed of the peculiar conditions under which the polygraph was administered cannot be ascertained from the record. Chief, SR simply told him that the examiner had "obtained significant reactions" and that "Subject can be thrown off balance . . . ." In this connection, it is useful to note here that, in a number of documents related to this case, this polygraph examination is referred to as valid evidence of Nosenko's duplicity, without giving the reader any hint of the unusual circumstances surrounding it. Even in the lengthy study of February 1967 (commonly referred to as "the thousand-page paper"), and in the shorter "green book" formally published in February 1968, one finds no cautionary notes. To put in perspective the developments of this case, both those already reported and those still to come, we shall therefore jump ahead briefly to quote from a formal Office of Security report covering a review of the 1964 examination. The senior of the three polygraph specialists who reviewed it stated his conclusions as follows, in a memorandum dated 1 November 1966:

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Even without the review by reviewing examiners, I considered the formal report dated 8 April 1964 to have been in error in that the conclusions reached in the case were a gross misinterpretation of the extent to which the reactions added up. In fact, in some instances the Subject was deemed to be lying when it is known he was telling the truth. With the review by the reviewing examiners, I can conclude only that the initial examiner did exactly what the requestor asked; i.e., he was told to collect reactions and he did. The fact that reactions were not consistent (and indeed may not have occurred) was not important since it had already been decided Subject was wrong and the polygraph was used only to support his decision.

I. Incarceration and Interrogation

Many aspects of this case did not go according to plan, but one that did was the incarceration of Nosenko. An Office of Security representative who periodically guarded Nosenko from November 1964 to May 1968, when questioned on 21 July 1976, described the regime as follows:

Security Officer (SO):

While he was [incarcerated], he was being held in a room in an old safehouse down there . . . it was an attic room . . . and he was afforded 24 hours visual custody observance by the security team.

Q: What does visual custody observance mean? You mean there's somebody in the room with him?

SO: No, the room had a special door. The top half of the door was a metal screen type where we were actually positioned outside the door on a 24-hour basis. There were two security escorts on duty 24 hours a day, and we were instructed to maintain visual observance of him--just observe his activities.

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Q: Now, what was the purpose of visually observing him 24 hours a day?

SO: Apparently to see that he made no attempts to escape, made no attempts to injure himself. There were never any problems along these lines.

For much of his confinement, the principal break in a day's monotony occurred when Nosenko was under interrogation. It is not necessary here to cover the various interrogations in detail; suffice it to say that, although they were conducted fitfully, with bursts of activity followed by long periods of quiescence, almost every technique of interrogation short of physical violence was either tried or at least considered. A few of the high points will be summarized in the succeeding paragraphs.

After he "failed" his polygraph on 6 April 1964, Nosenko was interrogated on an almost daily basis for nearly three weeks. During this period a participant commented that "we have received daily support for our conviction that Subject was sent on a KGB mission . . ." and by 25 April the interrogators concluded:

We have gone about as far as the time permitted for the "information gathering" phase of the interrogation will allow . . . The task now is to sort out and analyze the results of the past three weeks of interrogation, to mark out the strong and the weak portions of Subject's story, and to plan the strategy and tactics of the next phase . . . In the meantime, Subject will be given a short haircut to dramatize his situation, and a week or so without interrogations to emphasize our willingness to keep his [sic] indefinitely and to heighten his tensions.

Meanwhile, Golitsyn had been brought into the case and was being employed as a behind-the-scenes consultant in connection with the interrogations. Golitsyn was given for analysis voluminous material relating to the case and was told that "one of the most perplexing aspects of the Nosenko case to us at the present time is not whether he was sent (we all certainly agree with your view that he was sent on a mission) but the exact nature

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of his service with the KGB." Golitsyn's role will be covered more thoroughly in a separate chapter.

To ensure cooperation in the interrogation, an "Outline of Action to be Taken Should Subject Refuse to Answer Requirements" was drawn up on 25 August 1964. The tenor of this outline, which essentially set the basic policy of the incarceration until late 1967, is conveyed by the following excerpt:

Should Subject refuse to answer the case officer's questions, Subject will be returned to his cell at a time chosen by the case officer, there will be no further conversations between Subject and the guards except that which is absolutely necessary, and the case officer will notify Chief, SR. At the case officer's discretion, Subject may lose his cigarette privileges immediately. Each day for an indefinite period the case officer will return and begin a session with Subject. If Subject refuses each day to discuss the questions, he will lose an additional privilege in the following order: cigarettes, table, chair, reading material, ruler, paper and pencil. In no case, however, will any of these privileges be removed except with the prior approval of Chief, SR.

The basic policy to be followed during interrogations was outlined even more fully in a lengthy memorandum of 2 November 1964. Like all other documents on this subject, it assumed that Nosenko was lying and had to be "trapped":

How the Interrogation will be Begun: Subject will initially be confronted only by interrogators already known to him. They will begin detailed and apparently routine questioning on carefully selected operations or other aspects of the 1960-1962 period. This time, however, the interrogators will be prepared to stick doggedly to the particular subject. They will probe deeper and deeper for detail, never allowing Subject to dismiss them with such statements as "that is the way it was" or "that is all I remember." We would prefer to begin in this way so that Subject will already be under

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pressure, cornered and in trouble by the time he realizes that this is not a routine questioning but the climax of his long period of detention. In view of Subject's personality, one psychologist believes that Subject would otherwise welcome this climax and sharpen his wits for a final battle to hoodwink us and regain his freedom.

Position Into Which Subject is to be Put:

Once Subject has been trapped and cornered a few times, the basic theme of the interrogation will be put to him. He has protested his sincerity and desire to convince us of his truth. He must do this now; otherwise he is here to stay. He can only talk his way out by convincing us. In fact, he has shown in the present session and over the past months that he is unable to support his legend. He simply does not know the facts that anyone in his alleged position would have to know. We will confront him with our collateral knowledge, and insist that he answer our questions and prove his point. As he repeatedly fails to do so, he will be repeatedly accused of lying and of proving what we already know: that the entire service in the American Department was a clumsy fabrication, and he must confess it in order to get out.

Interrogation Guides: We will identify every detailed weakness, contradiction and omission in his stories, line them up with care according to priorities designed for maximum impact on Subject, and prepare interrogation briefs accordingly . . .

The Question of Attacking Him Personally or Placing the Blame on his KGB Superiors: In planning this interrogation we have examined two alternative methods of approach: (1) to attempt to destroy his own self-confidence by attacking him personally, exploiting our knowledge of his weaknesses and misbehavior, or (2) to pin the ultimate blame on his superiors, who sent him out under serious misapprehensions and with inadequate briefing. Psychologists who have

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examined Subject agree that he is pathologically self-centered. Since his own pride and his illusions of infallibility may constitute his last bulwark of self-protection, he may resist us more doggedly in this area than any other. The other course seems best. As he increasingly fails to answer our questions, we will point out to him the inadequacy of his briefing and the stupidity and fraud of which he has been made a victim. We will confront him with actual incidences which he must know about and then ask him for details. Over and over again, we will demonstrate and emphasize how inadequate his training and preparation was. We will demonstrate to Subject that the KGB consciously and callously sent him on an impossible mission and purposefully deceived him about the information that Subject himself considers the most important to the establishment of his bona fides . . .

The possible outcomes foreseen as a result of the interrogation were also based on the assumption that he had been lying about his reasons for coming to us:

Full Success: If Subject confesses fully, he will have broken with the KGB and will become dependent upon us for his security and well-being. After full debriefing and establishment of bona fides he will presumably be returned to a conventional safehouse and a life similar to the January to April 1964 period in which he will be permitted to go out with a security escort while we continue his exploitation and plan his future.

Partial Success: If Subject makes significant admissions and falls back on a second level cover story, he will be kept in the present safehouse. His personal circumstances and intensity of interrogation will be determined by the situation obtaining at that time.

Failure: If the interrogation fails, we would plan to put him "on ice" for a period, then interrogate him again. For this interim period, Subject would be transferred to visibly more

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permanent and more secure quarters. From the makeshift physical set up of his present quarters, the large number of guards who rotate weekly and the round-the-clock visual observation by two guards, it is obvious to Subject that his quarters (and therefore his situation) is temporary. As long as he knows that, he can hope. Our only hope of breaking Subject will be to allow him to convince himself that he has got into a situation from which he can extricate himself only by cooperating. This could be best achieved by breaking sharply with the present situation, placing him in permanent quarters, preferably remote and more primitive than his present quarters, physically secure and resembling jail, and capable of being manned by a minimum of guard personnel who would not keep him under constant direct visual observation. No Headquarters case officer would visit him, until he has given sign that he has changed his mind. This period would last for several months, pending another attempt to break him based on information obtained in the interim.

J. Elaboration of the Plot Theory

The stringency of the rules governing treatment of Nosenko varied from time to time, but the general trend was to take an ever harder line towards him. Since it was assumed that he was a KGB-dispatched agent, he could only satisfy his interrogators by admitting that such was the case. But, while he would from time to time attempt to placate his questioners with admissions of having lied or incorrectly reported certain past events, he would never admit to the key accusation of being KGB-controlled. The inevitable result was not only greater harshness toward him but a gradually spreading suspicion in regard to other agents, past and present, who seemed in any way to support his bona fides. This development is mirrored in a memorandum that the principal case officer wrote after a visit with Helms on 19 November 1964:

In connection with Nosenko, Mr. Helms referred to it as one of the greatest time consumers he had ever seen. I remarked that I felt the time was well spent since our examination of this

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case had opened our eyes not only to security threats in our own midst and within the US government, but also had revealed that many other important sources were in fact KGB provocations and in fact that our entire counterintelligence effort, double agents and all, may be contaminated and useless.

According to the theory being developed, no Soviet or Soviet Bloc agent was immune from suspicion if his reporting tended to confirm anything that Nosenko had said. Agents who were then currently producing intelligence, not only for CIA but also for the FBI and certain European intelligence services, all came under heavy suspicion. The single exception was Golitsyn. The latter, although he had confirmed Nosenko's identity (which had itself been in doubt at one point) as well as his affiliation with the KGB, also contributed the elaborate rationale according to which the KGB was sacrificing Nosenko and a host of other agents and operations to protect even more important, if somewhat nebulous, assets and plans. Golitsyn thus became the touchstone against whom the trustworthiness of all other agents was judged.

Because Nosenko refused to "break," however, it was hard to adduce proof of Golitsyn's theory substantial enough to convince Helms, the FBI, and other officials and organizations not so deeply committed to the theory. A lengthy paper on SR/CI's findings on this subject was always in the offing but was continually delayed; it did not finally materialize until February 1967. On the other hand, no one had at his fingertips the vast array of facts, and suppositions masquerading as facts, on which the case was based. The theory was therefore difficult to challenge; there may even have been reluctance to do so, because the main proponents of the disinformation theory frequently referred to unhappy consequences that would flow from abandoning the course upon which the Agency had embarked. Should the Agency change course, for example, by simply returning Nosenko to Soviet hands, terrible, though ill-defined, consequences would certainly ensue. As the principal case officer said (again to his 20 November 1964 memorandum of conversation with Helms):

I pointed out the potential dangers of returning Nosenko unscathed and within a short time.

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I thought the KGB would be . . . concerned [by implication, amazed and delighted] only by the fact that a defector thrust into our mits [sic] could expect such an easy fate if uncovered.

## K. Life in a Vault

The unforeseen stubbornness of Nosenko had meanwhile brought SR Division to an impasse from which there was but one escape--the more-or-less permanent incarceration of Nosenko. Nothing that the latter said would be believed except the one admission that he steadfastly refused to make (i.e., that he had been dispatched by the KGB), and, although Helms wanted to solve the problem thus created by simply turning Nosenko back to the Soviets, this solution was resisted by the division. The upshot was that, on 27 November 1964, Chief, SR wrote:

. . . If he fails to convince us (which he can't) and refuses to confess what we already know, the US government has every intention of protecting itself against this dangerous provocation by detaining him indefinitely.

The decision was therefore taken, with Helms' approval, to build a new detention facility. The cell constructed for Nosenko's occupancy was essentially a vault enveloped by a barracks-type building. Its projected amenities were described as follows:

- a. Small cell with concrete floor and ceiling and walls lined with metal.
- b. No electrical outlets in the cell, lighting to be recessed and grilled and controlled from the day room.
- c. No window in the cell.
- d. One entrance to the cell which will be of the metal bar type with an exterior door in front of this and a sliding panel in the exterior door which will permit a complete view of the cell area. Plexiglass will be used in the observation panel rather than glass.

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e. A toilet facility which will adjoin the cell and contain a shower, basin and commode. With the exception of the commode, which will be the prison push-button type, all controls will be in the day room area and will also contain a plexiglass observation port with a sliding panel on the exterior.

f. An exercise area just outside the nearest door which will be fenced and screened (so that Nosenko can only look up and see only the sky).

As the new installation neared completion, Chief, SR on 15 June 1965 wrote Helms:

We believe that we have gone just about as far as normal interrogation techniques will take us, and that the time has come to prepare Subject for his move to the ostensibly permanent detention site . . . It will be ready for occupancy on or about 1 August. Chief, SR/CI visited the site on 11 June and reports that the installation is excellent from every point of view.

Before returning the memorandum, Helms penned a marginal note next to the above paragraph: "I would like both you and [Chief, CI] to examine this site."

If Helms had had any doubt about the site's suitability, he must have been reassured by a 28 July 1965 memorandum addressed to him by the Director of Security:

On Tuesday, 27 July, the Chief, CI Staff, the Chief, SR Division and the undersigned [inspected] the newly constructed special detention facility . . . As you know, . . . it is planned to utilize this facility to hold AEFOXTROT for an indefinite period . . .

By mid-August, the time had come for Nosenko's transfer. The events surrounding it are recounted in a 19 August 1965 memorandum for the record:

As planned, . . . [the principal case officer] had a brief "confrontation scene" with Subject

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on the same evening, immediately prior to his removal to new quarters. The purpose of this session was not to deliver a new message of any sort, or to give Subject "another chance to confess"; everything that could be said had already been said by . . . the previous interrogators, and there was no doubt that Subject understood perfectly well the meaning and importance of what had been said to him; also, it was recognized that Subject would sense an impending move or change of some sort, and that it was inevitable that he would hope that the change would be for the better until he saw otherwise. The purpose of the confrontation was rather to close the circle: to show him that although [the principal case officer] had not seen him for over a year nothing had changed, and nothing would change until he told the truth. An additional effect would be to emphasize that the interrogators who had worked with him in the interim were fully responsible and authoritative, and that just as Subject had been told when he was first locked up in April 1964, what he was up against was the collapse of the operation in which he was involved. Finally, [the principal case officer] would stress . . . that the "investigation is closed" and that Subject had only prolonged and total isolation to look forward to now unless and until he decides to confess.

The meeting took place just about as planned. It lasted for 15 minutes only (2100 to 2115) and was essentially a formality, although it is hoped that Subject will have reason to reflect on it in the months ahead. As can be seen from the attached summary transcript, Subject did not display any hesitancy or indecision, and his answers and statements were made in a mechanical manner.

The 19 August memorandum concludes:

Immediately upon termination of the interview with [the principal case officer], Subject was blindfolded and led out of the house according to the prearranged plan. He was clearly frightened,

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but did not put up the slightest resistance. The move to the new quarters took place exactly as planned.

The new detention facility had been designed and staffed with the intention of engendering in Nosenko a feeling of hopelessness, from which the only escape would be through confession that he was a KGB agent and revelation of the full details of how he had been briefed and dispatched by the Soviet authorities. With the exception of being allowed certain books, carefully selected for him by SR Division, Nosenko was confined under conditions that were as close to stimulus-free as was consistent with maintaining him in good physical health. For example, the TV used by the guards was fitted with earphones, so that there was no risk of his overhearing snatches of dialogue. The principal case officer was assured, in answer to an inquiry, that "while he does note planes going overhead as well as animal noises from the woods during exercise periods, everything else . . . is excluded." As to the guards, if Nosenko were to attempt to open conversation with them on any subject, "the guards should instruct him in rude terms to shut up."

At this point, we must pause to consider for the moment how the period that follows is to be covered. Because there were long periods of time when no human being other than the guards was in contact with Nosenko, and because he was not allowed to keep a diary, the story of his sojourn from August 1965 to October 1967 does not lend itself easily to narrative presentation.

Yet this period cannot be ignored. It constituted over half of Nosenko's solitary confinement. And that three-and-a-half-year period amounts to five percent of the total life span of a man who lives to be 70.

Obviously, then, this period will weigh heavily in the findings made at the conclusion of our study. For these findings to be valid, they must be made on the basis of as much empirical evidence as can be gathered. Because the effect on Nosenko of this long period of confinement can only be dealt with speculatively, such few remarks as we have on that subject will be

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confined to the relatively discursive chapter on "Psychological and Medical Findings." Within the body of Chapter III, we are limiting ourselves to coverage of the main recorded events, none of which are seen through the eyes of Nosenko himself.

We now resume our narrative.

On 13 August 1965, before Nosenko was locked into his cell for the first time, he was read the following instructions, which outlined the basic rules to be followed from then on:

Cell

This is your cell. You are to keep it clean and will be given cleaning materials for this purpose.

Reading Privilege

You will be permitted one book a week which you may retain in your cell.

Smoking Privilege

You will receive a daily cigarette ration.

Exercising Privilege

Every day, weather and other factors permitting, you will have an exercise period.

Writing Material

Writing material will be provided only for correspondence with the appropriate authorities concerning your confession.

Schedule

This prison operates on a schedule. You will become familiar with this schedule and adhere to it at all times.

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Within the framework of the above rules, which were strictly enforced, Nosenko's only diversion was reading the one book per week that he was at first allowed. He did not even have the distraction of being questioned, for, when queried by Helms on 12 January 1966, Chief, SR stated that no one from SR Division had seen Nosenko since the beginning of his confinement there, five months earlier.

On 1 November 1965, his privileges began to be reduced, for reasons that are not always clear from the record. From that date on, for instance, he no longer received books to read, and for minor acts of indiscipline, soap, towel and toothbrush were temporarily denied him.

Some time in January or February 1966, Nosenko claimed to be suffering from auditory hallucinations. In a memorandum dated 18 February 1966, Chief, SR reported:

. . . There are hopeful signs that the isolation is beginning to have an effect on Subject. ([A doctor's] visit may have had further impact in this direction when [the doctor] told Subject that his visit constituted an "annual" physical exam; as he left Subject's room, [the doctor] also remarked, "I'll see you next year." Subject's reaction was visible.)

Now we have just received further confirmation of the development of Subject's attitude. On the evening of 16 February 1966, he shouted for a few seconds in English, apparently to guards, that he would commit suicide and kept repeating, "You'll see. You'll see." He asked to see the local "doctor" (he has been told that the medical technician at the base is a doctor), but the guards told him it was too late in the evening. When the technician came the following day, 17 February, Subject talked at some length about his worries that he might be going mad. He has repeatedly stressed his belief that he is being drugged, but said on this occasion that he recognized that there are no drugs designed to make a person mad. Consequently, he said, he was concerned about the fact that during the past day or two he had heard voices

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emanating from various objects, such as his shoe and his spoon, the engine of an aircraft overhead, and a bird in a nearby tree. When questioned, he said that the voices were saying in English "first die" while the bird was saying "kid." He asked if the "doctor" considered him insane. He was told that he did not appear to be so, upon which he reiterated, his worries and spoke of his desire to die. He expressed his recognition that his present circumstances do not afford means to commit suicide.

Nosenko's alleged hallucinations triggered a special meeting on 24 February 1966. The resultant memorandum for the record, written by a member of SR/CI, is worth quoting at length:

Representatives of SR Division, the Office of Security, and the Medical Staff met in the SR Conference Room from approximately 1400 to 1430 hours this date to discuss recent incidents in Nosenko's behavior and a forthcoming examination of Nosenko by [a doctor] . . . The undersigned entered the Conference Room after discussions had begun, so some of the initial remarks are not noted here.

[An Agency psychiatrist] first described to those present his examination of Nosenko on 21 January 1966 and stated his opinion, based on observations made at that time, that the recent outbursts by Nosenko and his threats of suicide are all contrived and do not represent an involuntary reaction on his part. Nosenko's recent behavior started with suicide threats, then progressed to auditory hallucinations, and has now reached the stage where every inanimate object in his environment, including the trees and the wind outdoors, are talking to him. [The psychiatrist] expressed his view that, if Nosenko actually does hear voices, it could normally be expected that they would speak to him in his native language, rather than in English as he told the base medical technician during a recent visit. Nosenko apparently now realizes this ([the

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psychiatrist] didn't describe how, but presumably the technician commented on it to Nosenko) and Nosenko, in [the psychiatrist's] opinion, has now picked this up and is trying to recoup by saying that he now does everything in English--think, speak, everything.

At this point, [the principal case officer] described Nosenko's recently begun word games, in which he takes a Russian word and then figures out as many root derivations as possible, as an illustration of how ridiculous Nosenko's claim is.

[The psychiatrist] continued to say that Nosenko is now agreeing to take medication and is asking for additional medication to help raise his spirits. [The psychiatrist] has told the base medical technician not to answer Nosenko directly, but to "let it be known" to Nosenko that the medication he is now receiving will help him out in this respect. [The psychiatrist] then repeated that he thinks that Nosenko is reacting to his isolation, his lack of human contact, and his environment, but that he is responding in a planned, contrived, and non-spontaneous way, from a psychiatric point of view. [The psychiatrist] added that the only thing that is worrying him at present concerning Nosenko is his possible urinary problem, which is now being look into.

[The principal case officer] next explained to those present that Nosenko's current behavior is consistent with our knowledge of Soviet training in techniques of resisting interrogation and imprisonment. However, because of intelligence and cunning (although he has a fair share of each), Nosenko has made some mistakes. [The principal case officer] agreed that Nosenko is probably feeling the effect of isolation and is making this try to get out. When he finds that this doesn't work, he may eventually decide "to hell with it" and start to talk. . . . [the principal case officer] said that he and [the psychiatrist] agree that, should Nosenko raise the issue of his alleged insanity during the upcoming examination, the best response should

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be to the effect that, if Nosenko actually is going out of his head, the best possible thing for him is isolation, lots of rest, and a place where he can't hurt himself. This is what is usually prescribed and this is, in fact, the situation Nosenko already enjoys. [The principal case officer] added that the wording of any such response would, of course, be up to [the psychiatrist].

In support of the above, [the psychiatrist] then said that he had gone over things very carefully during his January visit and, on this basis, can see no basic change in Nosenko. When [the psychiatrist] arrived at the site he had remarked that he had come for Nosenko's annual physical examination and when he was leaving he told Nosenko that he would see him again next year. In [the psychiatrist's] opinion, Nosenko reacted to this by saying to himself: "How can I get out of here?" He has apparently decided that the best way to escape his present situation is to be sick with something that can't be handled locally and then it will be necessary for him to be moved to a hospital. [The psychiatrist] said that, from Nosenko's point of view, any change will be for the better and agreed with [the principal case officer] that it is important to indicate that there will be none. The simple statement suggested by [the principal case officer] may give Nosenko the message and no further explanation is necessary.

[An Office of Security representative] then asked if, under conditions of prolonged confinement, there is not a chance that a person actually will go off his rocker. [The psychiatrist] replied that this is absolutely so, that this happens in many cases under less stringent conditions of imprisonment, and that the person usually improved quickly when these conditions are relaxed. [The psychiatrist] does not believe however that Nosenko fits in this category.

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[The Office of Security representative] then asked what sort of behavior can be expected in a person who is actually so affected by his imprisonment. Whether he could be expected to become violent or behave erratically. [He] said that he was asking this question from the point of view of his responsibilities for guarding Nosenko. [The psychiatrist] replied that such behavior can take almost any form, that there may be changes in physical behavior, eating and sleeping habits, etc. He added that there certainly has been a change in Nosenko since the January 1966 examination, that he doesn't know for certain what it means, and that there surely is a risk that he may go out of his head. [The principal case officer] pointed out that [the psychiatrist's] remark about the "annual physical" may have triggered this reaction. [The psychiatrist] agreed, saying that while he cannot dismiss true insanity as a real possibility, he doesn't think that this is what is going on right now.

[The Office of Security representative] next commented that Nosenko is again asking for reading material and asked [the principal case officer] if he wanted to give him any. [The principal case officer] replied absolutely not and [the psychiatrist] concurred that no changes should be made. [The Office of Security representative] then asked whether Nosenko has any sort of skin disease, pointing out that the guards have to wash his shirts two or three times to get them clean. Both doctors said that Nosenko is not afflicted as far as they know and [the Office of Security representative] asked whether it is still policy that Nosenko is to have a clean change of clothes only once a week. [The psychiatrist] expressed the opinion that nothing should be changed, at least until after the examination on 1 March.

[The psychiatrist] remarked that things are bound to change as far as Nosenko is concerned-- he is either going to stop faking or things will

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get worse. [The principal case officer] added that we (SR) are working hard on other sources of information, that things seem optimistic right now, and that this is no time to falter. He added that Mr. Helms is keeping current of the situation and goes along fully with present plans, without changes.

[The psychiatrist was] asked what medication Nosenko is now receiving. [The psychiatrist] replied that he is getting 1/4 of a grain of phenobarbital together with an antispasmodic (for gas), which won't have any medical effect on Nosenko's mental state. This is why, he explained, he had instructed the base technician to let Nosenko know that the medication will help him. It can have no real effect and if Nosenko suddenly improves, this will be added confirmation that he is faking.

On 1 March 1966, the principal case officer and SR/CI representative accompanied the two doctors to another examination of Nosenko. One doctor conducted the examination, while the other members of the party observed it on a television screen. None of the four men gave much credence to Nosenko's claim of hearing voices, but the following was noted:

Though Nosenko's mental difficulties are apparently a sham, it is also evident that there has been a change in his outlook since SR last had direct contact with him in August 1965. If by nothing else, this is evidenced by the single fact that he has taken a new tack in his relationship with CIA: He has apparently given up hope that his legend or "another source" can help him escape his predicament and, as [the psychiatrist] earlier proposed, is using his "voices" (except for which Nosenko claims to be sane) to force some sort of change. For the first time in the undersigned's recollection, Nosenko said that he now knows that his CIA handling officers will never (Nosenko's emphasis) believe him because of his behavior and for other reasons, and that there is nothing he can do about it. But, beyond this, it is difficult

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to interpret the significance of his remarks and behavior during [a second doctor's] interview--on one hand there were indications of deterioration; on the other Nosenko is an astute actor, who was clearly playing a role for [that doctor]. Bearing in mind that these superficial indications may well be a part of this act, Nosenko appeared far more subdued, almost despondent, compared with six months ago. For most of the interview, he slouched or sat listlessly in his chair and only seldom did he lean forward and, by the motions of his hands, attempt to reach and to secure the understanding and belief of the interviewer. There appears to be a slight deterioration in his English-language fluency (see transcript below) and his replies were broken by frequent pauses, incomplete sentences, and confusing revisions.

Nosenko's changed outlook next took the form of two letters to the principal case officer, written in mid-April 1966 (although incorrectly dated, because by now his calculation of the passage of time was no longer completely accurate). The first, and briefer of the two, read:

I ask you to excuse me for my baseness in 1962 and 1964. Now I have completely realized all my delinquencies and have reevaluated my past "life."

I want to live an exclusively honest and modest life and I am ready to work in whatever place that it may be possible, taking into account my knowledge of Soviet Russia. I believe that I have sufficient strength to live only a real life.

I ask you to help me.

The second letter was even more self-accusatory, and was clearly modeled after the self-criticisms exacted from prisoners in the Soviet Union. It began:

My despicable behaviour from the beginning of my acquaintance with you in 1962 led to it

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being necessary to create special conditions for me and to assist me, which has finally helped me to realize all my delinquencies and mistakes and to reevaluate all my past "life."

I should have honestly told you everything about myself, about my moral principles and my life in Soviet Russia in order to start a conscientious life in June 1962.

This letter next summarized Nosenko's career from childhood until his arrival in the United States, and admitted that although he had been documented "erroneously" as a lieutenant colonel he had actually never held a military rank higher than captain in the KGB. It concluded:

Work in the KGB was the chief and deciding period of my degradation--drunkenness, debauchery, baseness, and falsehood.

I should have told you all about this in 1962 or in 1964, before flying to America.

I started my life in the United States of America absolutely incorrectly. My behaviour was base, dirty, and boorish.

The creation of isolated living conditions and the appropriate assistance were necessary for me. But I was unable to honestly and directly tell everything about myself in 1964 or in 1965, right up to the last conversation with you. And only in 1966 did I gradually begin to realize and to correctly understand all my mistakes and delinquencies and to think about my behaviour. And only here was I able to reevaluate all my past "life."

Now I can think correctly about real life and work, and therefore I address myself to you because you know me more and better than anyone else, with the request to decide the question of my future life. By work against the Communists, and only with real life, I will try to justify the confidence placed in me.

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The Chief, SR commented:

The letters themselves do not represent a complete break but they reveal that his defenses are weakening and he may be seeking a way out. He tells essentially the same story as before but with more discrepancies of detail which suggest further deterioration and, by this time, an inability to recount his legend consistently. The most significant change is that he now admits he was only a Captain in the KGB and not a Lt. Colonel. On the other hand, this may be a prearranged fall-back position. We recall that [a Soviet agent]--who, in telling us repeatedly in 1964 of the importance of Nosenko, said he was a Lt. Col.--informed [us] in February 1965 (after our doubts about Nosenko had become well known and Nosenko himself had possibly missed pre-arranged contacts with the KGB) that [a Soviet agent] had heard that although Nosenko was a Deputy Department Chief, he was only a Captain and not a Lt. Colonel. On the other hand, there can be no doubt that the rank of Lt. Col. was part of the KGB prepared legend for Nosenko, and not simply his own improvisation. This is proved by the fact that one of the personal documents that Nosenko brought with him to Geneva in 1964 was a TDY travel order which Nosenko claims to have used to travel to Gorkiy . . . [and] was clearly a deliberate plant by the KGB and there can be no question of its being filled out erroneously. Furthermore, the rank was necessary to sustain the fiction of Nosenko's high supervisory positions, which in turn were necessary to explain his access to the information he claims to have.

Aside from the hope they offer for success in breaking Nosenko, the most interesting aspect of the letters is their tone. He does not complain of our treatment of him but on the contrary expresses appreciation for it and says that it was entirely justified. They are the latest in a series of indications that Nosenko is weakening. They follow an attempt to feign insanity, an abortive hunger strike and some erratic behaviour concerning his exercise period.

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We plan to answer him along the lines that we are willing to forgive his "baseness and falsehood" and discuss his rehabilitation but only when he is prepared to drop the legend which he seems to maintain in his letter. If he is, as we think, getting desperate to get out, he may reply with further admissions.

We have clarified the medical questions which were delaying further interrogation. We are now reviewing with Chief, TSD the proposals discussed with you earlier concerning the use of special interrogation techniques. The attached letters afford an ideal opportunity to resume discussions with Nosenko whenever we wish.

(The reference to "special interrogation techniques" harked back to a 13 January 1966 discussion with Helms, during which the latter had stated that "he was inclined to try special techniques on Subject in the hope that they might somehow provide the answers we are seeking." In this context, "special techniques" was a euphemism for the use of drugs as aids in interrogation. As will be shown later, although Helms was willing to discuss the use of such techniques in this case, he in fact never gave his consent and they were never employed. Nevertheless, the use of drugs for interrogation purposes seems to have been contemplated for some time, since it is foreseen in handwritten notes made by the principal case officer as early as November 1964, and Chief, SR and the principal case officer continued to press for permission to employ them until a final negative decision by Helms on 1 September 1966.)

On 26 April 1966, Chief, SR again wrote Helms to say that a response to Nosenko's letters had been delayed in order to allow time for discussion with Chief, CI and the psychiatrist. Their combined judgment seems to have been that the letters were "an attempt to relieve the isolation by reestablishing personal contact, if only with his interrogators." He bolstered this view by an appeal to medical authority:

It is [the psychiatrist's] opinion, in which we fully concur, that any such contact would in fact constitute a relief for Nosenko and that it would be a serious mistake to grant

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him this at the very moment that his psychological defenses may be cracking. On the contrary, [the psychiatrist] feels we should cut off any hopes Nosenko may harbor that he can alter his present situation without a full confession.

Since it is the technique of isolation and rejection that has led to the recent promising changes in Nosenko's attitude and behavior, we believe that it is logical to continue along the same lines and that there is a reasonable expectation that this treatment will produce further results in the near future. We therefore intend to send Nosenko the attached letter and to wait approximately 60 days before changing our tactics.

The letter thereupon sent to Nosenko in the principal case officer's name read as follows:

I have received your letters and so-called "autobiography." We understand fully what degradation the Soviet system has forced you into and as you have been told, we are willing to help you establish a real life.

As I told you in August, however, we have no further interest in reading or listening to the legend (or its variations) that you continue to repeat. We are only interested in evidence that you really want to talk truthfully. In the future we will reply only to a true written account of your life and how your legend was prepared. Do not waste our time with the lies of the past. This legend cannot be the basis of a new life for you.

Chief, SR's next report, dated 11 May 1966, was the following:

As previously agreed on 28 April, a brief note was passed to Nosenko in response to his earlier note and slightly amended biographical statement. He made no response upon receiving our note (although he did not touch his meal that night); but on the evening of 4 May he asked

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for a pencil and paper, indicating, in reply to a question from the guard, that he had a statement to make in response to our note. After writing his note, he sealed it in an envelope and gave it to the guard to be delivered.

The note, written in English, states:

Allow me to thank you very much for your kind letter. Now I understood fully what degradation to the Soviet Russia had forced me into. At last I can tell you that I really want to talk truthfully.

I want to begin the job against the Soviet Russia. My only wish is to establish a real life with your help as you are willing to do so.

[signed] George Nosenko

We have discussed his note with [the psychiatrist], who feels that the final sentence of the first paragraph probably reflects no real desire on the part of Nosenko to talk truthfully at this time, but is rather a further attempt by him either to generate a personal dialogue with us or at least to continue this written exchange.

We feel that it would not be in our interest to answer this latest note with another note, thus permitting additional and, to Nosenko, psychologically necessary contact and involvement--albeit impersonal. In order to cut off this effort on his part, but at the same time to allow for the possibility that this latest note might actually convey an intention to talk truthfully, we intend to deliver to Nosenko the attached statement. The requirement for direct "YES" or "NO" answers accompanied by his signature allows for no misunderstanding of the questions and does not permit lengthy discourses on peripheral matters.

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[The psychiatrist] concurs in our plan and recommends that it be carried out as soon as possible to achieve maximum effect. If we get a positive response we will follow up immediately.

In accordance with the above memorandum, the following form was passed to Nosenko on 13 May 1966, apparently by the Security guards:

Answer "YES" or "NO":

- 1) Do you admit that you came to the United States on a KGB mission?

YES

NO

- 2) Are you ready to tell us about your KGB mission and how your legend was prepared and taught to you?

YES

NO

Date \_\_\_\_\_ Signed \_\_\_\_\_

If the answers to both questions are "YES" someone will come to talk to you. If not, there is no need to write any more letters.

The next major maneuver on Nosenko's part was a hunger strike, in the course of which he lost some forty pounds. This tactic was counteracted with the help of a medical officer while administering a physical check-up on 22 June 1966:

In the course of the examination, [this doctor] questioned Subject on the reasons for his fast and got him to admit that this was a deliberate tactic. As planned, the doctor showed no concern, assured Subject that he was still in good health, described to him in some detail the physical and mental consequences of prolonged undernourishment, and emphasized that Subject would not be allowed to do himself any damage in this manner. The doctors' description of some of the standard methods of forced feeding and his

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matter-of-fact emphasis that all appropriate medical measures could and would be taken at the present site made an instant and evident impact on Subject, who nevertheless continued to assert that he had no need or desire for more food. (Despite the weight loss, the results of the medical exam showed that Subject is in good overall condition.)

On 23 June, the day following the doctor's visit, Subject began to eat ravenously and he has been consuming all his meals since. By 6 July he had gained 15 lbs.

The Agency's next step was to have the principal case officer see Nosenko. This interview, which took place on 6 July 1966, lasted for about 45 minutes and "was the first time that a case officer had talked to Subject since he was moved . . ." The interview resulted in another stand-off, the principal case officer insisting that Nosenko admit to being a KGB agent and the latter refusing. Once again, however, Agency officers in charge felt they were making progress:

[The psychiatrist], who monitored the entire interview, was impressed by the fact that Subject had used it solely to appeal to the pity and sympathy of the interviewer, and felt that the way in which the interview was conducted would very effectively slam shut still another psychological door. It is believed that for the first time Subject has come to appreciate the measure of our resolve and determination, and that he is actively grappling with the realities of his present situation. Subject's pattern of behavior over the past few months suggests that he will need some time to fully digest the import of the [principal case officer's] interview, but that he will then be impelled to initiate some new effort to relieve (sic) his lot. Very few alternatives short of confession--real or false--appear to be left to him.

On 23 August 1966 Helms, who had become DCI on 30 June 1966, instructed the DDP and Chief, SR to close the case "within about sixty days assuming there are no new developments which would warrant reconsideration of this development." Chief, SR gave this account of Helms' reasoning:

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. . . the Director advised us that in his view the time had come to consider disposal of Subject. He was willing, he said, to proceed with the immediate plans we had for the sodium amytal interview and to consider proposals for use of special techniques within the time frame we suggested but unless these steps developed new information or indicated definite progress in resolving the case, he wanted us to wind it up.

Helms' decision triggered a new rash of activity within what was now the SB Division. Chief, SR, noting that "there is no appeal . . . unless we uncover new, compelling data," reconstituted a special Task Force to work on the case, headed by the principal case officer.

A problem which the principal case officer found particularly thorny, to judge by his notes, was posed by the FBI's unwillingness to accept CIA's evaluation of Nosenko.

Our case is based primarily on analysis, not confirmed by juridically acceptable evidence, and this analysis is so complex that it probably could not be made more understandable to laymen than it has been to the FBI, which has largely failed to understand it.

Despite Helms' expressed preference for returning Nosenko to Soviet hands, the principal case officer continued to have misgivings about such a course:

Danger in the Nosenko case lies not only in holding him, but in bringing his case to public notice again, and especially in allowing the Soviets to regain possession of him. (Our denial of Nosenko to the Soviets, particularly if they are in some doubt about his real status/loyalty, is a form of guarantee that the Soviets cannot take the many damaging actions available to them if they had the body.) The course of action therefore must balance the respective dangers.

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Helms, on the other hand, hardened his position. He was perhaps influenced by [the psychiatrist's] pointing out that in his experience with sodium amytal it had only worked once, and then by accident; Helms promptly revoked his permission for use of this drug. Helms remarked that Nosenko was "one person on whom these techniques were never going to be used." The upshot was that, on 1 September 1966, Helms limited the interrogators to the polygraph in any future interrogations, and reiterated his preference for "having Subject turned back to the Soviets . . ."

On 2 September, Chief, SB saw Helms again, to ask that under the new circumstances the sixty-day deadline be extended. Helms agreed on an extension until the end of the year. A discussion of a final report and "disposal" then ensued, reported by Chief, SB as follows:

. . . it would be imprudent I thought not to have ready for any eventuality a detailed study of our findings. This would provide backup to our final report to the intelligence community principals, the Secretary of State, Attorney General and others. In the case of the FBI, I added, we would most certainly have to have such a document. [This remark stemmed from the fact that the FBI had never fully agreed with the Agency's views on Nosenko.]

As for disposal, [Director Helms] believed that return to Soviet control is the only practical solution. Third country disposal might only delay our having to face the same problems and if accusations are leveled at the agency it would be far preferable to have Subject in Soviet hands. The Director did not believe the Soviets would refuse to accept Subject and felt we could take the sting out of any Soviet reaction by our own statement concerning Subject's mission. If our position is publicized first, anything the Soviets or anyone else says about the case thereafter will have very little effect. In the conclusion the Director emphasized the need to bring this case to an end in a manner which will permit us to arrange events and timing to our advantage. He does not want

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to be stampeded by publicity beyond our control.

Interrogation of Nosenko, preparatory to the preparation of the above-mentioned final report, was recommenced on 18 October 1966. Assisting in the interrogation was the polygraph operator whose 1964 polygraph tapes were at this very time under review by the Office of Security; on 1 November, thirteen days later, they were officially and in writing pronounced to have been invalid.

This is what Chief, SB had to report on 25 October 1966:

Nosenko knows he is reacting in sensitive areas and this is worrying him because he is not sure how much we know or how we learned it. Nosenko's reactions have given us hope that we may be this procedure have begun to strike home. We do not know what it is that keeps this man sitting month after month in his present situation. We speculate that one factor may be confidence that the KGB will get him out. Related to this may be the thought that the KGB has CIA so deeply penetrated that it would be unhealthy for him to confess. Our current line of interrogation, expanded and used even more forcefully, might break down some of his obstacles to confession by showing us in a different and stronger posture.

Despite eight days of interrogation employing the polygraph, however, SB Division did not achieve their goal: Nosenko did not "confess" to being a "provocateur." Operating under the constraint of Helms' injunction to wind up the case by the end of the year, the principal case officer made one last attempt to shatter Nosenko's resolution. In a long letter, the principal case officer outlined the hopelessness of Nosenko's situation and adduced a number of proofs of Nosenko's prevarication, derived in part from a fictitious "KGB officer . . . sent out as a provocateur" whom the SB Division leadership invented for purposes of this letter. A possible tactical error on their part, however, was the inclusion of information about Nosenko, ostensibly received from the notional

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source, which Nosenko himself would obviously recognize as false: "He heard that you had been in prison in the USSR, and that you received a Government award for your meetings with us in 1962." According to the SB Division officer who delivered the letter, Nosenko responded to this allegation with a belly-laugh, but he certainly was depressed, as his rambling remarks to the SB Division emissary showed:

. . . I know about my lies and I corrected all my false statements, my chattering. I know everything what is necessary for me to know. And I will be here, I understand this, I will be here so many years as you will consider it necessary. You consider five . . . I will be five; you consider ten . . . I will be ten. I have no, I have no exit and I have no way out of this situation, and . . .

L. Inter-Agency Disagreement

Meanwhile, enormous effort went into preparation of SB Division's "final report" on the case. This document, frequently referred to as the "thousand-page report," was described by Chief, SB as follows:

[It] will reflect all of AEFOXTROT's statements concerning his personal life, alleged KGB career and other matters as well as subsequent contradictions or denials of earlier statements plus the results of our investigations at home and abroad of these statements. It will also cover statements pertaining to AEFOXTROT made by various Soviet officials some of whom have been or are now in operational contact with the CS [Clandestine Service] or the FBI. This factual portion will be followed by analysis and conclusions. The latter will be absolutely unequivocal on these points:

- a. AEFOXTROT is a dispatched KGB agent whose contact with us and ultimate defection were carried out at KGB direction.

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b. AEFOXTROT's claim to service in the KGB was an integral and vital part of his KGB agent mission, forming as it did the basis for all that he has had to say about KGB operations and personnel. Yet, the results of our interrogations of AEFOXTROT supported by polygraph examination demonstrate conclusively that AEFOXTROT did not and could not have served in any of the specific staff positions he has described.

c. Whatever the ultimate goals of this KGB operation might be, it has been possible to determine that among the most significant KGB aims in directing AEFOXTROT to us were: (1) to persuade us of KGB ineptitude and lack of success in developing technical and human penetrations of the US government, its security and intelligence services while at the same time deliberately diverting these services from specific areas of investigation in which the KGB has been successful; (2) to offer us leads to new sources and new investigations which had they all been pursued would have absorbed our limited manpower in handling cases in which ultimate control rested with the KGB.

Preparation of the report was somewhat complicated by disagreements between CIA and the FBI, as well as between SB Division and CI Staff within the Agency. The intra-CIA disagreement stemmed from differing views on the validity of Golitsyn information. Whereas SB Division insisted that Nosenko, during his KGB career, had never "served in any of the specific staff positions he has described," Golitsyn had in some respects supported Nosenko's claims regarding his KGB service. After a conference with Chief, CI, the Chief, SR summed up the problem on 29 March:

Chief, CI said that he did not see how we could submit a Final Report to the Bureau if it contained suggestions that Golitsyn had lied to us about certain aspects of Nosenko's past. He

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recalled that the Director of the FBI had stated that in his opinion Golitsyn himself was a provocateur and penetration agent. On the other hand, most FBI agents have accepted that when Golitsyn was speaking on facts known to him he was accurate even though they do not accept most of his hypotheses or inferences drawn from facts. Chief, CI went on to say that if we submitted to the FBI a report on Nosenko in the form we now have it, it would most certainly cause us difficulties. It might cause us to lose whatever impact our report would be able to make on the overall question of Nosenko's bona fides . . .

The disagreements between the Agency and the FBI were never to be resolved as long as Nosenko remained within the jurisdiction of the SB Division and the CI Staff. Within house, Chief, SR and Chief, CI eventually papered over their differences sufficiently to publish a second, compromise report on the Nosenko case in February 1968. But by then the case had been taken out of their hands, and the report was a dead letter even before it went to press.

M. Voices of Dissent

Meanwhile, although the top leadership of SR Division remained unassailably certain of its thesis regarding Nosenko as a KGB-dispatched agent, there was some dissent at the lower levels. Manifestations of disagreement were not well received by the leadership, however, and thus had no effect on the handling of the case. A former member of SR/CI remembers that it was sometimes possible to discuss alternative ways of presenting very specific points in preparing the written case against Nosenko (which was eventually to become the so-called "thousand-page paper"), but no qualification of the basic thesis was tolerated.

The first recorded dissent, therefore, came from outside SR Division, and it was a tentative one. A senior Plans Directorate psychologist had been asked to interview Nosenko in depth, which he did during a series of meetings between 3 and 21 May 1965. As a result of his questioning, he became convinced that at the very least Nosenko was in fact Nosenko. Even this rather

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bland assertion, however, was met by Chief, SR with the statement, "there are things in this case that you do not know about." Nonetheless, in summing up the sessions, the psychologist had this to say:

I am totally at a loss to even attempt to rationalize why a story with this much pathology would be used as a legend. Nothing could be served other than to discredit the man to whom it was assigned. In some remote sense--to me--it might have been felt it would evoke sympathy but this is really far out and a very dangerous gamble on their part. The manner in which he has told his story and the nuances he has introduced would require great ingenuity and preparation. From my standpoint, he has been essentially convincing and accurate in general if not always truthful in detail. Here I am talking about the psychological data only--I am not prepared to express an opinion on other aspects. Within whatever frame of reference I can operate, I am forced to conclude that all the psychological evidence would indicate that he is Nosenko, the son of Ivan Nosenko. His life story is essentially as he has described it. It is obviously distorted in places but in each case there is a probable psychological reason for the distortion and deception. No man is a good reporter on himself and we all use rationalization to avoid seeing ourselves as others see us. My opinion, for whatever it is worth, is that Nosenko cannot be broken outside the context of his life story and personality structure. It should be noted here that the life story is completely compatible with the personality structure as projected by psychological tests.

The psychologist claims now that he had more doubts about the validity of the SR view of Nosenko than he felt it wise to express. The following excerpt from a memorandum of conversation, dated 4 August 1976, gives his memory of the situation facing him:

In discussing his lengthy series of interviews with Nosenko on 3-21 May 1965, [the psychologist] said that he was very hesitant

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to express the full extent of his doubts about the theory that Nosenko was a KGB-dispatched agent. The reason for his hesitation was that, when [Chief, SR] got a hint of [the psychologist's] doubts about the theory, [Chief, SR] told [the psychologist] that such doubts might make [the psychologist] suspect of himself being involved in the KGB/Nosenko plan.

There is no evidence in the files to indicate that the psychologist's doubts were accorded any impartial consideration. Chief, SR, in a 15 June 1965 memorandum to Helms (who was by then DDCI, but still riding herd on the case), described the interviews as "unrewarding in terms of producing new information or insights . . . . It was obvious that Subject had given some thought . . . . to improving and smoothing over some of the rougher spots in his story."

By the end of 1965, there were others in SR Division who doubted the thesis, and one of them was willing to risk his career by putting his thoughts on paper in a 31-page memorandum to Chief, SR commenting on a "sterile" version of SR/CI's "notebook" documenting the case against Nosenko. It began:

#### Introduction

At your request, I have read the basic Nosenko notebook and I hope you will honor my right to dissent. I find the evidence that Nosenko is a bona fide defector far more convincing than the evidence used in the notebook to condemn him as a KGB agent.

It is because I am concerned about the serious ramifications of a wrong verdict that I wish to set forth my dissenting views in considerable detail. If the present verdict of "guilty" is right I believe there must be satisfactory answers to the questions raised herein; if it is wrong--as I believe it is--it should be rectified as soon as possible.

#### Intelligence Production

There are several references in the Nosenko notebook to the extent and quality of the intelligence

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he provided. In the 25 March 1964 memo to DDP, it is asserted that "A comparison of his positive intelligence with that of other Soviet Bloc intelligence officers with whom we have had an operational relationship shows that all of them were consistently better able to provide useful positive intelligence than has been Nosenko." Tab D of this same memo states "His positive intelligence production is practically nil," and later: "Viewed overall, however, Nosenko's positive intelligence production has been so meager for a man of his background, training and position as to case doubts on his bona fides, without reference to other criteria." All of these statements are incorrect.

The three persons in the Clandestine Services with the background and experience to make such a judgment regarding Nosenko's production and access agree that they are incorrect. No KGB officer has been able to provide more useful intelligence than Nosenko has; experience has shown that intelligence usefulness of KGB officers in general is "practically nil." Golitsyn's was nil. Viewed in the proper context, therefore, Nosenko's intelligence production cannot be used in his defense, but neither can it be said honestly to cast any doubt whatsoever on his bona fides. In the realm of substance, judgment regarding his bona fides must therefore be made on the basis of his counter-intelligence information.

#### Counterintelligence Production

The ultimate conclusions about Nosenko's bona fides, as of March 1964 DDP memo and others indicate, must be based on his production--how much did he hurt the Soviets. I believe that the evidence shows that he has damaged the Soviet intelligence effort more than all other KGB defectors combined.

Chief, SR later wrote:

I have read this document and am of mixed minds. First, it shows clearly that the so-called

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"sterile" book in the hands of a person with none of the other background on other cases or appreciation of the penetration problems affecting us and the FBI can be a very damaging document. I question seriously whether we should make it available to others in its present form. Second, the book's weaknesses are principally its language and the fact that it was made up of memos from various periods and as our evaluation matured, or we developed additional information, the tone of the subsequent memos changed but the reader can suggest our approach has been superficial or inconsistent. Third, we cannot make the book available unless we are prepared to deal with the totality or near totality of the picture. Fourth, if a book is to be used at all in briefing individuals, it should be re-written and questions of the kind posed by this . . . paper treated [sic] no matter how irritating we find them to be. If one person has this view, others might at some point . . .

In replying to Chief, SR, another SR officer also attempted to take a balanced view:

The paper suffers from many faults. These include bias, intellectual arrogance, and lack of CI background. Needless to say, the conclusions are false. Nevertheless, I found it to be a useful paper, and I think that we would be wise to treat it seriously, because it does highlight some problems which we have all been aware of for some time.

It is inevitable, I suppose, that all of us who contributed substantially to the black books will feel personally attacked by many of the uninformed judgments and intemperate comments contained in [this] paper. I urge that we all strive to overcome the temptation to reply in kind. Despite the paper's shortcomings, it is one reader's serious and sincere response to the black book, and it reflects some serious faults in the book which we must correct.

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This is not the first indication we have had that some of our analytical methods, and particularly the style and language we have become addicted to, are not easily understood by "outsiders." We have all been on this problem so long that we've gotten into the habit of taking mental shortcuts and using elliptical proofs, considering the gaps and omissions to be self-explanatory . . .

When the author of the dissenting paper wrote to Helms on 4 April 1966, he included the following comments:

My primary reason for bringing the attached bootleg copy of my memorandum to your attention is the morbid effect that the Nosenko case has, and will continue to have, on intelligence collection against the USSR by all agencies of the US government. The accusations against Nosenko, which I believe to be entirely false, have contaminated all current agent operations against the USSR and most of the past operations, ex post facto . . . Any case which we get from now on which supports Nosenko, especially the GRU and KGB cases, will likely be considered tainted. Since all such good cases are bound to support him, US intelligence faces a bleak future. The explicit ramifications of the concept of an all-powerful KGB, which can with impunity present us one of their senior personnel, or a knowledgeable facsimile, are already apparent in the negative moods of CIA personnel here and overseas. .

Not long thereafter, Helms called the author by phone and told him he was having a great deal of trouble with the Nosenko case. He said that he was therefore going to turn it over to the DDCI, who he hoped could get to the bottom of it for him. Helms also asked the author if he would agree to Helms' passing his paper to an Agency psychologist. A few days later, Helms again called the author by phone and asked if he would agree to his paper's being passed to both the DDCI and the Director of Security.

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N. Helms Takes Control

With the third anniversary of Nosenko's confinement drawing near, no resolution of the case was yet in sight. The FBI continued to take what Chief, SB described as a "neutral position" in regard to Nosenko.

The conflicting views of the various interested parties are not sufficiently relevant to the purposes of this study to require a detailed coverage. What is relevant is the fact that the stand-off increased Helms' impatience with continued delay. He therefore initiated a number of measures that gradually took handling of the entire Nosenko matter out of the hands of the SB Division. The first of these measures was to instruct the DDCI to undertake a thorough study of the Nosenko case.

When debriefed regarding the Nosenko case on 21 September 1976, the former DDCI remembered his involvement as follows:

DDCI: I became concerned as a result of Dick Helms [saying] that there was a matter that worried him very deeply, that needed resolution, that he doubted that there was enough objectivity amongst the people in the Agency who handled it so far to arrive at any kind of a really objective solution to the problem, and it was very sensitive indeed, would I please look into it and let him know my conclusions. Then he went on to tell me about Nosenko, the defector, who was at that time incarcerated . . . And he mentioned that there was a dichotomy of views in the DDP as to whether Nosenko was a bona fide defector or whether he had been sent on a mission, and that in any case he, Helms, felt that it was wrong to keep him confined and we had to do something with him one way or the other.

Q: He said that it was wrong to keep him confined?

DDCI: Yes, he was really distressed about the fact that this fellow had been in confinement so long and that they had never been able to arrive at a conclusion as to whether he was a bona fide or whether he was a plant, and he just had to get it resolved and something had to be done to get this fellow in a . . . oh, I've forgotten just how he put it,

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but in a more acceptable position. So, I said, yes, I would undertake this job and I sent for all the background papers on it and studied them first. Then I interviewed [Chief, CI and Chief, SB] and arrived at the conclusion . . . I think I talked to some other people in the Soviet Division of the DDP also, but I arrived at the conclusion that people had their feet so mired in concrete of opinion as to one side or the other of the case, that it was just damned near impossible to get any worthwhile information out of interviews. And I then wrote a memorandum to Helms in which I indicated that I had, after reviewing the . . . making a preliminary review of the case, that I had considerable doubt that Nosenko was a plant; if so, I couldn't figure out what he was planted for. Nor could I get out of anybody else what he was supposed . . . what his mission was supposed to be, even in their hypothesis . . .

. . . My second memorandum to Helms was to the effect that, whatever the case, I didn't believe that Nosenko was any threat whatsoever to the Agency, that he ought to be rehabilitated, and I got a free hand from Helms to go ahead with the idea of rehabilitating him. And [the Director of Security] then had him moved . . .

Q: Well, do you remember anything about Dick Helms' reactions to your recommendations?

DDCI: He seemed rather pleased with the information. I got the impression from discussing the case with him that he never had been able to get what he felt was a really fair appraisal of it from anybody; and I got the impression that he felt at last he had a fair appraisal of it.

On 26 May 1967, the DDCI called the Director of Security to his office, and the Director of Security recorded the meeting as follows:

[The DDCI] started by asking me whether or not I had seen the eight hundred page report summarizing the Soviet Bloc Division's interrogation and exploitation of [Nosenko]. I said that I had not

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read it personally but that [a member] of my Security Research Staff was now in the process of reviewing it and commenting on selected portions of it. He then asked if I agreed with its conclusions. I told him that I did not; that it had been the consistent position of this Office that while we did not, under any circumstances, consider him bona fide, we were not convinced that he was a provocation dispatched by the KGB with a specific mission. Rather, our position has always been that there is something wrong with [Nosenko] and his story but we do not know enough in order to make a final decision.

I went on to point out to the [DDCI] that I had thought, and had so recommended on numerous occasions in the past, that it would make a lot of sense for [a member] of my Office to take over the interrogation of [Nosenko] in order to resolve several discrepancies that had always concerned us. Further, I said that the polygraph examination given [Nosenko] at the outset was designed only to "break him" and was not an objective polygraph examination designed to establish or deny his bona fides. I indicated that the Director had approved this idea but that I had been unable to sell the idea to . . . SB Division.

[The DDCI] said that he thought this was an excellent idea. He agreed with me that we had everything to gain and nothing to lose through such a course of action and that he would so recommend to the Director. I pointed out to him that one of the things that had always concerned us was that the Soviet Bloc Division had never released any verbatim transcripts covering their many interrogations of [Nosenko] and that we could make our judgment only on the basis of written summaries prepared by the Division.

Thus, acting under the DDCI's orders, the Office of Security transferred Nosenko to "a decent, respectable safehouse." SB Division was cut out of the case, as was the CI Staff.

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O. Resolution of the Case

The Office of Security took over the handling of Nosenko in October 1967. The officer in charge immediately inaugurated a rapid transition to normal living conditions. Throughout this process, he found Nosenko fully cooperative, and without any tendency toward drunkenness or other aberrant behavior.

The following is a summary report prepared on 16 November 1967:

Nosenko was moved to his current location on 27 October 1967 and the first interview with Nosenko occurred on 30 October. During the first interview, particularly the first hour, Nosenko was quite nervous and showed a certain reticence to talk. This condition ameliorated rapidly and it is considered that the current situation is better than could have ever been anticipated in view of the conditions of his previous confinement.

Nosenko on his first day indicated his complete willingness to answer all questions and to write his answers to questions on areas of specific interest. It was determined that his English is adequate both for interview and for preparation of written material. Interviews are not usually over two and a half hours a day, six days a week, with Nosenko preparing from six to ten pages of written material each day. Prepared material has included life history, individual cases, trips of Nosenko, reason for defection, and detailed drawings of pertinent offices during his claimed period of KGB employment.

There does not appear to be any impairment of his memory. His current living conditions, although physically secure, are luxurious compared to those he had been in during the past three years and have resulted in a relaxation of physical tension.

Definitive resolution of the complex problems in this case will require a considerable period of

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time for further interviews, preparation of written material and a comparative analysis against his previous statements and information from other sources, interviews and investigation. Nosenko freely admits certain previous lies concerning a recall telegram while in Geneva and having received certain awards or decorations.

All interviews with Nosenko are recorded and transcripts of the interviews are being prepared. In addition, all written material from Nosenko is being typed with certain explanatory remarks . . . In addition, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence has been orally briefed by the Director of Security. As of the present time, it is estimated that there are 1,000 pages of material completed or awaiting completion. All of the finished material is in a form which will permit dissemination to the FBI in part or in toto when such dissemination is considered appropriate.

Work thus far with Nosenko has resulted in a clarification of certain areas of previous controversy. As an example, it is considered that there can be at this time little doubt that Nosenko was in the KGB during the approximate period which he claims to have been in the KGB. The matter of the actual positions held by Nosenko during the approximate 1953-early 1964 period is not considered adequately resolved at this time and any speculation concerning the dispatched agent aspects would be completely premature.

If even a degree of optimism is realistic, it is felt that the additional interviews and work in the Nosenko case together with a detailed comparative analysis of all information will provide a firmer basis for a final conclusion of the Nosenko problem. Nosenko has been very responsive [to] the normal consideration he is now receiving, e.g., our current work with him, and if it accomplishes nothing else, will at least condition Nosenko more favorably for whatever future action is taken relative to his disposition.

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This questioning of Nosenko was paralleled by a separate investigation conducted by the FBI. Results were covered in two reports published at about the same time, the FBI's on 20 September 1968 and the CIA Office of Security's on 1 October 1968.

The essence of the Office of Security's findings was expressed in a covering memorandum to the Director of Security:

In brief, the conclusion of this summary is that Nosenko is the person he claims to be, that he held his claimed positions in the KGB during 1953-January 1964, that Nosenko was not dispatched by the KGB, and that his previous lies and exaggerations are not actually of material significance at this time.

The conclusions of the FBI report were more sweeping:

1. The current interrogations and collateral inquiries have established a number of significant omissions and inaccuracies in the February 1968 CIA paper and have invalidated the vast majority of conclusions on which that paper relied to discredit Nosenko.

2. The current interrogations and the polygraph examination\* disclosed no indication of deception on the part of Nosenko. He is knowledgeable in the areas and to the extent he should be; he furnished logical explanations for acquisition of information which would not normally have been accessible to him in his claimed positions. There is no substantial basis for doubting his bona fides as a defector.

3. The variety and volume of information provided by Nosenko is such that it is considered impossible that he acquired the information only by KGB briefing. It is also illogical and

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\*Reference is being made by the FBI to the polygraph examination of Nosenko performed by CIA between 2 and 6 August 1968 as part of the interrogation undertaken by the Office of Security.

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implausible that the KGB would have dispatched an officer of his caliber with instructions to disclose the variety and volume of valuable information furnished by him. No compensatory objective is apparent.

4. The current interrogations show that Nosenko is in possession of information not previously obtained. In the interest of both intelligence and counterintelligence agencies of the government, interviews should be continued to exhaust his knowledge.

5. There should be a thorough re-examination of all information and cases emanating from Nosenko and other defectors where the decision for action, or lack of action, was previously influenced by the presumption that Nosenko was not a bona fide defector.

Despite the above findings, the CI Staff never gave up its contention that Nosenko was a KGB-dispatched agent. On 31 January 1969, the CI Staff argued that to accept Nosenko's bona fides meant repudiating Golitsyn, "the only proven reliable source about the KGB for a period of time which appears to be vital to both Nosenko and CIA."

An undated memorandum written by the Office of Security officer in charge of Nosenko essentially brings this chronicle to a close:

Since April 1969, Nosenko has had his own private residence and since June 1969, his own automobile. Even prior to April 1969, Nosenko could have, if he chose to do so, acted in a way seriously adverse to the best interests of this Agency since control was not of such a nature as to preclude independent action by Nosenko.

It is the opinion of Agency representatives in regular contact with Nosenko that he is genuinely interested in maintaining the anonymity of his current identity, that is, not becoming publicly known as identical to Nosenko. As an example, he was very interested in having a facial birthmark removed. However, he has on numerous occasions indicated his interest in participating under the Nosenko identity in some action or

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activity which would "hurt the KGB." Nosenko considers that he has certain capabilities and knowledge which could be useful in the effort of the United States government against the KGB. This interest has not been associated with any particular curiosity in regard to the activities of this Agency . . .

Nosenko has consistently expressed his deep interest in obtaining United States citizenship as soon as possible. He realizes that under normal circumstances, citizenship could not be obtained until February 1974, but also is aware that citizenship can be obtained in less than the normal waiting period by legislative action.

Nosenko is considered by Agency personnel and FBI personnel in contact with Nosenko to have made an unusual adaptation to American life. He lives like a normal American and has an obvious pride in his home and personal effects. His home life from all appearances is quite calm. The fluency of Nosenko in the English language has greatly increased and there is no difficulty in understanding Nosenko or in his ability to express his thoughts. Obviously his accent and occasional incorrect sentence structure (and misspelling of words) has not been eliminated and probably will never be entirely eliminated.

Nosenko continues to complete work assignments expeditiously and with interest. As indicated above, Nosenko is very interested in doing "something active" which is understandable. Full consideration should be given to this interest since if properly controlled and channeled, could be used in a way adverse to the best interest of the KGB.

Nosenko has since become a United States citizen, has married an American woman, continues to lead a normal life, and works productively for the CIA.

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CHAPTER IV

Nosenko's Contribution: A Summary Evaluation

Any attempt to assess Nosenko's value to the US government must begin by pointing out that he might well have been able to contribute more had he been permitted to do so. Unfortunately, we were unwilling to give serious consideration to his stated desire to assist us in making recruitments of Soviet officials; we discounted Nosenko's suggestions along this line as possibly part of a plan to embarrass the US government. There is no telling what potential recruitment targets might have emerged had we, soon after Nosenko's defection, briefed him with such targets in view.

In this part of our study, we therefore confine ourselves to a summary of the contributions that, despite considerable odds, Nosenko was able to make. Let us take them, very briefly, one by one.

A. Information on KGB Personnel

The Office of Security's 1968 report summed up Nosenko's contribution in this field as follows:

Nosenko has furnished information concerning perhaps 2,000 KGB officers and 300 KGB agents or operative contacts (here the terms agents or operative contacts are used to refer to Soviet nationals), mainly in the Second Chief Directorate or internal KGB organizations. However, he has identified approximately 250 former or current First Chief Directorate officers and there is a considerable exchange of officers between the FCD and SCD. In addition, numerous officers of the SCD and other internal KGB organizations travel abroad with delegations, tourist groups, and as visitors to various major exhibitions such as World's Fairs. It is impossible at this time to estimate the number of KGB officers identified by Nosenko who have been outside the Soviet Bloc since his defection or who will be out some time in the future.

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There has been very little attempted exploitation of information furnished by Nosenko concerning other KGB officers and, therefore, the possible value of this information to United States Intelligence cannot be estimated nor can the potential damage to the KGB be estimated.

**B. KGB Recruitment Efforts Against US Citizens**

Most of Nosenko's own operational experience with the KGB involved efforts against US citizens, either visitors to the USSR or members of the US embassy in Moscow. As a result of this background, Nosenko was able to provide some 238 identifications of, or leads to, Americans in whom the KGB had displayed some interest.

Some of the KGB operational efforts culminated in "recruitments" that, according to Nosenko, were more statistical than real; the KGB played the numbers game, for purposes of year-end reporting. Nonetheless, Nosenko's reporting did result in the uncovering of certain US citizens genuinely working for Soviet intelligence:

1. US Army Sergeant Robert L. Johnson, who had been recruited in 1953, was arrested in 1965 on the basis of a Nosenko lead to an agent assigned to a US military installation outside Paris who was providing the KGB with important documents as of 1962-1963. Johnson was custodian of classified documents at Orly Field Armed Forces Courier Transfer Station during this period, and he provided documents from there. Excerpts from a preliminary damage assessment are included below:

The full extent of damage will only be known when the current review of documents by all affected agencies is completed. The damage assessments prepared by the military services, however, based on a review of their documents to date, indicate that as a result of access to documents in the Orly vault, the Soviets may have learned:

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[a]. Details of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) including the attack plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the identity of Soviet targets, the tactical plans of USAF elements including weapons systems and methods of delivery.

[b]. US Intelligence holdings on Soviet military capabilities, atomic energy production, weapons storage facilities, industrial complexes and order of battle.

[c]. Daily US Intelligence summaries including our comments and reports on military and political developments around the world.

[d]. Comprehensive comparisons of US and Soviet SAM Systems.

[e]. Indications of the scope and success of the US national SIGINT effort.

[f]. A wealth of material for use in crypto-analysis.

From these preliminary reports . . . it is evident that Sgt. Johnson's cooperation with Soviet Intelligence has resulted in most serious damage to US national security.

2. US Sergeant Dayle W. Smith, a "code machine repairman" who confessed to having been recruited by the KGB while serving in Moscow during the period 1952-1954. Smith, while initially denying any contact with Soviets, finally admitted he had been recruited and had passed information to them.

3. James A. Mintkenbaugh, formerly a member of the US Armed Forces, later in the real estate business as a civilian. In connection with Nosenko's lead to Johnson, Mintkenbaugh was interviewed after Mrs. Johnson identified him as a friend of her husband's. Mintkenbaugh unexpectedly volunteered that he, too, had been recruited, by Johnson himself, to provide cover for and assist

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the latter in his work on behalf of the KGB. Mintkenbaugh described his KGB role as a spotter, collaborator with Johnson in clandestine photography of documents, and later as a courier between Johnson and his KGB handlers.

C. Moscow Microphones

In 1962, Golitsyn had in general terms reported on the existence of microphones in the US embassy in Moscow. This information was promptly sent to the Department of State, but no action was taken; lack of specificity was cited as one of the reasons. It was not until Nosenko's more detailed information was communicated to the Department of State in March and June 1964 that action was taken that led to the uncovering of a system of 52 microphones, beginning in April of that year. Of the microphones found, 42 were active at the time of discovery. These microphones covered most of the offices in the embassy most significant from the Soviet standpoint.

D. William John Christopher Vassall

Nosenko, in June 1962, told us the KGB had an agent in the British Admiralty. Though this information eventually contributed to the arrest and conviction of William John Christopher Vassall, CIA for some time tended to give Golitsyn credit for this success.

The British counterintelligence service stated in 1976 that, although Vassall probably would "eventually" have emerged as a "leading candidate" for suspicion as a result of the Golitsyn information, it was in fact Nosenko's information that "was to clinch the identification of Vassall as the spy."

The British added that "[Nosenko's] information affecting UK interests seems to have been consistent with his position and we cannot recall any indication in the leads of UK interest that [Nosenko's] object might have been to mislead or deceive."

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E. Leads to Foreign Nationals

Altogether, Nosenko is estimated to have provided some 200 identifications of, or leads to, foreign nationals (including recruited agents) in some 36 countries in whom the KGB had an active interest.

F. Summary Evaluation

It is not feasible, within the terms of this study, to make comparisons between Nosenko's counterintelligence production and that of other similarly qualified defectors. Enough has been said, however, to demonstrate on an absolute basis that, both in terms of quantity and quality of information, Nosenko's contribution was of great value to the US government.

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CHAPTER V

The Analytical Foundations of the "Monster Plot"

For the purposes of this study, we have not chosen to duplicate the mammoth effort put into analyzing and validating Nosenko's information by the Office of Security in CIA and by the FBI; we have reviewed their work and can find no possible reason to challenge their findings. There remains, however, the question of how senior officials could have drawn so many erroneous conclusions from data tendered by a source whom we now believe to have been cooperative and acting in good faith.

A. Lack of Systematic Interrogation

At no time between June 1962 and October 1967 was Nosenko afforded the kind of systematic, objective, non-hostile interrogation by well-informed professional intelligence officers which had otherwise been standard operating procedures in dealing with defectors and in-place sources from Soviet and East European intelligence services.

We now examine the manifestations and consequences of this problem at various stages of the case.

1. June 1962 Meetings

The transcripts of the 1962 meetings reveal a disastrous problem of communication:

- Nosenko spoke fair English, but he preferred to use Russian for the sake of precision. He spoke Russian very rapidly, and his voice ranged from loud and dramatic to excited whispering.
- The senior case officer spoke fair Russian, but he preferred to speak English when saying anything important. He was largely unable to follow Nosenko's "machine-gun style" of delivery in Russian. Nosenko and the senior case officer frequently interrupted one another at important moments.

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--A second case officer, with native Russian, arrived on the scene for the second meeting filled with assurance derived from his involvement in two important operations concerning CIA sources in Soviet Military Intelligence: Popov from 1953 to 1958, and Penkovskiy (who was still working in-place as of the June 1962 Nosenko meetings). Unfortunately, the communication problem was exacerbated, not only by the case officer's showing off his knowledge to Nosenko rather than listening to what Nosenko had to say, but also by the case officer's inaccurate summarizations in English rather than translations of Nosenko's statements in Russian. This case officer's presence was justified by the fact that the senior case officer could not cope with Nosenko's Russian, but the second case officer distorted so much of what was said that he was a barrier of communication.

The second meeting, the longest of the five, was further disorganized by the fact that Nosenko arrived half-drunk from partying the previous day and most of the night. Even during the nearly eight-hour interview, Nosenko continued to drink. This point was consistently overlooked or ignored in later examination of boastful claims Nosenko made during this meeting; e.g., Nosenko personally handled the Langelle/Popov case, Nosenko personally ran the operation against a US security officer, Nosenko personally talked to a US code clerk to try to recruit him, etc. When confronted in hostile interrogations in 1964 and 1965 with these claims, he denied personal participation in all three instances (other than directing the code clerk case behind the scene) and said that if he had said such things in 1962 it was because he was either drunk or under very strong tension at the time. Such explanations were not considered acceptable by his interrogators, and the claims were let stand as evidence of his mendacity.

While Nosenko provided a substantial amount of information during these five meetings, there was little or no follow-up questioning on most of it, partly because of lack of time but also because of the case officers' lack of background on the KGB in general and the Second Chief Directorate in particular. Ignorance of the Second Chief Directorate was only to

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be expected, of course, since Nosenko was the first KGB officer ever to talk to CIA who had spent his career in this component.

2. January-March 1964

The second series of meetings in Geneva, in January and February 1964, were somewhat better organized, but--given the already prevailing belief that Nosenko was a KGB controlled agent--he was not carefully questioned on the information he gave. This was partly because it was considered of primary importance not to reveal even by implication how much we already knew, lest his mission include elicitation of information CIA had received from Golitsyn or other sources considered bona fide.

Debriefings in the United States after Nosenko's defection were similarly limited to noncontroversial generalities and were not noteworthy for attention to accuracy and detail. (Although most of the debriefings of this period were taped, none of these tapes was ever transcribed. Notes were taken, and reports were then written up on the basis of the notes. This three-stage process did not always result in an accurate version of what had been said.)

3. April 1964-October 1966

The hostile confrontation that took place for some two weeks in April 1964 cannot be considered systematic interrogation; "shouting matches" would better characterize these sessions.

During one period--May to November 1964--Nosenko was systematically debriefed in neutral fashion to obtain additional information on leads to Americans and other Westerners recruited by the KGB, in part to meet requirements provided by the FBI. The other two objectives of this debriefing period, of greater importance to the CIA concerns in this case, were:

--to obtain answers to questions posed in writing by Golitsyn, whose aim was to trap Nosenko into exposing his ignorance or "lies" about topics Golitsyn considered central to Nosenko's "KGB missions."

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--to acquire fuller background on Nosenko's alleged duties and activities in his various KGB positions in order to use his own information against him in the hostile interrogation period that was to follow.

The January-March 1965 hostile interrogations were carefully structured and systematic but were not designed to collect information. The information Nosenko provided in these sessions was consistently and intentionally ignored, as the stated objectives were to force Nosenko to agree with his interrogators that (1) he did not know what he should have known (according to CIA assumptions), and (2) that he had not held the positions in the KGB that he claimed. This objective was "successfully" achieved in the eyes of the interrogators by bringing Nosenko to sign statements that purported to summarize his statements of inadequacy of both knowledge and performance in regard to each of the positions he had held. Each time, in signing these so-called "protocols," Nosenko objected that the way they were worded distorted what he had said; however, he acknowledged his inability to get his interrogator to listen to what he was trying to tell him and therefore his inability to reword these papers in any manner satisfactory to him. When given one key "protocol" to sign--one that was a "confession" that he had been sent by the KGB to deceive CIA, and that he had lied purposely on behalf of the KGB--he said that, if his signing this document would serve some good purpose of CIA or of the US government in general, he would do so, but only with his interrogators' clear understanding that the entire "confession" was untrue. Under these circumstances, his interrogators declined to have him sign this document. Thus this series of interrogations failed in its ultimate objective--that of "breaking" Nosenko.

Subsequent interrogation sessions were not constructed to collect information any more than the previous ones but were designed to collect further damaging evidence of Nosenko's ignorance about the KGB and of the areas in his reporting to which he was "most sensitive" and that therefore were most revealing of his "true KGB missions." In sum, while a great deal of personnel time was spent in talking

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to Nosenko and a large amount of paper was generated in consequence, the canons of proper interrogation were rarely observed.

4. Time Devoted to Debriefing or Interrogation

A point that can easily be overlooked is that, of the total period of Nosenko's incarceration, a relatively modest amount of time was devoted to actually debriefing or interrogating him. The most generous estimate we can make is that approximately 292 days were at least in part devoted to debriefing or interrogating Nosenko, out of a total of 1,277 days' incarceration. Thus, from the standpoint of obtaining information, about 77 percent, or more than three-quarters, of the detention period was downtime.

B. Faulty Record of Conversations with Nosenko

The outcome of the Nosenko case was prejudiced at the outset by the establishment of a faulty record.

Let us look first at what happened during the June 1962 meetings. The inadequacy of the principal case officer's Russian for use in an interrogation has already been mentioned. The problem was exacerbated, however, by the fact that he nonetheless took notes on what Nosenko is purported to have said, which became part of the official record without their being compared with tape transcriptions by a more competent Russian linguist.

If anything, the role of the second case officer, who had a native command of Russian but little patience with detail, simply compounded the errors. Returning from Geneva on 15 June, the principal case officer on 18 June began to dictate, using his own notes, a series of 30 memoranda covering highlights of the meetings as he had understood them. These memoranda were reviewed by the second case officer as they were typed, but he made only minor additions or corrections.

The so-called "transcripts of the tapes" from the five meetings were then prepared by the second case officer between the week of 19 June and mid-August 1962. Contrary to the usual procedure, the second case officer did not first transcribe from the tapes into the combination

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of Russian and English (predominantly Russian) actually used in the meetings, and then make his translations on the basis of transcriptions. Rather, he dictated them into English directly, using the error-filled memoranda of the principal case officer's for guidance.

In March 1964 a KGB defector of 1954 vintage was brought into the case to examine Nosenko's reporting in terms of his own expertise on personalities, file procedures, reorganizations, etc. He concentrated on the early years of Nosenko's career, particularly 1952 and 1953. In a resultant memorandum dated 12 March 1964, he commented as follows:

The undersigned began work on this special project by reviewing the taped recordings of the meetings only, without reference to the meeting transcripts, believing that it would be possible and preferable to get all the necessary information and other material firsthand in this way. From the beginning, however, it was obvious that this would be very difficult, if not in many cases impossible; the early tapes (Nos. 1-6 and especially No. 1) were very poor in quality. (These are the tapes for meetings No. 1 and 2.)

After proceeding thus far in a review of the tapes, the undersigned then switched over and began anew, reviewing the transcripts alone and without reference to the tapes. This method also quickly proved unsatisfactory; from his memory of the discussions as actually presented on the early tapes, although poorly reproduced and hard to "catch," the undersigned soon was able to tell that the transcripts are, to say the least, faulty.

A point-by-point review of the tapes and transcripts was then initiated and has been pursued until the present time by the undersigned. In the course of this review, a large number of errors--omissions and other discrepancies--have been discovered scattered throughout the transcript coverage of the meetings recorded on the tapes.

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It is impossible to make enduring pronouncements of the following type without knowing the whole situation and being fully aware of all the motives and factors--personal and professional--involved, yet it should be noted that the undersigned in many places throughout the records of the meetings has encountered examples of what he would consider errors in the handling and conduct of those meetings. Let it suffice merely to register this point here; notes on this subject will be drafted and presented in later papers.

He then proceeded to cite nine major examples of errors, omissions, distortions, and procedures characteristic of the second case officer's transcripts (and performance during the meetings). He concluded by saying:

The foregoing present but a few examples of errors, discrepancies, distortions, etc., to be found throughout the transcripts. A complete report of all such errors, etc., will be prepared upon request.

The "complete report" was never prepared, and it may never have been requested.

Later, the first series of hostile interrogations of Nosenko, beginning on 6 April 1964, was monitored by the 1954 defector, who listened from an adjacent room. On 17 April, Nosenko was challenged concerning a claim he had supposedly made in June 1962 (according to the second case officer's "transcripts") that he in person had recruited an American professor of Slavic languages visiting in Bulgaria during the time Nosenko was on TDY for briefing sessions with the Bulgarian internal counterintelligence service. Nosenko denied ever having made such a claim and went into lengthy detail explaining just what had happened. In effect, because by chance he was in Sofia when the Bulgarians were planning their operation against Professor Horace G. Lunt, he gave the Bulgarians advice on how to go about the compromise operation--a homosexual one--and how to handle the actual confrontation and recruitment. Apparently as a result of listening to Nosenko tell his story, and his vehement denial of any claim to personal meetings with Lunt, the 1954 defector went back to the 1962 tape recordings and

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retranscribed exactly what Nosenko had said on the two different occasions in 1962 when he had referred to this case. The retranscription clearly verified Nosenko's detail. Nonetheless, all subsequent papers on the Nosenko bona fides question included reference to his having claimed in 1962 that he recruited Lunt in person. His denial of such a statement in all sessions from 1964 onward was lost from sight.

In the course of the second series of hostile interrogations in January-March 1965, a still further discovery was made by the 1954 defector when Nosenko was challenged on another "claim" supposedly made in 1962, which Nosenko also denied having made. Reviewing the tape recording of the 1962 meeting in which the alleged claim had been made, the 1954 defector once again established that the record was erroneous, and that Nosenko was right again.

Later in 1965, retranscription of the 1962 tapes was begun, faithfully transcribing Russian when Russian was used, and English when English was spoken. These transcripts were not translated into full English, however, until mid-1968 under the auspices of the Office of Security reexamination of the entire Nosenko case. In late 1968-early 1969, a line-by-line commentary on the more significant discrepancies between the two versions was prepared. It required some 35 pages to cover only the major errors and the effects they had had in supporting the charge that Nosenko was a false defector who "lied" and "changed stories."

C. CIA Misapprehensions Regarding Nosenko's Life Story

The first step in debriefing a new defector is to obtain his most "perishable" information; i.e., positive intelligence and important agent leads. The next step usually is to obtain a biographic statement, highlighting his personal history, family members, education and career.

In February 1964, all information relating to his life story, collated from transcripts of meetings with Nosenko (in Geneva, 1962 and 1964), was presented in written form to Nosenko for him to correct or expand upon. This draft was so full of errors derived from defective

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transcripts that only in the most general terms did it correspond to his actual statements. At this time, however, Nosenko was restless, tense, and impatient with the tedious interviews with which CIA was trying to keep him occupied. It appears obvious that he paid scant attention to the dates or terminology used in this draft, because he made only one noticeable change: he insisted on deletion of a statement attributed to him to the effect that he had attended a one-year course in counterintelligence at the beginning of his KGB career (a mistake dating from the 1962 "transcripts" by the second case officer). Given the volume of other erroneous statements in this "biography" that he left untouched, one can only assume that he considered this biography an exercise of no particular importance.

When hostile interrogations began on 6 April 1964, the inaccurate biography was used as the base point for measuring so-called "lies" about Nosenko's entire life story. It therefore caused him to be accused time and again of "changing his stories."

One of the first wrangles that arose in the hostile interrogations concerned his responses to questions on his schooling. Among other aspects of this subject, Nosenko told his interrogators that he had spent approximately three years during World War II in various naval preparatory schools--(rough equivalent of American high school-level military "academies"). The problem that arose in this instance was traceable first to a careless transcription by the second case officer but was exacerbated by ignorance on the part of the interrogators concerning the subject under discussion. Because it typifies other misapprehensions that complicate the Nosenko case, this example is worth relating in detail,

The second case officer "transcribed" the tape of the 25 January 1964 meeting in Geneva, quoting Nosenko thus (underlining is ours):

. . . When I first came here I graduated from the Institute of Foreign Relations. I specialized in International Law and on the USA there. I came to GRU in 1949. Before I attended this Institute I was in a naval school. I also studied in Baku in a navy preparatory school and I even studied in Frunze. And then the war

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ended. The only time I participated in war-time activities was when heavy combat was going on near Novorossiysk. They threw the students from Baku into the battle.

After we lost Novorossiysk the remnants which were somewhere between one third and one half of the students were brought back to Baku. When the war ended I had not yet graduated from Frunze and I was demobilized. I didn't want a military career so I went to the Institute of Foreign Relations in 1945 and graduated in 1949. Toward the end of the year in early 1950 the placement commission (raspreditel'naya komissaya) [words missing in original transcript] where I wanted to work. I said that I've had some military experience and I'd rather have something along that line rather than go to MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs]. They said I would be called on the phone and they would let me know. I was called up by the personnel section of the old MGB.

To Nosenko's interrogators in April, "Frunze" meant only one thing--the Frunze Naval Academy, equivalent to the US Naval Academy at Annapolis. Unfortunately, the naval preparatory school to which Nosenko referred was named Frunze also; it was the prep school for those Soviet boys with aspirations for naval command positions who would later go on to the Frunze Naval Academy.

When Nosenko was asked in April 1964 to discuss his schooling, he referred to having entered a naval preparatory school--at roughly the high school level, and in Russian called a uchilishche. This was, said he, the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School named after Frunze\*. In 1942, the school was relocated to Baku because of the fighting around Leningrad. Nosenko's interrogators clearly did not understand what he was talking about, as they had no background on these naval preparatory schools; the only Frunze they knew of was the Academy, and every time Nosenko mentioned the prep school carrying Frunze's name confusion

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\*In the Russian language, the fact that a school is named after a great man is always made explicit. Thus, in Russian, the George Washington University would be called the "University named after George Washington."

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erupted. At the end of several heated exchanges on this topic, with the interlocutors invariably at cross purposes, the conclusion was reached that Nosenko had lied in saying originally that he had attended the Frunze Naval Academy. The claim was then made that he had been made to admit that he had not done so. He then was accused of telling stories, which were confused and contradictory, about the secondary schools he claimed to have attended.

Asked repeatedly if he was then saying that he did not attend the Frunze Academy, he consistently replied no, it was the Frunze preparatory school. This discussion was repeated several times during these interrogations, without the problem area's being resolved in the minds of the interrogators.

Because of the lack of background on the part of the interrogators, a memorandum for the record, dated 14 April 1964, Subject: "Interrogation of Yuriy I. Nosenko, 4-11 April 1964," contained the following relevant quotations (underlining is ours):

. . . On 10 April, Subject was interrogated in the morning and afternoon for a total of nearly five hours. Questioning covered his early schooling, his studies at the Institute [of International Relations], and his service in the naval GRU, both in the Far East and in the Baltic. Gaps and contradictions in his accounts cast doubt on whether he was telling the truth about the early years of his life and even raised some possibility that we may not be dealing with the real Nosenko . . .

. . . Under pressure, Subject admitted that he had not entered the Frunze Higher Naval School (Vysshaya Voyenno-Morskaya Shkola imeni Frunze) in 1944, but that he had merely attended the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School (Leningradskoye Voyenno-Morskoye Podgotovitelnoye Uchilishche) of the Frunze Higher Naval School. His story now is that he attended the Moscow Naval Special School (Moskovskaya Spetsialnaya V.M. Shkola) in Kuybyshev from 1941 to 1942, then entered the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School in Baku, completing two classes of this school in Baku (1942-1943 and 1943-1944), and

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the third class in Leningrad (1944-1945). Subject insists that he was given credit for successfully completing each of the four years of secondary schooling, but says that at the end he had the equivalent of 10 years' education. He can offer no explanation for the discrepancy--by his chronology he would have completed 11 years of schooling plus one year of kindergarten. Subject has been very weak in providing names of teachers and classmates and descriptions of school layouts and curriculum for this period, particularly for the period in Baku. It is interesting that [Nikolay Artamonov\*], who has identified pictures of Subject as being identical with the son-of-a-minister Nosenko whom he knew at the Leningrad Naval Prep School in Leningrad in the period 1944-1946, has provided information about the history and make-up of this school which is incompatible\*\* with Subject's story, as is [Artamonov's] statement that Nosenko was a class junior to [Artamonov] and would not have graduated from the prep school until 1946. Subject has never mentioned [Artamonov], and has not yet been challenged on this part of his story.

Further compounding the confusion on this one subject was the development of suspicion that Artamonov, cited in the memorandum above, was himself not bona fide. This doubt arose because Artamonov claimed to have known the Nosenko in question, and, as shown in the paragraph cited below from a 21 April 1964 summary of interrogations for the second week, because his "own elementary and secondary schooling is a curious parallel to Nosenko's . . . ." (underlining is ours). The following is quoted as an excellent example of the reasoning process by which one could at one and the same time be suspicious of Artamonov's bona fides because some of his information supported what Nosenko said, while also citing his reporting as evidence

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\*Nikolay Artamonov is a Soviet naval officer who defected in 1959.

\*\*This is not a true statement. Artamonov's statements are more confusing than clarifying. The possibility that Artamonov's memory might have been unclear was not considered.

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that Nosenko was lying because Artamonov's memories of the schools differed from Nosenko's:

. . . Adding to the mystery of Nosenko's war-time years is the information provided by Nikolay Artamonov, the Soviet naval defector. When Nosenko's defection was first made public, Artamonov volunteered the information that, if this was the same Nosenko who was the son of a minister, he had attended school with him in Leningrad. Later, when shown photographs of Nosenko he positively identified him as the same man he had known in Leningrad in the period 1944 to 1946 and gratuitously provided the names of six schoolmates from Leningrad that Nosenko should remember because they were prominent members of the student body there. Nosenko was subsequently queried about three of these names, but out of context and with no indication of who and what they might be. He immediately identified them as schoolmates, but positively affirmed that two of them had been the roommates in Kuybyshev in 1941-1942, while the other had been in the school in Baku. According to Nosenko, none had gone on to Leningrad. Of the names provided by Artamonov, Nosenko mentioned a fourth one independently, but although he originally placed him in Leningrad he later moved him to Kuybyshev and stated categorically that he saw him for the last time in Moscow in 1942, before going to Leningrad. Artamonov, whose own elementary and secondary schooling is a curious parallel to Nosenko's, has provided other information on the schools and dates which Nosenko claims to have attended which is incompatible with Nosenko's story but it has not been believed advisable to requery Artamonov on this until we can be certain that Artamonov is not deliberately trying to substantiate Nosenko's bona fides according to a prearranged plan which misfired owing to crossed signals or Nosenko's poor memory.

In May 1965, in preparation for his own set of interrogations, it apparently occurred to the 1954 defector that the original "transcript" should be rechecked for

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accuracy (he was right). After transcribing it into Russian first, he then transcribed it into English, but with one unfortunate mischoice in wording. He translated the Russian word "uchilishche" into English as "academy." The Russian equivalent to the English "academy" in the sense of a college-level institution is "akademiya." The following is the 1954's defector's translation of meeting No. 3 on 25 January 1964:

Telling about his entrance into the Naval GRU, Nosenko says: . . . I went there . . . I completed the Institute of International Relations in 1949. I studied in the Juridical Faculty, i.e., specialist in international law and specializing in the US. Before the Institute, I studied at the Naval Academy (voyenno-morskoye uchilishche), etc. In the beginning, I was still in the Special School (spetsshkola). Following the Seventh Class of the School, I then studied at the Preparatory School (podgotovitel'noye uchilishche), was transferred to the Frunze Academy [sic--uchilishche]. The war ended. We weren't successful in getting into battle. The only time they sent us in was when we were in Baku. There was heavy fighting near Tuapse. We students were sent in near Nov., i.e., near Novorossiysk. There was heavy fighting there. We took part in these battles there and then returned when Novorossiysk surrendered. Our health was gone: less than one-half of one-third of all the students remained, and they sent us back to the school.

So, the war ended and I didn't finish Frunze Academy [sic--uchilishche] after demobilization. What to do? Be a soldier? I didn't want to. Study? Where? I went to the Institute of International Relations and entered it in 1945. And I graduated from there in 1949--the end of 1949 or the beginning of 1950. When the placement commission asked me where I wanted to work--it is mandatory for the commission to ask--I said that I was a military man and asked that they give me something related to military.

To sum up, the following problems typical of the whole case are evident in this episode:

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1. Nosenko had been misquoted in the second case officer's transcript, because the second case officer did not understand what he was talking about. He had referred specifically to the "Leningrad Naval Preparatory School named after Frunze," a fact once again uncovered by the 1954 defector's rechecking of the meeting tape, but not until May 1965. When Nosenko "admitted" to his interrogators in April 1964 that he had not attended the Academy, he didn't know this was considered an admission; he never realized his interrogators had thought he had made such a claim.

2. In general, Nosenko's interrogators overestimated their substantive background. Nosenko's "stories" about the several naval preparatory schools he had attended during the war are difficult to follow, because war conditions brought about a number of relocations of these schools: the Leningrad School was relocated to Omsk oblast but was still called Leningrad School; the Moscow School was relocated first to Achinsk, then to Kuybyshev, but was still the Moscow School, etc. Nosenko's interrogators were almost totally ignorant of these matters but did not know they were. Because they were unable to follow his detailed description of all these changes (documented by other informed sources, including Soviet historians), they thought something was wrong with Nosenko, not with themselves.

D. Errors or Omissions in Available CIA Headquarters Records

In this category lie many of the causes of error in building the cast against Nosenko. We are not speaking here of transcript errors but rather of sometimes quite understandable lacunae in CIA's collateral records.

Two important examples concern John Abidian, the State Department Security officer in Moscow who was, according to Nosenko, an American for whom Nosenko was operationally solely responsible.

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One point at issue was whether Abidian employed a maid in Moscow who would have been in a position to treat Abidian's clothes with a so-called "thief powder" used by the KGB to facilitate postal surveillance. Nosenko claimed that there was such a maid, and that her actions enabled the KGB to pick up three operational letters Abidian mailed for CIA, when the powder activated a sensor in the Soviet postal system.

The second point concerns the question of whether Nosenko lied in claiming that Abidian cased a dead-drop site in Moscow that we assumed Nosenko knew was crucial to the KGB apprehension of Oleg Penkovskiy.

On the first point, CIA had no record of Abidian's having a maid, because he did not formally hire one until a few months after his last letter mailing for CIA. However, the maid who served an American woman in the embassy also informally took care of Abidian's apartment throughout the time period in question. Thus, we were wrong, Nosenko was right.

The second point has yet to be subjected to confirmation, but there is strong circumstantial evidence that Abidian "cased" the Penkovskiy dead-drop site not once, but twice. The CIA officer tasked with the first casing had been too afraid to go himself, as ordered, and therefore apparently prevailed upon Abidian to handle the job for him. The report submitted by the case officer, however, could lead the reader to believe that the CIA man had carried out the first casing mission--under circumstances and in the time period when, according to Nosenko, Abidian handled the assignment.

Both these problems seems minor in and of themselves. But they were not minor in the context of the inquisition to which Nosenko was subjected. Rather, the discrepancies involved were evoked, as was every other discrepancy arising from whatever cause, to bolster the case against him.

E. CIA Assumptions about the Second Chief Directorate

Lacking contemporary information on the organization, responsibilities, policies and capabilities of the KGB's Second Chief Directorate from knowledgeable sources other than Nosenko, it was necessary for Nosenko's

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interrogators to extrapolate from pre-1954 defector information plus that received from Goleniewski and Golitsyn. Not one of the sources cited below by the principal case officer had ever been regularly employed in the Second Chief Directorate--except Nosenko.

In a memorandum of 20 October 1964, the principal case officer set out to demonstrate at great length that Nosenko's claim to the position of deputy chief of the American Embassy Section between early 1960 and late 1961 was completely false. Having informed his readers that this position was one of the most important in the entire Second Chief Directorate, he then proceeded to present a "job description" for it:

Functions of a KGB Deputy Section Chief: Within this framework, an understanding of the functions and responsibilities of any deputy chief of section in the KGB is important. The following description of this position has been confirmed by Deryabin, Rastvorov, Golitsyn, Goleniewski, and even in large part by Nosenko when speaking in general terms:

a. He must be broadly informed on the section's operations and individual case officer duties in order to act in the chief's absence, when he assumes responsibility for the entire section's work.

b. He approves and retains monthly schedules for planned use of safehouses by the section.

c. He discusses agent meeting schedules with individual case officers and approves and then retains a list of planned agent meetings for each case officer on a monthly basis.

d. He approves the acquisition of new agents and new safehouses and their transfer from one operation to another.

e. He usually maintains liaison with other KGB units on matters related to the section's target.

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f. Based on file reviews and discussions with individual case officers, he assigns priorities for the operations that each case officer handles.

g. He reviews and approves by signature the periodic written reports, general operational plans of the section, periodic section progress reports, and specific operational proposals of individual case officers which are required by the KGB. If the department [sic--meant to read "section"] chief signs these papers, the deputy chief still reads them in order to keep himself informed on the section's activity.

h. He assigns priorities for processing microphone material and telephone taps, for selecting targets for surveillance, etc.

i. He participates directly in important operational activities and is often in contact with agents or agent prospects. As a senior officer responsible for the section's operations, he or the section chief are almost invariably present during the compromise and recruitment of important target individuals. He periodically participates in control meetings with the section's agents in order to check on the development of individual operations and case officer's performance.

Hostile interrogations in January 1965 produced a different picture. Nosenko said that, as deputy section chief, his principal responsibility was to supervise operational activity against American embassy code clerks. His detailed knowledge of this activity and his description of innovative programs he had instituted in this area of operations have, with few exceptions, been fully verified by investigations and already existing collateral reporting.

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As for other aspects of his "job description," Nosenko said simply that he did whatever his chief told him to do, and, while he granted that he did from time to time perform some of the tasks outlined above, he denied that he had any such fixed administrative responsibilities. He contended that the other officers in the section were not children and did not require that Nosenko teach them what to do and how to do it.

The outline of the duties of a "deputy chief" was erroneous, because it was based on a misinterpretation of the Russian word zamestitel, the term Nosenko applied to himself when speaking his native language. When the meaning of this term was researched in 1968, a clear distinction was drawn between the American and Soviet conceptions of a "deputy":

"Zamestitel," or "Deputy," in Soviet bureaucratic practice and usage is not limited to denoting what we think of as the number 2 in the office, but rather is a broader term which can perhaps most accurately be rendered in English as "assistant." Soviet offices, at least at the higher levels, commonly have several "Deputies"; some may have five or six or even more. In keeping with this multiplicity, the Soviet term does not carry with it the same sense of responsibility and authority paralleling the Chief and of automatic replacement as the American term. The Soviet position of "Deputy" is probably not as intimately associated with a specific slot as is the American position of Deputy, if indeed it is so associated at all.

In addition, the outline of a "deputy chief's" duties can be considered tendentious because it was designed to establish a criterion of knowledgeability that Nosenko clearly did not meet. Had the principal case officer examined the validity of the criterion more closely, he could easily have determined for himself that it was unrealistic.

How misleading the Agency's misconceptions could be was also brought out in a paper written by certain SB

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Division officers in January 1969. The following excerpt is instructive:

[Officer No. 1] In the absence of a firm informative base, we were obliged to formulate a stereotype of the Second Chief Directorate (SCD) against which to compare Nosenko's information. That stereotype contains a variety of quite fixed assumptions regarding the authority of the SCD in the USSR, the extent of SCD cooperation with the First Chief Directorate, and the manner in which the SCD operates. Of particular relevance, with respect to some anomalies found in Nosenko's statements, are assumptions regarding the relative weight the SCD placed on the recruitment of agents among foreigners as compared to the control of foreigners, how much the SCD itself might know of certain events, and how much a specific SCD officer (Nosenko) should have known and recalled. I believe that some of our assumptions are too finely drawn, with the consequence that, at least in some instances, Nosenko's assertions have been improperly impugned.

[Officer No. 2] The SB Study is, I believe, generally reflective of an exaggerated view as to the overall capabilities of the SCD. There are implicit judgments made that the SCD had to be aware of certain things; therefore, Nosenko should have known about them in his various positions. For example, there is some question in my mind as to the validity of the assumption that KGB surveillance of Americans, even suspected CIA officers, is such as to make it suspicious when Nosenko is unaware of certain operational activities these CIA officers are known to have performed.

This possibly exaggerated view is also apparent when we question Nosenko's ignorance of incidents that we know occurred and which we conclude, or at least suppose, are KGB-inspired.

Finally, and possibly the most important, is the question of control as opposed to

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recruitment of American officials (excepting code clerks). While these two missions are not mutually exclusive, in either Nosenko's or our eyes, many times (particularly in the case of Abidian) we have faulted him for not knowing information that would be significant only in terms of interest in recruitment. If control was the main interest, as in Nosenko's claim, it would appear appropriate to judge Nosenko's information more in this context (perhaps a comparison with the FBI's mission with regard to Soviets would be helpful) than in the context of CIA operations against Soviets abroad. I sense that the latter was the case.

Thus, largely because of the influence of Golitsyn, the Agency greatly exaggerated the competence and, indeed, the authority of the KGB. Even though this defector's claims were often extravagant, they were received with very little reserve by senior officials who in turn applied them across-the-board. On a different conceptual level, this pattern of exaggeration was applied to individual positions within the KGB; since that organization was conceived as an all-seeing eye, it seemed to follow that individual officers within it would partake of its omniscience. Such habits of thought, regrettably, were self-reinforcing in a situation where the objective of CI analysis was not to uncover the truth, but rather to prove that a particular present or former Soviet official was part of a grand plot against the security of the United States. It made possible constant exciting discoveries of duplicity on the part of any Soviet source who came under analysis, simply because he could rarely ever measure up to our expectations of what he ought to have known, accomplished, or said.

F. The A Priori Assumption of Disinformation as Applied to the Popov and Related Cases

The remainder of this chapter is devoted to a retrospective analysis of the Popov case and the involvement of Nosenko therein.

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1. Prologue

It is ironic that both Nosenko and Golitsyn should have become so involved in the retrospective analysis of the Popov case, because neither knew a great deal about it. Perhaps they would not have become thus involved had it not been for the disinformation hypothesis.

Some time after 19 June 1962 the principal case officer was given access to tape transcripts of debriefings of Anatoliy Golitsyn, the KGB officer who had defected in Helsinki in December 1961. Debriefing of Golitsyn had been going on for over six months, compared with five relatively short, hectic conversations with Nosenko.

In a memorandum written by the principal case officer dated 27 June 1962, the day after his interview with Golitsyn, he set forth his views on "Possible Control of [Nosenko]." He opened with a statement: "Detailed study of [Golitsyn's] production in the light of [Nosenko's] has suggested the possibility that [Nosenko] may be part of a major Soviet disinformation operation . . . "

2. Implications of the Popov Case

Unfortunately for Nosenko he had, at the end of his first meeting with the principal case officer in 1962, said, "Tomorrow, I'll tell you how Popov was caught." Feelings ran high over this case, with which the principal case officer had been personally concerned in a minor capacity.

Petr Popov was a CIA source within the GRU from January 1953 to October 1959, when the KGB rolled up the operation in Moscow. He was the most important Soviet source CIA had ever had until the advent of Penkovskiy in 1961. Therefore, any information Nosenko might have on how the KGB had learned of Popov's clandestine cooperation with CIA was of great interest.

In Nosenko's discussion of Popov's compromise, he explained that, in January 1959, the KGB had had

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under surveillance a member of the American embassy in Moscow who, they were certain, was a CIA officer--as indeed he was. When they observed this man, [redacted], clandestinely mailing a letter in Moscow, the KGB intercepted the letter, found that it was addressed to Petr Popov, and came to realize that this Soviet was working for CIA. He was arrested soon thereafter and sent under KGB direction to make several clandestine meetings with another CIA officer, [redacted]. Finally in October 1959 the KGB apprehended [redacted] immediately after such a meeting, with material in his possession just received from Popov. The Popov case was over.

Enter Golitsyn. Originally, his information concerning the Popov case had been slight. As of the time of his defection in 1961, he knew or believed only that:

a. There had been an agent leaking Soviet military, political and intelligence information to the US.

b. When CIA officer [redacted] was assigned to Moscow, he was going there to handle "a special agent or mission . . . ."

c. Surveillance of [redacted] in Moscow then led the KGB to Popov.

Nosenko, for his part, said much the same thing but added that the KGB had been led to [redacted] through their surveillance of another CIA officer in Moscow, [redacted]. Unfortunately, to the principal case officer no statement meant what it purported to mean. Under Golitsyn's influence, his doubts concerning Nosenko's bona fides led to the use of an analytical technique that he described as trying "to read the case through a mirror to find its implications if it is bad . . . ." By the time this June 1962 memorandum was written, the principal case officer had decided that the story of the Popov compromise given by Nosenko was the primary area to determine whether CIA itself had been penetrated by the KGB.

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Golitsyn's 1962 reporting on how Popov was compromised, i.e., identified by name through KGB surveillance of Langelie in Moscow in 1959, varied from Nosenko's story only in the name of the officer surveilled. The Golitsyn report was actually completely omitted from a 17 April 1963 memorandum. (Why this omission passed unnoticed is not explained in any records in this case.) Yet when Golitsyn gave a completely different story of the compromise in June 1964, after he had read all the Popov case materials, this story became the Golitsyn gospel and has remained so to this day in Golitsyn's argumentation. We shall come to Golitsyn's 1964 version shortly, but first some additional background is needed.

Since Nosenko had said that Popov was compromised through KGB surveillance of [ ] the "mirror" technique indicated that this was not the case. The mental leap from this postulate was that if surveillance of [ ] was not the cause of the compromise, then recruitment of [ ] by the KGB was the logical possibility to be explored.

[ ] had met a Soviet known to him as Vladimir Komarov, who had spent nearly a year assigned to the Soviet embassy in Washington, DC. [ ] reported meeting this Soviet in Moscow.

The man called Komarov was known to Golitsyn and to Nosenko as Vyacheslav Kovshuk, a Second Chief Directorate case officer who was chief of the section working against the American embassy, Moscow.

[ ] documented association with Komarov/Kovshuk came to light immediately when name traces were run on the Soviet. The same reporting documented his one-time meeting with a friend of Komarov/Kovshuk's--a TASS correspondent just returned from Washington named Aleksandr Kislov.

Kislov, Nosenko had told CIA in 1962, was his friend in the Soviet Disarmament Delegation in Geneva with whom Nosenko had gotten drunk on several occasions. Asked if Kislov was also a KGB officer, Nosenko specifically denied that he was.

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A review of FBI reporting on Komarov/Kovshuk's TDY in Washington brought to light a close regular association with Kislov, in company with a number of identified KGB officers, leading to a strong circumstantial case that, contrary to Nosenko's denial, Kislov probably was a KGB officer. His contact with [redacted] in Moscow, introduced by Komarov/Kovshuk, was therefore held to be not a coincidence but:

We cannot find a convenient explanation for Kislov's role in this theory, but it appears significant . . .

A further twist concerned Golitsyn's and Nosenko's reporting on Komarov/Kovshuk's TDY to Washington. Both sources agreed that it was related to recruitment of an American who had earlier served in the Moscow embassy (speculation by Golitsyn) or reactivation of an American already recruited in Moscow (also Golitsyn speculation; but statement of fact by Nosenko, supplemented with specific details that would eventually lead to identification of the agent).

Nosenko said Kovshuk came to Washington to reactivate a code machine mechanic, KGB code name "ANDREY," who had been recruited and had worked in Moscow in the early fifties. In the first Geneva cable of 9 June 1962, in the principal case officer's memoranda, and throughout the second case officer's "transcripts" of 1962, this agent was consistently misdescribed as a garage mechanic, although Nosenko in fact always called him a code machine mechanic. Thanks to this major error in notes and transcription, the FBI was hindered in its investigation of this lead until Nosenko corrected our misconception in January 1964. The FBI already had located the one possible candidate for this lead but could not actively pursue the investigation until this confusion was cleared up. By December 1965, they finally succeeded in obtaining a limited confession from a code machine mechanic who had been at the American embassy, Moscow, from 1952 to 1954, and this confirmed the essentials of Nosenko's reporting of 1962.

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3. Impact of Penkovskiy's Arrest on "Popov Compromise Theory"

Without our going into details on the Penkovskiy case, it is important to know that in October 1962, only four months after the first Nosenko meetings, the KGB dramatically announced the arrest of another penetration of the GRU--Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy. This was yet another blow to CIA, even more serious than the Popov arrest, and a great deal of worried thought was given to the cause of Penkovskiy's exposure.

Penkovskiy's arrest heightened the suspicions within CIA--especially Soviet Russian Division--that there must be a KGB penetration of CIA for two such calamities to have occurred within three years. When in April 1963 a KGB officer, working within the KGB as a Western agent, reported that Penkovskiy (like Popov) had been exposed to the KGB through its omnipresent surveillance in Moscow, senior SR Division officers interpreted this report as proof of KGB disinformation designed to conceal KGB penetration of CIA.

4. Golitsyn's 1964 Story

In June 1964, while commenting on Nosenko's version of the Popov compromise, Golitsyn stated that the KGB report he had referred to in 1962 stated that the KGB did not consider running Popov as a double because he could not be trusted. He then went on to give a completely new story of the Popov compromise, diametrically opposite to his original information.

Golitsyn stated then that a certain Kotov (first name not given), who had been in the KGB in Vienna during the period Popov was there, suspected Popov of being a Western agent and made known his suspicions. At the time, no action was taken by Kotov's superiors. In 1957 or 1958, however, when the KGB received similar information from another source, Kotov was sent to Germany because he knew Popov and was familiar with his background. (Contrary to his 1962 report, Golitsyn here implied strongly that Popov, by name, was identified

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by the KGB as a CIA agent in Berlin in 1957 or 1958.) Golitsyn's 1964 story must be evaluated within the framework of the facts that follow.

On 21 November 1963, Chief, SR recorded the passage to Golitsyn, through the CI Staff, of all materials passed to CIA by Popov, including English language transcripts of all operational meetings held with Popov in Vienna in 1953-1955 and all operational meetings held with him in Berlin 1957-1958. Thus, by the time Golitsyn was commenting on Nosenko's version of the Popov compromise in June 1964, he had become aware of everything Popov had told CIA, specifically what was going on in Berlin in 1957 and 1958. This included Popov's mention of a KGB officer named Kotov, who arrived a week or two before Popov was recalled to Moscow, and another KGB officer named Zhukov, who had worked against the Yugoslav target at the same time that Popov worked on this target for the GRU in Vienna. In view of the fact that Golitsyn's story in June 1964 varied drastically from that he had told in March 1962, it is legitimate to suspect that he had recreated a story of Popov's compromise based on deductions he had made after reading the Popov transcripts. Thus, the 1964 decision must be thrown out of court.

5. The Hypothesis that CIA was Penetrated

Unfortunately for the course of events in the Nosenko case, it was Golitsyn's 1962 version that was ignored in favor of his "facts" of 1964, which condemned Nosenko's story as strongly as his 1962 version had supported Nosenko. The reason for this is obvious. The Popov compromise hypothesis had been feeding on itself for so long that it had come to be treated as fact, with the result that the subject of Popov's compromise became a kind of litmus paper test of every Soviet source. If a Soviet source reporting to CIA on Popov agreed with Nosenko that KGB surveillance, rather than a KGB agent-- a penetration of CIA--had compromised Popov, then that Soviet source was held to be a part of an ever-growing massive KGB conspiracy to protect penetration(s) of CIA. By further extension, Nosenko's failure to produce evidence that Popov and Penkovskiy had been

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compromised by a KGB penetration of CIA was interpreted as proof that indeed such a penetration must exist.

The acceptance of Golitsyn's story in turn guaranteed not only that Nosenko could never be seen as bona fide, but also that all other Soviet sources must be considered suspect if they supported Nosenko's story. The overall result was to distort seriously for a number of years the ability of the Soviet Bloc Division accurately to evaluate the bona fides of any defector or agent.

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CHAPTER VI

Dezinformatsiya: Origins of the Concept and Application in the Nosenko Case

There can be little doubt that the handling Nosenko received as a supposed dispatched agent would not have taken place precisely as it did had it not been for the Soviet intelligence practice known as dezinformatsiya. Furthermore, the timing of Nosenko's defection, some months after that of Golitsyn, the fact that Nosenko provided information on some of the same or similar persons or leads as had Golitsyn, and Golitsyn's conclusion that Nosenko had been dispatched by the KGB specifically to discredit him (Golitsyn) as part of a dezinformatsiya operation--all these factors combined to preclude "normal" professional treatment of Nosenko. As a defector, Nosenko's bona fides should have been established, or not established, on the basis of careful and sound analysis and investigation of the information he provided under standard interrogation procedures. In actuality, he came under suspicion as a KGB-controlled agent long before he presented himself as a defector, and his handling was therefore based upon this prejudgment.

Dezinformatsiya is a Soviet concept and practice of long standing that has been defined or described by numerous sources through the years. Two representative definitions are as follows:

Petr Deryabin: Dezinformatsiya is the deliberate and purposeful dissemination of false information regarding accomplished facts and/or intentions, plans of action, etc., for the purpose of misleading the enemy. Such disseminations may be accomplished by means of the press, radio and television, agent reports and communications, operations, etc. The term also refers to the information itself.

Anatoliy Golitsyn: In Soviet parlance, the term dezinformatsiya is used to denote false, incomplete, misleading information passed, fed or confirmed to opposition services for the purpose of causing these services (and their governments) to reach erroneous conclusions regarding the USSR or inducing them to undertake action beneficial to the USSR.

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By means of dezinformatsiya, again according to Golitsyn, the Soviet government hopes to ensure that the policy decisions of a given country will be based on a false impression of the USSR's domestic or military posture. Specific measures taken to achieve this end might be designed to induce a foreign country to engage in costly and useless research projects, to create a misconception about or adversely affect the stature of another country in the eyes of the world, to remove by nonviolent means, such as publicly discrediting, individuals who are considered a threat to the national interests of the USSR, or to weaken or dissolve, create or strengthen certain political parties.

With regard to the definitions quoted above, Deryabin, Golitsyn and others have spoken from knowledge gained as Soviet state security officers. However, implicit in all definitions is the fact that dezinformatsiya is not an activity that is the exclusive prerogative of the security organs. It has always been carried out as a matter of government policy, as an activity that at times may involve the security organs.

Before 1959, there was no separate dezinformatsiya department within the KGB (or its predecessor organizations), although establishment of such a unit had been discussed from time to time. Each geographic component handling foreign intelligence operations was responsible for dezinformatsiya work within its own sphere of activity. All such work was carried out with the approval of higher authorities within the KGB, frequently in consultation with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, and even in many instances with the specific approval of the Central Committee of the CPSU. It was not until 1959 that responsibility for dezinformatsiya insofar as it was to be the concern of the First (foreign intelligence) Chief Directorate of the KGB was centralized within that unit, and not until 1961 that the concept of dezinformatsiya played any significant role in the thinking of CIA counterintelligence officers.

The dezinformatsiya concept was first highlighted for CIA by the senior Polish UB officer, Michal Goleniewski, who initially provided information by anonymous correspondence starting in 1958 and later while under interrogation following his defection in January 1961. The information he provided was of major significance, as he had dealt with the KGB on the subject of dezinformatsiya from as early as 1953 and was in fact not only a ranking Polish intelligence officer but also a KGB agent. While Goleniewski was not the first source to refer to dezinformatsiya, he was the first to bring it to

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CIA consciousness as a technique to be reckoned with in our analysis of the USSR's foreign policy. It was his claim that the Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence services played a major role in the implementation of such policies.

Specifically, Goleniewski provided information that was to serve as the basis for premises as to what the KGB would do upon learning of the defection of a KGB officer. Goleniewski stated that one of the many objectives of KGB dezinformatsiya was the protection of Soviet agents by means of action designed to mislead Western security services. He listed among specific objectives and types of dezinformatsiya operations those designed to confirm unimportant true information, thus establishing in the eyes of the opposition the reliability of a channel through which the KGB passes misleading information to anti-Soviet governments.

Conversely, another type of dezinformatsiya operation might be designed to discredit accurate information of significance received by the opposition through sources not under Soviet control, e.g., defectors, thus casting doubt on the veracity of the source or sources of this true information.

Goleniewski stated further that the information passed through dezinformatsiya channels could be based on analysis of what was already known about any sensitive items, i.e., could stem from defector damage assessments. One means obviously might be the channeling of information at variance with that provided by the defector. Another means might be the provision of "give away" material, which neither added to information already in the hands of the opposition nor, by the same token, did any particular damage to the KGB. In extreme cases, the KGB would be willing to sacrifice some of their own agent assets in the interest of enhancing the reputation of an agent penetration of one of the anti-Communist intelligence services. (That this latter technique was used to advantage by the KGB in building Heinz Felfe as a penetration agent within the German Intelligence Service has been assumed in most analyses of that case. Felfe was a KGB agent for all of the ten years he worked for the German Intelligence Service, from 1951 until his arrest in 1961. During this period Felfe was able to work his way up to the position of chief of the Soviet Section of the German counterintelligence staff. It has been postulated that Felfe's rise in the German intelligence ranks was assisted by the KGB, which was willing to sacrifice less important agent assets to enhance Felfe's reputation and position as their long-term penetration agent.

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In all its essentials, the information provided by Goleniewski was confirmed and elaborated upon by Golitsyn, who defected in December 1961 and who was the first significant Soviet or Soviet Bloc defector to come into CIA hands after Goleniewski. In addition to the general definition of dezinformatsiya quoted above, Golitsyn said that a KGB (or GRU) defector's file would be sent to the KGB dezinformatsiya unit; the latter would search for opportunities to exploit the situation, after review of the probable areas of information revealed to the opposition by the defector. He indicated in this connection that the Disinformation Department of the KGB maintained extensive files organized on a topical basis, containing all information on a given topic that was known (from the debriefing of defectors to the Soviets, double agents, captured agents, etc.) to be in the hands of opposition intelligence services. For example, a KGB officer assigned to Beirut to work against the American embassy who defected to CIA would be assumed by the KGB Department of Disinformation to have told CIA everything he knew about KGB operations against the embassy and embassy personnel. By reference to their files on Beirut operations, the Department of Disinformation would be able to determine the extent to which KGB operations in that area had been compromised to CIA.

On the basis of the foregoing information, it might be assumed that the Golitsyn and Nosenko defections would have received similar handling by the KGB Department of Disinformation and by CIA upon their arrival as defectors to the West. However, the two men were not similarly received by CIA when they presented themselves as defectors; they received completely different handling, based on quite different assessment of the information they provided and their motives for defecting. Golitsyn was accepted as a bona fide defector in relatively short order, while Nosenko was speedily rejected as a bona fide defector, as explained below.

Golitsyn, an officer of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB, defected to CIA in Helsinki in mid-December 1961. Information that he provided relating to the organization and structure of the KGB was accepted as factual and true, at least in part because there was relatively little record information against which it could be compared, but also because the information appeared to be logical and reasonable. In addition, he provided voluminous and valuable information on KGB personalities; available CIA file holdings were limited, but the information provided by Golitsyn proved to

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be accurate to the extent it could be checked against these holdings. Finally, he provided a theory of KGB operations that was not only accepted at face value but received with outright enthusiasm. Given the value of his information, plus his apparent motivation for defecting, which included an obsession with the evil inherent in the KGB and an emphatically-stated wish to "fight against the KGB," his bona fides was accepted in March 1962.

The reception accorded Nosenko, after he defected in 1964, has already been recorded in detail. That Nosenko did not receive standard treatment as a defector whose bona fides would be determined on the basis of the information he provided under interrogation after defection inevitably involves reference to Golitsyn. As explained in Chapter III, Golitsyn himself played a curious role in that, as a result of the trust placed in his judgment, he was actually encouraged to label Nosenko as a deception agent.

This situation arose as follows: During initial contacts with CIA in 1962, Nosenko provided information on personalities that was similar to that provided a few months earlier by Golitsyn. Because CIA counterintelligence officers had been warned by Goleniewski that they should not be "taken in" by false information fed to them through no matter what channels, the "duplication" or "overlapping" information given by Nosenko was viewed with extreme suspicion. This original doubt led to information provided by Nosenko being shown to Golitsyn soon after the former's defection. The paranoid Golitsyn immediately saw Nosenko as a person sent out to discredit or even assassinate him.

Thereafter, the desire of CIA counterintelligence officers not to be outwitted by the KGB led them to apply an analytical technique that has been referred to variously as "double think" or "mirror reading." This "analysis" led to the conclusion that Nosenko, as a dispatched agent, was feeding us what the KGB wanted us to believe. Thus, everything Nosenko said had to be "interpreted." If he said that the KGB had been unable to recruit any Americans serving at the US embassy in Moscow during a given period, this meant that the KGB had been quite successful in doing so. If he provided information on a given topic that we had already received from another source, this meant that the KGB wanted us to believe that particular piece of information, hence the other source undoubtedly was a KGB agent as well. And so on. Facts were discarded or ignored when they did not fit the hypothesis

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that Nosenko was a dispatched agent. Any other sources whose information confirmed, tended to confirm, or dealt with any of the topics mentioned by Nosenko were regarded as "contaminated"--that is to say, they were considered part of the same dezinformatsiya plot in which Nosenko figured.

Golitsyn played a major role in this "analytical process." As soon as Nosenko's defection became public, Golitsyn asked whether he could participate in Nosenko's interrogation. As of 20 February 1964 the DDP had agreed that Golitsyn should be brought into the operation and given full access to the "Nosenko material." The reasoning at this time, given Golitsyn's identification of Nosenko's function as a false defector, was that the Nosenko operation was "the reverse of the Golitsyn coin" and thus that Golitsyn's assistance was required to pursue it properly. Accordingly, over the next several months Golitsyn was provided with material from the 1962 and 1964 meetings with Nosenko and at his request was supplied with all available biographic data on Nosenko to assist him in "analyzing" the operation.

On 29 June 1964 Golitsyn was interviewed by Chief, CI Staff, Deputy Chief, CI Staff and Chief, SR Division. The following is quoted from the transcripts of this meeting:

Golitsyn: I have made a study of the documents and information which was provided to me about Nosenko and his interrogations. I would like now to make known my conclusions . . . my conclusion is that he is not a bona fide defector. He is a provocateur, who is on a mission for the KGB . . . to mislead, chief in the field of investigations . . . on Soviet penetrations made mainly by [the] Second Chief Directorate to Moscow . . . Why did they choose Nosenko for that mission? In my opinion, Nosenko was recommended by Churanov, Kovshuk and Guk\* for the mission. Nosenko could have been

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\*Vladimir Aleksandrovich Churanov, Vladislav Mikhaylovich Kovshuk and Yuriy Ivanovich Guk. Churanov and Kovshuk were colleagues and good friends of Nosenko's in the Second Chief Directorate. Guk, also a close friend of Nosenko's, was a one-time officer of the Second Chief Directorate; he transferred to the First Chief Directorate and was posted at the Soviet Mission to the European Office of the United Nations in Geneva at the time of Nosenko's temporary duty there in 1962.

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named or recommended by them and the KGB gave these people a chance. They are very energetic--all of them. And, of course, they discuss things among themselves. Many of them had made mistakes--they had told too much. They were, therefore, in the damage report (on my defection) and for them the only way to act was to suggest an operation against me in order to save their face, to save the situation.

It can be argued that Golitsyn had two interests: (a) to discredit Nosenko in order to maintain a position of pre-eminence as advisor to CIA (and other Western intelligence services) on Soviet intelligence matters, and (b) to promote his contentions as to how the West was being deceived by the Soviet Union in political and strategic matters, and thus to enhance his position as advisor to governments on overall Soviet political matters.

Golitsyn clearly had a high opinion of himself. When he defected, he brought with him some 23 classified documents from the Soviet embassy in Helsinki, which he made clear he wished to discuss with President Kennedy and the Director of Central Intelligence personally, to alert them to what was going on and to measures needing to be taken. Moreover, his willingness to cooperate with CIA and other US government agencies underwent changes from time to time, depending upon whether his demands for access to and interviews with specified ranking officials of those organizations were granted.

Golitsyn's chosen role as interpreter of Soviet policy and anti-Western actions was threatened by the arrival of Nosenko. His response was to gain access to virtually all of CIA's files on Nosenko for purposes of providing CIA with an "interpretation" of the latter's role. In any event, the idea took hold within CIA as a result of Golitsyn's hammering away at this theme that we were being "had" by the Soviets, particularly by being penetrated as a result of clever KGB counterintelligence operations, and that Nosenko had to be "broken" at all costs; his "confession" would make clear to us the details and dimensions of the Soviet machinations.

Further, it was deemed expedient not only to proceed with efforts to "break" Nosenko but also to study past

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operations known to have been Soviet-controlled to see what could be learned from these cases about how the Soviet intelligence services had carried out their activities against the West through the years. This study of historic Soviet cases, designed not to explore a hypothesis but to prove an already-accepted thesis, produced information about an awesome "enemy," cunning and complex, lavishing money and manpower on operations that were almost invariably successful. The fact that many of these cases were primarily of historic interest, undertaken at a particular time to take advantage of or exploit a particular situation that no longer obtained or had little or no pertinence to Nosenko's defection, appears to have been discounted. On the contrary, since the cases included in the study were considered to have been hugely successful in duping or deluding the Western intelligence services and governments, it was concluded that we were continuing to be deluded and duped. It was reasoned that, as CIA and other Western intelligence services became increasingly aware of and informed on the Soviet operational techniques being used against them and changed their operational tactics accordingly, the KGB simply adjusted to the new situation and continued to outwit us. With Shelepin and succeeding chiefs of the KGB as members of the Central Committee, it was assumed that those KGB operations that could be (or were) classed as dezinformatsiya were not only important per se but took on added importance inasmuch as the KGB, through its chief, was involved in the policy making body of the Soviet Union. Consequently, any operation as important as the one that involved sending a senior KGB officer, Nosenko, to the West on a dezinformatsiya mission must have been an exceedingly important one, involving high-level staff coordination. Any other agents who provided confirmatory information or whose information could in any way be regarded as suspiciously coincidental had to be part of the overall operation. Given the importance of the operation, Chairman Khrushchev was undoubtedly directing the whole thing himself.

No attention was paid to the fact that, despite the assertions of Goleniewski and Golitsyn, there was no known case of a KGB officer's ever having been sent to discredit a previous defector in the eyes of a Western intelligence service. After brief consideration of the notion that Nosenko might not even be a member of the KGB at all, it was decided that the KGB had dispatched him to counter Golitsyn.

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Conclusions

In retrospect, it seems worthwhile to point out that (a) in the years since Nosenko's first contact and subsequent defection, no information has ever been developed to substantiate the charges made against him either by Golitsyn or by the "mirror-readers"; (b) Golitsyn's information with respect to dezinformatsiya has not been internally consistent; and (c) Golitsyn himself as the architect and sponsor of theories presented has not been able to support his claims, despite the wealth of information made available to him for analysis. The following is quoted from an unsigned paper, dated 10 September 1968, in summation of Golitsyn's claims:

Golitsyn's overall thesis, that the Soviet leadership in 1959 developed a "New Policy" (peaceful coexistence, non-violent tactics, united front, etc.) is perfectly acceptable as a statement of the "Right" strategy developed during the mid- and late-fifties and enshrined in the November 1960 Moscow Manifesto. Golitsyn's depiction of this policy as, in toto, a "misinformation" operation rests upon his extremely broad use of that term: "special deliberate efforts of the communist governments to mislead Western studies and to direct them in wrong directions" by means of official Soviet speeches and Party documents, official press and propaganda outlets, travel controls, diplomatic activities, leaks, etc. His vocabulary and general handling of this new Bloc policy gives the strategy a conspiratorial quality not justified by its essentially open and public character.

The role of the KGB in the execution and coordination of this policy is constantly alluded to, but no evidence is provided to define the precise nature of its role and no actual "covert" disinformation operations are cited for the years from 1959 to the present. Golitsyn provided factual evidence for "politicalization" of the KGB in 1959, but its new role may also be interpreted to cover routine operations of covert propaganda, political action, recruitment of

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agents of influence and specific "disinformation" operations without involving the KGB (or the Bloc intelligence services) in any broader role.

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CHAPTER VII

Golitsyn Vs. Nosenko: A Comparison  
Of Their Handling By CIA

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the differences in handling by CIA of the two KGB defectors, Anatoliy Golitsyn and Yuriy Nosenko. Comparison is material to this study, since it was Golitsyn's "confirmation" of certain theories regarding Nosenko as a dispatched agent that helped to establish the standards by which CIA judged Nosenko when he walked in some months after Golitsyn. It is also material, since Golitsyn played a role in CIA efforts to "break" Nosenko. Brief discussion of the treatment given the two men follows.

Interrogation

The defections of Golitsyn and Nosenko cannot be considered directly comparable, since some five meetings were held with Nosenko about eighteen months before his actual defection. There had been no similar contact with Golitsyn before his defection. However, the following statements can be made.

Golitsyn was brought to this country within days of his defection in Helsinki in December 1961. Standard interrogation procedures were initiated, which included his systematic debriefing regarding his own biographic data, family background and career, and his knowledge of the structure, organization, personalities and operations of the KGB. What he said was checked against CIA files and formed the basis for his acceptance within weeks of arrival in the United States as a bona fide defector.

In Nosenko's case, he cannot be said to have been interrogated at all, in the strict sense of the word, during initial contacts with him in Geneva in June 1962. For one thing, he evinced no desire to defect at that time but simply offered certain pieces of information that he thought would be of interest to CIA, in exchange for a specified sum of money that he claimed to need. Also, time with him was limited.

When Nosenko actually defected in February 1964, he was interrogated in a manner that contrasted sharply with that applied in Golitsyn's case. In the interim between initial

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contacts in 1962 and his defection in 1964, as previously explained, it had been concluded that he was a dispatched agent. Voluminous papers had been written during this period "proving" that such was the case, and because of the accumulated "evidence" it was decided to attempt to "break" him as soon as possible. Accordingly, and because it was also believed imperative to act quickly, Nosenko's interrogation took place in various pre-planned stages or phases, ranging from ostensibly friendly to hostile.

In Nosenko's case, then, the entire effort was to force him to admit to CIA's accusations rather than to obtain information from him in any logical or systematic fashion. Efforts were made to "trap" him or "throw him off balance," by indicating that CIA had "proof" that he was lying, that his only option was to "confess" that he had been sent by the KGB, etc. His denials of charges or refusals to "confess" only resulted in increasingly hostile treatment. While his statements did contain inconsistencies, and there were questions for which he gave no adequate or consistent and logical answers, the manner in which he was questioned was in no way that afforded the usual defector. Moreover, the pressures put upon Nosenko contributed to the creation of a climate not conducive to proper interrogation. It was not until October 1967, in fact, that he received a proper interrogation.

#### Polygraph Examination

As with other phases of their respective handling, the account of Nosenko's polygraph examinations is in marked contrast with that of Golitsyn.

Golitsyn was given two polygraph examinations, on 27 and 28 March 1962, by a polygraph operator of the Office of Security. The tests were administered under special ground rules that were established initially during discussions held on 16 March 1962 between Deputy Chief, SR Division, and Deputy Director, Office of Security. It was agreed at that time that Golitsyn was to be regarded as a "special case"; his "flap potential" was regarded as high, because high US government officials were aware of Golitsyn's allegations that the US government and CIA were penetrated at a high level, and these allegations had been accepted to that point by CIA without reservations. Also, Golitsyn himself had reacted adversely to the idea of taking a polygraph examination and had consented only after it had been brought

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home to him that the test was an absolute requirement for receipt of resident alien status in the United States.

The unusual manner in which the tests were conducted is illustrated in the following quotations from the report later submitted by the polygraph operator:

The undersigned had a series of prepolygraph conferences with [Chief], SR/CI [a] CI Staff officer, and [an officer] of the Office of Security. The general consensus of the interested parties regarding what areas should and should not be covered during polygraph testing all reflected the fact that Subject [Golitsyn] should be disturbed as little as possible by the questions asked during the polygraph test so that he would not feel personally offended and as a result become "sour," unmanageable or uncooperative. Furthermore, that no indication be given to [Golitsyn] during testing that there were any doubts as to his reliability or defection motivation.

. . . [Polygraph] coverage was to deal with questions pertaining to whether [Golitsyn] was a dispatched KGB agent, if [Golitsyn] had a mission in connection with his defection, if [Golitsyn] was intentionally misforming his [American intelligence] interviewer, whether he had any secret prearranged means of contact with Soviet officials, if he had a concrete plan to return to the USSR, as well as questions dealing with his motivation (the latter to be asked as discreetly as possible so as not to disturb).

. . . It was also pointed out . . . during the pre-polygraph conferences . . . that regardless of how [Golitsyn] reacted specifically, even if there were consistent specific indications of deception to the questions, under no circumstances should [Golitsyn] be made aware of the fact that [we] had conclusive polygraph evidence which reflected that [Golitsyn] was attempting deception to the pertinent questions.

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Although the operator was fluent in Russian, the test was given to Golitsyn on 27 March 1962 in English; Russian was used only when Golitsyn failed to comprehend the full and accurate meaning of a question. Golitsyn raised no objections to any questions asked, but the operator did not consider the day's testing conclusive, because of the difficulties that had arisen owing to Golitsyn's poor comprehension of English plus a malfunctioning polygraph.

A second test was therefore given the following day, 28 March, in the Russian language, during the course of which Golitsyn was asked the same questions as on the previous day. Before the test could be initiated, however, Golitsyn again had to be convinced of the necessity for taking it. He stated that he had thought over the questions he had been asked the previous day, and he considered them "insulting." He resented having been asked whether he had been sent by the KGB, whether he had a mission connected with his defection having to do with misinformation, his motivation for defecting, etc. In the operator's words, he resented "all in all, any and every question which may have reflected that he was not accepted 100 percent on the basis of only his own explanations and assurances." Nevertheless, the test was finally conducted. Upon its completion, the operator informed Golitsyn that he (the operator) had concluded that Golitsyn was substantially truthful in his answers and that, as far as the operator was concerned, the results were favorable.

Six months later, the Office of Security reviewed the polygraph charts, as well as the questions that had been posed, the transcriptions of the interviews, and the final report. On 19 September 1962, a memorandum was prepared for the chief of the Interrogation and Research Division of the Office of Security. The report contained the following initial statements:

A review of [the operator's report on the testing of Golitsyn] reflects everything except a clear-cut statement of whether or not Golitsyn lied or did not lie to any or all of the questions. The report states that the first day's testing was inconclusive. The results of the second day's testing is not set forth. The report is rather remarkable for this reason.

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This review indicates that the first day's charts showed that Golitsyn was very nervous during testing on that day, but considerably less so on the second. No particular interpretation was placed on this lessened apprehension, other than to note that Golitsyn knew what to expect in the way of questions and procedures on the second day, and also that on the second day he was tested in Russian rather than English. Of more interest is the reviewer's conclusion that, while the charts for 28 March show no noticeable reactions to relevant questions, they also show no noticeable reactions to any other questions: the reviewer was unable to determine which, if any, of the questions were designed to be "hot" or control questions that could provoke a response indicative of deception; thus, the reviewer concluded that the questions were not well conceived. In addition, it was noted that Golitsyn was not asked any detailed questions on his personal biography that might have indicated whether he was withholding information. The ultimate conclusion was that the charts, with the limitations noted above, did not show reactions indicating that Golitsyn was a dispatched Soviet agent. However, the report also contained the following conclusion:

This should not be considered any definitive [polygraph examination]. The conditions and limitations placed on the [polygraph] officer as reflected in the body of the report imposed a set of conditions that preclude and make impossible any unequivocal statement that a conclusive [polygraph examination] was conducted.

\* \* \* \* \*

The use of the polygraph in Nosenko's case contrasts sharply with the way it was used on Golitsyn. We shall not go into detail here, because Nosenko's polygraph examinations are covered at length in Chapter VIII. It is relevant here, however, to make the point that those polygraph examinations of both Golitsyn and Nosenko performed prior to 1968 were all invalid.

## Access to Classified Information

With respect to their relative access to classified information, the cases of Golitsyn and Nosenko could not stand in greater contrast.

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Practically from the moment of his arrival in this country, Golitsyn began to demand access to CIA files. He largely achieved his ends and was soon being given transcripts of his own debriefing sessions as well as what has been described as a "valuable library," including reference publications classified up to SECRET. Starting in November 1963, voluminous information was made available to him, including:

A. Thirty-two documents concerning the Penkovskiy case.

B. Biographical sketch on, and all (83) reports obtained from, Nikolay Artamonov, a Soviet naval officer who defected in 1959.

C. Voluminous documents pertaining to the Popov case, including secret writing messages, meeting transcripts and contact reports.

D. Copies of the first four substantive cables from Geneva relating to the circumstances of Nosenko's contact with CIA in Geneva in 1962. The cables included details of the first meeting with a US Foreign Service Officer.

E. Transcriptions of all meetings with Nosenko in Geneva in 1962 following those noted in the cables described above.

F. Transcriptions of meetings 1 through 13 with Nosenko in Geneva in 1964.

G. Material requested by Golitsyn in connection with his "work on the Nosenko case": biographic information provided by Nosenko before he underwent hostile interrogation; a copy of the documents and handwritten notes that Nosenko brought out with him; a resume of the first week's hostile interrogation of Nosenko; Nosenko's comments on Yuriy Krotkov's manuscript entitled Fear (Krotkov was a writer and KGB agent who defected in London in 1963); and a nearly complete collection of photo identifications made by Nosenko as of that date.

H. Sanitized copy of a cable summary of Nosenko's reactions to Yuriy Krotkov.

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I. Biographic sketch of a US citizen and CIA staff officer at one time stationed in Moscow, with a list of operations in which he was involved.

J. Biographic sketch of a US citizen and former CIA staff officer at one time stationed in Moscow, with a list of operations in which he had been involved.

K. Biographic sketch of a US citizen and former CIA staff employee who had served as Security Officer of the American embassy in Moscow.

L. Biographic sketch of a US citizen and Foreign Service Officer who cooperated with CIA during the period of his assignment to the American embassy in Moscow, plus a list of operational actions carried out by him for CIA.

M. Biographic sketch of a US citizen and Foreign Service Officer who cooperated with CIA during the period of his assignment to the American embassy in Moscow, with a list of operational actions carried out by him for CIA.

N. Biographic sketch of a US citizen and Foreign Service Officer assigned to the American embassy in Moscow at one time. He had no CIA affiliation.

O. Biographic sketch of a US citizen and Foreign Service Officer assigned to the American embassy in Moscow at one time. He had no CIA affiliation. Golitsyn was provided with a copy of an interview of him conducted by US government security officers (not identified as to agency affiliation).

P. Biographic sketch of a US citizen and Foreign Service Officer assigned to the American embassy in Moscow at one time. He had no CIA affiliation.

Q. Biographic sketch of a US citizen and CIA staff officer at one time assigned to Moscow.

R. Information on a Russian-born American citizen employed as an interpreter by the United

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Nations in Geneva who was the object of a KGB recruitment attempt while on loan to UNESCO for conference work in Tbilisi in 1968.

S. Biographic information on CIA-connected personnel mentioned in the Cherepanov papers. This information was additional to sketches on the same persons given to Golitsyn with the transcript for Meeting No. 12 with Nosenko in Geneva in 1964.

T. A nine-page summary of the status of the Nosenko case, including information on the results of Nosenko's 1964 polygraph examination, on his confrontation and subsequent interrogation, on his life history, on CIA conclusions ("daily support for our conviction that Nosenko was sent on a KGB mission"), on CIA plans for future handling of Nosenko (continued interrogation), and on Nosenko's circumstances (confinement under observation, without cigarettes or reading material).

U. Copies of two reports on the subject of KGB audio-technical operations, one prepared on the basis of information provided by Golitsyn himself in 1962 and one prepared on the basis of information brought out by Nosenko in 1964, with notation for Golitsyn that recent sweeping operations in the American embassy in Moscow had located all the microphones identified by Nosenko and a number not mentioned by Nosenko.

V. A repeat of Nosenko's commentary on Krotkov (identified above), expanded to include identifications Nosenko made of the KGB people involved with Krotkov.

W. A list of questions that Krotkov had suggested be put to Nosenko to confirm and clarify information given by Krotkov.

X. Biographic sketches on Vladimir Kovshuk, Yuriy Guk, Aleksandr Feklisov alias Fomin, and Igor Ivanov. Kovshuk and Guk were KGB officers known to both Golitsyn and Nosenko; with Vladimir Churanov, they were credited by Golitsyn as having

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recommended to the KGB that Nosenko be sent to the West to discredit Golitsyn in the eyes of CIA and other Western intelligence services. Feklisov was a KGB officer who visited the United States as part of Khrushchev's party in 1959 and later (1960-1964) served as Counselor of the Soviet embassy in Washington, DC. Ivanov was arrested by the FBI in 1963 in connection with the case of John W. Butenko, an electronics engineer who was arrested as a KGB agent. These reports were given to Golitsyn as his request.

Y. A chronology of the case of Boris Belitskiy, a KGB-controlled CIA source. Golitsyn had asked to "re-read" the file on Belitskiy, whose status vis-a-vis the KGB was first reported to CIA by Nosenko. Golitsyn was also given a background sketch of Belitskiy and transcripts of "all four contact periods."

Z. File summary of the case of Mikhail Fedorov alias Razin, a GRU colonel who served as an illegal in France in 1958-1959.

AA. Case descriptions of two operations serviced by CIA personnel in Moscow. Both were KGB couriers dispatched on emigre operations into West Germany, where they were apprehended, agreed to work for American intelligence, and later returned to the USSR.

BB. Responses by Nosenko to questions drafted by Golitsyn on: recruitable Soviets (by name and background); American double agents; the Popov case; recruitment of US intelligence personnel; KGB operations against US embassy (Moscow) personnel; surveys or studies done by the KGB Second Chief Directorate about arrested American spies (including Popov and Penkovskiy); KGB awards (including those given to persons who participated in the investigation of Penkovskiy, Popov, Stashinskiy); the Penkovskiy case; Golitsyn.

CC. Charts indicating what Nosenko had reported on KGB operational interest in specific persons (i.e., operational "leads"), and what CIA had been able to develop on them through investigation, with

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CIA comments as appropriate; an outline of information provided by Nosenko on the structure and personnel assignments in the KGB as he knew them; a chronology of Nosenko's life "in varying versions."

By contrast, the CIA position with regard to revelation of information to Nosenko is indicated by the following statement taken from a memorandum for the DDP prepared by Chief, SR Division, dated 30 March 1964:

. . . I think we should make absolutely sure that Subject [Nosenko] does not learn a single thing from us that we do not want him (and eventually the KGB) to know. I think CIA has to take a very firm position on this issue, otherwise the FBI might urge a delay in confrontation while they present case after case to [Nosenko] in an effort to learn more from him.

For information on Nosenko's deprivation of reading matter of any sort for long periods of time, much less intelligence files of the sort given to Golitsyn, see Chapter III.

#### Physical Confinement

Golitsyn cannot be said to have been physically confined at any time. The following description of the protective custody afforded him and his reaction to any type of control is quoted from the 1976 Counterintelligence Staff Study (No. 3) on Golitsyn:

Golitsyn always felt the need for protection against possible KGB retaliation, but quite obviously believed he alone was the best judge of what this entailed. He wanted guards around, but not underfoot. The record is replete with his complaints against the guards and his attempts to isolate them. This became a key issue in the adoption of the codicil to the Statement of Agreement in July 1962, when Golitsyn moved into his own house and was given complete personal control of the guards, their hours of duty and their responsibilities. From that point on, Golitsyn was essentially unguarded. His

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wife also railed against her "companions" in the early days. She made frequent trips into Washington to shop or attend movies, theater or ballet. At these times, she would dismiss her chauffeur for lengthy periods. On two occasions she took the bus alone to New York for the day, and Golitsyn also visited New York in November 1962, at which time he roamed the city unescorted.

Golitsyn's behavior from that time on followed a similar pattern. He suddenly left the United States for the United Kingdom in December 1962, and while in England he lived where he wished and had no security protection. The British asked Golitsyn to keep his whereabouts to himself, not to stay in one hotel for any length of time, and to call when he wanted to meet. According to the study quoted above, this loose method of dealing with Golitsyn probably helped in maintaining a cooperative attitude on his part; it also apparently set a precedent for his attitude toward the manner in which he would live upon his return to the United States in July 1963. Upon his return here, he was given complete freedom to set his own pattern of living and working, following the British example. He obtained his own residence in New York, moved several times, developed the concept that he was the best judge of his own security, and at times lived "almost under the eaves of the Soviet Mission" in New York while simultaneously refusing to talk to CIA officers because CIA was "penetrated."

Nosenko's physical confinement and deprivation of even minor amenities from the time of his defection in early 1964 until late October 1967 stand in stark contrast to the treatment afforded Golitsyn. This matter has been covered so fully in Chapter III that it requires no further comment.

## Conclusions

If summation is needed, the following can be stated with respect to the five areas dealt with above:

A. Golitsyn controlled his own interrogation, withholding information if he chose, refusing to answer questions according to his own whim, and on occasion refusing even to talk to CIA officers. Nosenko was not really listened to (or even talked to for long stretches of time), much less properly

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interrogated, for several years after the date of his defection.

B. Golitsyn was given a signed agreement covering the conditions of his cooperation with the US government, which met all of his demands. Nosenko was specifically denied a written contract, on the grounds that an oral agreement was the "bureaucratically correct" manner of handling his relationship with the US government, until five years after his defection (1969).

C. Golitsyn's polygraph examination was administered under ground rules imposed by SR Division. These rules produced inconclusive test results, but full assurances were given Golitsyn that he had passed his examination. No further attempt was made to establish Golitsyn's bona fides. Nosenko, on the other hand, underwent three separate series of polygraph tests. Two of the three were conducted in such a manner as to prejudice the results against Nosenko; under the ground rules imposed by the SR Division officers on the polygraph operator, the latter was under instructions to "find" evidences of deception in the polygraph charts, whether they were there or not.

D. With respect to access to information, Golitsyn was provided with literally safes-full of classified documents, including files on cases that were regarded as highly sensitive within CIA and to which only a very small number of CIA staff officers had access. Nosenko not only did not see any intelligence material but was denied access to newspapers, books, radio, or even personal contact with other human beings.

E. As to physical confinement, Golitsyn was simply never confined; the thought of confining him did not even arise. Nosenko spent virtually all of his first five years in this country as a prisoner, given fewer amenities than he would have received in most jails or prisons within the United States, or in some form of protective custody.

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It seems self-evident that these two defectors should have received the same treatment, that one was as suspect as the other until completion of all appropriate processing aimed at determining bona fides.

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## CHAPTER VIII

### Use of the Polygraph in the Nosenko Case

Nosenko was first polygraphed on 4 April 1964, in a series of six tests. That the procedures followed were somewhat unorthodox is indicated by the following quotations from the report of the polygraph operator:

During the pre-polygraph conferences with representatives of SR Division, the undersigned was informed that the polygraph interview was part of an overall plan to help break [Nosenko] and elicit the truth from him. SR Division's instructions were that, regardless of whether [Nosenko] passed his polygraph test or not, he was to be informed at the termination of his polygraph interview that he was lying, and had not passed his polygraph interview.

The question of [Nosenko's] willingness to participate in the polygraph test was one of minor consideration, since he had, on previous occasions, agreed that he would take the test. However, whether [Nosenko] would continue with the polygraph testing, if he was confronted with attempted deception after an initial test run, was one of the considered problems. Consequently, in order to preclude the possibility of [Nosenko's] terminating the test prior to its completion, it was decided that a minor deviation from the accepted polygraph technique would be used during the polygraph testing, specifically to ensure that a polygraph record of [Nosenko's] reactions to all the pertinent questions be obtained prior to challenging him on any significant polygraph deception indications his charts might reflect. Because of the extenuating [sic] circumstances of the case, this plan was followed throughout the polygraph interview.

. . . When [Nosenko] arrived for his test, [the fact that he had been drinking] was

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evident both to [the operator] and the examining physician who checked [Nosenko] prior to [Nosenko's] polygraph testing . . . . Although [Nosenko] had used both alcohol and some unknown drug prior to testing, there is no question, based both on analysis of [Nosenko's] polygraph charts as well as personal observation during the interview, that [Nosenko] has attempted deliberate deception in the specific pertinent areas [on which he was questioned].

According to the pre-agreed upon plan, the different phases involving various pertinent areas were covered with [Nosenko] polygraphically. Challenge of [Nosenko's] reactions was indirect and "soft." . . . Subject was told that he was lying to numerous pertinent questions and was accused of being a dispatched agent.

After completion of the interview, the SR representative at the safesite was informed, in front of [Nosenko], of [the operator's] opinion that [Nosenko] was lying and was a dispatched Soviet agent. [Nosenko] was taken into protective custody and escorted to his new place of residence.

A second series of polygraph tests were administered to Nosenko between 18 and 25 October 1966. Although by this time the operator had transferred from the Office of Security to SR Division, it was desired by SR that he conduct the new polygraph tests. He was allowed by the Office of Security to do so, as an exception to the rule that all polygraph testing be performed by Security personnel, on the basis of Chief, SR's statement that, for Nosenko's polygraphing, use of a person of his "temperament" was essential.

The following is quoted from an interim report dated 24 October 1966 (i.e., before completion of the new polygraph series), which was attached to a memorandum from Chief, SR to the DCI.

Our aims in this phase of the interrogation have been limited: in view of the possibility of losing access to Nosenko, we have sought

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(a) to strengthen our basic report, now in preparation, by testing his story further, clarifying points of confusion and revealing new contradictions, and by polygraph examinations in key areas, and (b) to lead toward his eventual confession by directly exploiting our hypotheses about the true background of Nosenko and this KGB operation, to convey to Nosenko the impression that we know more than before, that we possess irrefutable proof of his guilt and that he has no prospects for release. We refrained from doing this in earlier phases of the interrogation, but at this point there seems little to lose.

. . . [Regarding his identity]: Nosenko was questioned extensively on the polygraph concerning his identity . . . He was also given a series of tests asking for the first letter of his given name. The whole alphabet was covered, and the polygraph charts show that he became increasingly tense, culminating at the letter S (or perhaps T) on both runs. While we recognize that testing of this sort may not give valid results, it certainly gets over to Nosenko the degree of our doubt and may even help us determine who he really is.

Nosenko's becoming "increasingly tense" during this 1966 polygraph examination must be evaluated in the light of certain facts that were not brought out in this report. Let us begin by giving a schedule of the hours during which he was under continuous polygraph interrogation:

<u>Date and Times</u>	<u>Hours and Minutes</u>
19 October	
1330 - 1530	2
20 October	
0930 - 1215	2:45
1530 - 1910	3:40

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<u>Date and Times</u>	<u>Hours and Minutes</u>
21 October	
0930 - 1245	3:15
1645 - 1810	1:25
25 October	
1350 - 1545	1:55
1630 - 1805	1:35
26 October	
1000 - 1320	3:20
1755 - 1925	1:30
27 October	
1020 - 1345	3:25
1700 - 1913	2:13
28 October	
0955 - 1020	:25
1024 - 1125	1:01
Total hours of continuous polygraph examination	28:29

When queried during the present investigation about the advisability of such long sessions of continuous polygraphing, a responsible official of the Office of Security's Polygraph Branch stated that such sessions are counterproductive and contrary to their organization's policy. The long confinement, plus operation of certain of the polygraph sensors, may result in pain as well as artifactual reactions. Results of a polygraph examination conducted under such conditions are not dependable.

In addition, it should be pointed out that during this period the days began early and ended late for Nosenko, because when he was not being polygraphed he was being intensively interrogated. The record shows that in addition to the approximately 28 hours of polygraphing, he was subjected to 15 hours of straight interrogation. The dividing line between

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polygraphing and hostile interrogation is not always clear from the record, however, because the polygraph operator participated in both. For example, at one point the typed record reads:

[The operator] told [Nosenko] he is a fanatic who was told too little to support his legend and that his future is now "zero."

It is also probable that Nosenko's physical movements were restricted for long periods of time during this whole period. In a report he wrote on 16 November 1967, the Director of Security stated:

. . . [Nosenko] was left strapped in a chair between periods of interrogation for as long as four or five hours at a time. As you know, the role of this Office in the Nosenko case during the past three years has been one exclusively of support under the direction of SB Division personnel. None the less, I have consistently instructed my personnel who were guarding him that I would not condone or support any treatment involving physical abuse. I have confirmed this one example of what I consider to be physical abuse and regret that it was not brought to my attention.

Nosenko's final polygraph examination, conducted under the direction of the Office of Security, was quite at variance with the first two. Initiated on 2 August 1968, it concluded on 6 August 1968. The tests took place after approximately 7,000 pages of transcripts and related materials had been compiled during the course of Nosenko's new interrogation undertaken in late October 1967. About 60 questions of a pertinent nature were covered in the interview. Nosenko was completely cooperative, no problems were encountered, and the conclusion of the polygraph operator was that Nosenko had been substantially truthful in answering all relevant questions put to him.

In the course of the present investigation, the Office of Security was requested to make a further reevaluation of the Nosenko polygraph charts of April 1964, October 1966, and August 1968. The resultant report, dated 30 September 1976 and signed by the Director of Security, states:

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This memorandum is in response to your request for a review of the polygraph charts of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko obtained during polygraph interrogations in April 1964 and October 1966 . . . [and] in August 1968 . . .

After a thorough review of the charts obtained in April 1964, it is our opinion that the polygraph charts obtained do not contain sufficient technical data on which to base a conclusion of deception or to support that Mr. Nosenko was a dispatched agent of the KGB . . .

Finally, the polygraph patterns produced to pertinent questions during the August 1968 polygraph examination substantiate that Mr. Nosenko was truthful and that he had not given false information to his CIA debriefing officers. It is our opinion that the examiner in that testing was correct in his chart analysis.

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## CHAPTER IX

### Psychological and Medical Findings

A small, but nevertheless key role was played by two Agency specialists, respectively a psychologist and a psychiatrist, in the handling of Nosenko. Like so much else that occurred in this case, this aspect is edifying mainly in the negative sense of demonstrating how the services of such professionals ought not to be exploited. In sum, the psychologist and psychiatrist principally involved in this case were given enough misinformation about Nosenko's bona fides to prejudice seriously any chance of an accurate personality assessment.

We now examine in some detail the roles played by the psychologist and the psychiatrist. In doing so, we have very much in mind the fact that both these gentlemen are members of organized professions, both of which impose explicit standards of conduct upon their members. We must therefore look for possible conflict between demands the Agency made of these professionals on one hand, and their professional standards on the other.

#### A. The Role of the Psychologist

The psychologist's role will be dealt with first because, to judge by the written record, he was the first to assess Nosenko from the psychological point of view, by means of a brief interview and test administered on 23 June 1964. His initial report is dated 9 July 1964. In addition, he interviewed Nosenko at length in 14 sessions during the period 3-21 May 1965. He then wrote a chronicle of Nosenko's life and an overall psychological evaluation based on these interviews.

By way of background, it should be said that the psychologist is an extremely insightful person with clinical experience acquired both before joining CIA as well as during his CIA service. He has developed his own system of interpreting the Wechsler intelligence tests (Wechsler-Bellevue and Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale), which he calls the Personality Assessment System (PAS). It is PAS that, for over two decades, has been the main resource used by the Clandestine Service in the assessment of personality for operational purposes.

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Like any other scientific practitioner, however, a psychologist can only function properly on the basis of valid data. If you put a cube of ice in a patient's mouth before inserting the thermometer, you do not get an accurate temperature reading. If you provide an examining psychologist or psychiatrist with erroneous data regarding a defector, the findings of his examination will inevitably be in part erroneous.

Personality assessment instruments, or "tests," also have their limitations. They yield results that should be read only as statements of the statistical probability of the presence of a given personality predisposition or characteristic. In other words, the results give the psychologist a suggestion as to what to look for in a person, as he collects further data. In the case here under consideration, the personality formula that the psychologist derived from his administration of the PAS test to Nosenko suggested that Nosenko might have the characteristics of a sociopath. The psychologist's task was then to evaluate this datum within a framework that included the following elements:

1. His judgment of the validity of his own test results. Note that he depended on a single, English-language measurement instrument when he examined Nosenko on 23 June 1964.

2. Personal interviews. He had time for only a limited interview at the time of testing, and it was conducted without benefit of an interpreter in English, a language Nosenko spoke with far from idiomatic fluency. Lengthy interviews were conducted later, in May 1965, long after the original diagnosis had been made. They also were conducted in English.

3. Collateral data, obtained from senior SR officers, which were uniformly prejudicial to Nosenko. The latter was described as one who lied and changed his story constantly, and who had been sent to the United States on a mission for the KGB. Doubt was even expressed as to whether Nosenko was the person he professed to be.

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Subsequent events have revealed that Nosenko's falsehoods were in fact minor ones. But the psychologist did not know all this; told that Nosenko lied constantly and knowing that manipulative lying is part of the psychopathic syndrome, he diagnosed Nosenko as a psychopath.

The term "psychopath" (another term used interchangeably is "sociopath") itself deserved a word of explanation, because its connotation is misleading. Like so many psychological terms, it evolved out of the fact that psychologists tend to be involved primarily with people in trouble, very often with those who end up in prisons and mental institutions. A survey of psychological literature reveals, not surprisingly, that the one quintessential criterion of a psychopath is that he is habitually given to criminal or delinquent behavior. The criteria that psychologists use in distinguishing between psychopaths and non-psychopaths have been developed almost entirely from studies of juvenile delinquents, criminals and mental patients, and thus the term is really only applicable with any certainty to individuals belonging to one or another of those groups. Despite this fact, testing of many people who are not delinquent or criminal may yield a score or profile of scores suggesting psychopathy. To illustrate the point, let us take an example. On the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (one of the most widely used clinical testing instruments in this country), the profile that suggests psychopathy has also been generated in testing persons who turned out to be good WACs in World War II and others who have been predicted as likely to succeed in the life insurance business. Yet, good WACs and life insurance agents are obviously not groups to whom we would ordinarily apply the term "psychopath." Thus, the fact that you have a predisposition to psychopathy does not mean that you necessarily become one; the psychopathic profile on either the MMPI or the PAS test is merely a warning signal of what you might do under certain adverse circumstances.

When he tested Nosenko, the psychologist was not fully aware of all the pressures under which this defector was functioning. He was unaware of the manner of his sudden confinement after glowing promises had been made of rewards for defection; of the falsified polygraph results, and the fact that Nosenko had been informed

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that the examination showed him guilty of deception; or of the fact that the principal case officer had told Nosenko that the latter's information (later to prove of great value) was all "crap." Given these factors, we would have to conclude a priori that the resultant PAS personality profile was likely to be partly spurious.

The exact extent to which the psychologist's test results were inexact cannot be determined, but one example is illustrative of the possibilities. One part of the profile suggested that Nosenko was endowed with a well-below average memory. That his memory was functioning at less than average level at the time he took the test cannot be doubted; but it has already been made clear that he was functioning under extremely adverse conditions, and, since the Wechsler subtest that measures memory span has been experimentally shown to be vulnerable to so-called state (i.e., temporary) anxiety,\* this aspect of the personality profile must be considered spurious. From Nosenko's performance during extensive debriefings since he was released from confinement and began to receive normally humane treatment, we know that his memory is in fact exceptionally good. We can only conclude that, if it functioned badly at the time of testing, this was largely owing to anxiety induced by treatment received at the hands of CIA.

As to the psychologist's characterization of Nosenko as a psychopath, the limitations of such a diagnosis have already been made clear. Since his release from incarceration, although he has certainly shown himself to be an emphatic person, winning and charming when he wants to be, he has not shown any of the undesirable traits associated with psychopathy. Quite to the contrary, as of this time at least, he has since 1969 comported himself with both dignity and discretion.

The psychologist's evaluation contained a section entitled "Vulnerabilities" that was, once again, clearly based on the premise that Nosenko was dissembling, when he denied being under continued KGB control. The psychologist wrote:

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\*Matarazzo, J. D., Measurement and Appraisal of Adult Intelligence. Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins, 1972. Page 444.

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Under prolonged pressure he will admit almost anything to get relief. Another vulnerability is that he will "break" in order to get relief. Care should be taken to continue pressure for some time after an initial break is secured to allow for vacillation and modification. Long periods of isolation after these breaks may be useful in evaluating the reliability of his information. In general, it is better to give him slight rewards (e.g., cigarettes, baths, etc.) for no apparent reason than to tie them to periods of cooperation, etc.

The psychologist's last major involvement in the case appears to have been the series of debriefings having to do with Nosenko's personal history, conducted during the period 3-21 May 1965. These led the psychologist to the following conclusions and recommendations:

1. Nosenko's story was consistent with the previous diagnosis of a "bright sociopath" (i.e., psychopath).

2. The psychologist was "totally at a loss to even attempt to rationalize why a story with this much pathology would be used as a legend. Nothing could be served other than to discredit the man to whom it was assigned.

3. New approaches were necessary, as described in the following paragraph:

I have few specific recommendations. The first is to consider a pentothal sodium [sic] interview . . . Second, he can be hit with a hostile, or a better term would be a needling, interrogation on his psychological weaknesses. His reaction to my mild needle on him running away from a bad situation suggests he may be highly vulnerable in this area. Third, some consideration could be given to turning him back to the Soviets. The publication of his life story with

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the proper editorial changes-- emphasizing the class distinctions and privileges in a classless society could be most humiliating to the Soviets. In addition, we could take the gamble of demonstrating that defection is an honorable act of motivated men. The US has no room for the misfits and failures of the Soviet system.

The above findings were still insufficient for some of the SR Division personnel, who then drafted a series of very specific questions to be put to the psychologist. Of these the first three will be quoted, together with the psychologist's answers:

1. This man's story is full of demonstrable lies. Often these lies seem pointless--no matter from what point of view they are studied. When challenged, he will sometimes retreat from one of his stories; in other instances, he will cling adamantly to one even when it is clear to all that he is lying and even when he has an easy way out. In other words, his lies, distortions and rationalizations are harder to understand than those of most "normal" people. In your opinion, when he lies, does he do so:

a. because he is a compulsive liar;  
(Answer: No.)

b. because he seeks to bolster his stature and ego for his own reasons;  
(Answer: Essentially yes.)

c. because the KGB told him to.  
(Answer: Perhaps.)

2. Do the incidence and nature of his inaccuracies and distortions add up to a behavior pattern that might reasonably be called "normal"? If not, how can it be described in layman's terms?

(Answer: Not a "normal" personality but legally normal and not hospitalizable.)

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3. If his behavior pattern is not "normal," could it be counterfeit, either for personal reasons or because he was briefed to comport himself this way? Could he play such a role over a considerable period of time?

(Answer: Absolutely not.)

When at long last, in February 1968, SB Division concluded its long-awaited study of the Nosenko case, the findings of the psychologist were included in the following abbreviated form:

Nosenko is a rationalizer, a distorter, and an evasive person clearly capable of dissembling for personal reasons. He is not a compulsive liar. He is inclined to relate what he thinks he is expected to say rather than to tell the truth as he knows it. He lies by design as well as for effect, however, and he does not always embroider just to bolster his ego. He is neither "insane" nor psychotic, and he suffers from no "delusions." Nosenko's rationalizations are not the product of derangement.

The most notable quality of this summary is its selectivity. For example:

1. The summary nowhere mentioned the diagnosis of Nosenko as a psychopath/sociopath. The fact that psychopaths generally try to evade the penalties of their misbehavior by adaptive role-playing (e.g., sudden religious "conversions" to win sympathy and "prove" they are changing their ways) could have served dangerously to undercut the thesis that Nosenko was sufficiently dedicated to persist in carrying out a long-term KGB plot in face of the sort of treatment he had received since 4 April 1964.

2. By the above-cited omission, it tends to establish a dichotomy between the "insane" or "psychotic," who suffer "delusions," and "normal" people, who tell the truth. It carefully skirted the existence of a middle

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ground between normality and psychoticism in which people do not behave "normally" but are not insane. Yet this distinction had been drawn specifically in answer to one of the SR Division questions quoted above.

Enough has been said to make clear that the psychologist was put in an impossible position. On the basis of the "facts" provided him, he was frankly puzzled as to how Nosenko could have been selected for a KGB mission involving extended dissimulation.

The psychologist was not sure enough of his ground to stick to his guns. As a psychologist who had dealt previously with a number of Soviet defectors, he had a great degree of insight. On the other hand, he knew that he did not have all the facts, because Chief, SR had specifically told him so. Insight is of very little use when not based on adequate data.

Helms tried to help. When told by the psychologist that the latter did not have all the facts necessary to make a judgment about Nosenko, Helms called Chief, SR and instructed him that the psychologist should be fully informed. This instruction appears to have been disregarded.

We can only conclude that the psychologist did what could legitimately be expected of him, within the constraints of the Agency's command structure. The weaknesses that in retrospect we can perceive in the psychologist's diagnosis and recommendations can be ascribed directly to his being asked to make professional judgments based on inadequate knowledge. The propriety of the Agency's employing a professional in this manner should be carefully reviewed.

B. The Role of the Psychiatrist

The psychiatrist's role in the Nosenko operation was more extensive and of longer duration than the psychologist's. In addition to physical examinations, it included giving advice on how Nosenko should be treated while in confinement, advice on special interrogation techniques such as the use of sodium pentothal, and an assessment of Nosenko's personality.

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The psychiatrist has stated (in discussions with the senior author of this report) that he had been told when he was first assigned to the case that Nosenko was concealing information of great importance to the US government. That he worked throughout the case under this assumption is evident from the total context of his reporting. On the other hand, there is no evidence that either SR Division or CI Staff shared the reasons for their suspicions with him to a sufficient extent for him to have evaluated their claim, even had he been qualified by professional background to make such an evaluation. He knew and accepted his limitations in the latter regard; for example, in a report dated 23 February 1965, after he had spent an hour observing an interrogation, he remarked:

[Nosenko] comes off [in] his responses to questions (at least when I saw him) in the same fashion as always though I am not competent to judge the content of what he says. [Underlining added.]

Yet, even though the psychiatrist was not an "operations officer" according to normal Agency criteria, during his long association with this case (which included 34 examinations of Nosenko in the year 1964 alone) he acted in more than a purely medical capacity. Not only did he check on Nosenko's health and endeavor to safeguard it, he also advised the operational component of the Agency on certain aspects of their own specialized activities to which his medical and psychiatric knowledge appeared relevant. In this latter capacity, the psychiatrist's name was invoked frequently in operational correspondence, generally without his knowledge; for example, in a 27 November 1964 memorandum to the DDP, concerning arrangements for forthcoming interrogations, Chief, SR stated:

Given . . . the assessment by both [the psychiatrist] and [the psychologist] that Subject is a compulsive talker, we are hopeful that we will make some progress.

By implication, this and other similar references evoked the recondite expertise of the psychiatric and psychological professionals to bolster claims of impending success.

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It should be made clear that throughout the Nosenko affair, the psychiatrist was entitled to feel that he was acting properly in line of duty. His component, the Office of Medical Services/Operational Services Division, was specifically charged with providing assistance to the operational components of the Agency. It had long been Agency practice, both at Headquarters and in the field, for medical doctors to function in a partly operational capacity, even though they were not necessarily cognizant of all aspects of the operations in which they became involved. The assumption was that senior operations officers knew what they were about and that, within rather vaguely defined limits, a doctor of medicine could accept their authority as guaranty of the rightness of what he did to assist them.

Thus, it was only natural that the psychiatrist, having been told by senior Agency officials that Nosenko was consistently lying about his true mission, should accept their views. Unlike the psychologist, he did not even have the advantage of having systematically debriefed Nosenko on his life history; had he done so, he might have shared the psychologist's suspicions that the SR Division opinion of Nosenko was not beyond legitimate challenge.

Nevertheless, the anomalous situation in which the psychiatrist was placed had two unfortunate consequences:

1. Because he was led to assume that Nosenko was systematically lying, his diagnosis was somewhat distorted.
2. The same assumption led him to play a quasioperational role in the handling of Nosenko.

Let us look in greater depth at the first consequence. In so doing, it is not our purpose to second-guess a qualified psychiatrist; rather, it is our purpose to ascertain whether this particular professional, well known to his colleagues for his devotion to duty, was in fact given a fair opportunity to make an honest evaluation.

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The psychiatrist's diagnosis of Nosenko, which he labeled "Psychiatric Impressions," was dated 20 December 1964. It read in part:

Psychiatric impression is that of an individual who shows an above average intelligence capacity, is shrewd and perceptive. While he claims to have desired to cooperate and work with US officials, his antisocial behavior was destructive and self-defeating to the aims he claimed to pursue. His own needs and desires are of paramount importance to him and he manipulates those around him without regard to consequence in order to satisfy his needs. As such he tends to be selfish, ungrateful, narcissistic and exhibitionistic. In satisfying his own desires there is no concern for the feelings or interests of others. There has been no evidence of a sense of honor or of shame. He has seen nothing wrong with his own behavior, being unable to view this from another's viewpoint. For most of his adult life, it is reasonable to expect that he has operated in this manner--without conscience, without guilt and has directed his efforts at satisfying his own needs. He may at times give the impression of being a reliable and steadfast person, but after gaining security for himself and the confidence of others, can shrug off major obligations easily. As with many individuals of this personality makeup, his disregard for the truth is remarkable. Whether there is a good chance that he will get away with a lie or whether detection is almost certain, he shows no signs of perturbation and can coolly maintain his position. While committing the most serious of perjuries, it is easy for him to look anyone calmly in the eye.

Alcohol certainly catalyzes his tendency to uninviting or destructive behavior . . . Emotional attachment is shallow. Although he may give at times the impression of being cordial and affectionate, beneath this is an astonishing callousness.

As a youngster, this man might well have been looked upon as a juvenile delinquent with

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constant brushes with authority. As he grew older this behavior most likely continued in the same pattern with occasional brushes with the law and perhaps some punishment. But the effectiveness of his ability to manipulate and protect himself by personable appeals may have kept him in circulation in society on the fringe, so to speak. His reaction to his restricted environment is not unusual, as some such individuals come to accommodate to some limits imposed by authority while at the same time not accepting the seriousness of their situation and believing that, as in the past, they can talk their way out. This man is capable of playing a role and playing it effectively.

With this view of his personality, it seems unlikely that he could have achieved much stature as a staff intelligence officer. He could, however, have been effective in various types of intelligence operations.

On 1 October 1976, the above evaluation was discussed with the psychiatrist in the light of facts previously unknown to him. Inter alia, he was given (in writing) background on the following aspects of the Nosenko case:

1. CIA promises of substantial monetary rewards and an opportunity for Nosenko to work with CIA on a salaried basis.

2. The conclusion of the Director of Security, as of 30 September 1976, that "Mr. Nosenko was truthful and that he had not given false information to his CIA debriefing officers."

3. Acceptance of Nosenko's bona fides by both FBI and CIA.

The memorandum of conversation dictated by the senior author following the above discussion reads in part:

[The psychiatrist] agreed that his 20 December 1964 memorandum, as well as subsequent psychiatric

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judgments which he had made, were all heavily dependent on "collateral information" which he obtained from representatives of the SB Division. He agreed that, had he known the facts as stated in my memorandum, his psychiatric judgments might have differed from those he actually made.

In connection with some of the specific points raised in my memorandum, [the psychiatrist] made the following observations:

[1]. He was not aware of the financial or other promises made to Nosenko, and perhaps assumed that Nosenko, like most defectors, was angling for large rewards. [The psychiatrist] mentioned Golitsyn as among the precedents which he probably had in mind . . .

[2]. In regard to Nosenko's alleged lying and deception, he was totally dependent upon the judgments of SB Division personnel as well as that of [a polygraph operator].

[The psychiatrist] stated that, until he read my 1 October 1976 memorandum, he had never known that Nosenko had contributed valuable information. He had also never received any information concerning Nosenko's behavior since his being released from incarceration . . .

We are thus justified in concluding that, in the psychiatrist's case as in that of the psychologist, a professional was not given the proper "collateral information" on the basis of which to render a sound professional judgment. More explicitly, because neither the psychiatrist nor psychologist was accurately informed even about such basic aspects of the case as the promises made to Nosenko (which could not possibly be considered to have had sensitive security implications), neither man had an accurate criterion for judging the appropriateness of Nosenko's behavior in seeking better treatment.

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Given the apparent consensus among the Agency's leadership that there were good and sufficient reasons for incarcerating and trying to "break" Nosenko, it is not surprising in hindsight that the psychiatrist offered judgments and advice extending well beyond the bounds of conventional medicine and psychiatry. Since his quasi-operational participation in this case has been covered to some degree in Chapter III, we need only reeveoke a few examples here:

- His judgment of 24 February 1966 that "things are bound to change as far as Nosenko is concerned--he is either going to stop faking or things will get worse."
- His judgment, reported on 26 April 1966, that reestablishing contact between Nosenko and the interrogators would be a serious mistake because it would constitute a "relief."
- His opinion, offered after monitoring the 6 July 1966 meeting between the principal case officer and Nosenko, that "the way in which the interview was conducted would very effectively slam shut another psychological door."

Admittedly, the above comments come to us secondhand, via memoranda written by others. Nonetheless, they are consistent with everything in the psychiatrist's handwritten reports of his visits to Nosenko in confinement. It will suffice here to illustrate our point with one example, quoted from the psychiatrist's 14 July 1964 report of a visit to Nosenko:

Subject was seen for [the] first time in over two weeks. His general physical condition is satisfactory and his weight is now 170 lbs. There is evidence however that he is reacting psychologically to his detention and is showing increased tension, anxiety and is misinterpreting various stimuli in his environment. More significant is his conviction that he is being constantly photographed in his room and in the "privacy of his bath." The latter is most disturbing to him especially being

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photographed totally nude. He describes hearing the sound of movie cameras especially in the bath and was quite disturbed over having pictures made without his "panties." (This is the exact word he used.) I asked how pictures were being taken in his room and he got off the bed, walked over to the door to his room and pointed to pin holes on each side of the door through which he was being clandestinely photographed. He said he had taken photographs of people in compromising positions for operational use in [the] KGB and he understood the reason for this. But he did not understand why the guards continued to take pictures of him--especially in the bath. In the guard log is a notation last week about a request from him that picture taking be stopped. This sequence, I am convinced, was not play acting. The nebulous situation he finds himself in is beginning to take its toll. From the psychiatric standpoint this is viewed as first sign of disintegration of personality and loss of contact with reality. It may progress or it may remain at this level. It is interesting that this first indicator centers around his "privacy," being in the nude and is concerned with sexual identification and his underlying concern over this area. At this juncture I do not recommend any changes in his management [underlining is ours] other than those previously suggested, i.e., reading material, writing material, chair and table in his room. He has been given reading material and I understand from [the principal case officer] who is aware of the above visit, that chair, table, and cigarettes in the room are forthcoming in the next day or so.

Although the psychiatrist later changed his mind and expressed the conviction that Nosenko had been faking his signs of psychological deterioration, the reasons behind his assurance are not evident, at least to the lay mind. There have been ample studies of the effects of isolation and sensory deprivation on human beings, triggered in large measure by the demands of the space

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program. They are only partially relevant to Nosenko's situation, because no experimenter in the non-Communist world has ever attempted to impose social isolation or other forms of deprivation on experimental subjects for more than a few days at a time. (The Soviets, who are bound by fewer restrictions than we, have employed durations of up to 60 days.) Nevertheless, while various researchers have obtained diverse results, there is ample evidence that certain psychological, physiological, and behavioral impairments do indeed result from severe restrictions being placed on physical activity, sensory stimulation, and social interaction; and this generalization seems to apply to Soviets in much the same way as it does to Americans. The psychiatrist's judgments were not doubt based in good faith on his clinical judgment, but the question remains as to whether the latter was not distorted by his apparent commitment to the cause of "breaking" Nosenko. Thus we are led inevitably to the problem of whether such a commitment is appropriate in the case of a doctor of medicine.

C. Conclusions

The senior author of this study spent 1972 making a study of Soviet agents-in-place. Two of the conclusions of that study are worth quoting in part four years later:

. . . We have not always used our Agency psychiatrists and psychologists to best advantage. When we deal with computers, we know that we have to call on specialists to help us, but we have a false self-confidence in dealing with people. This self-confidence is allowable when we are dealing with people who are normal, but unfortunately many Soviet defectors and just about any Soviet who is willing to serve as an agent-in-place are not psychologically normal. They therefore require very specialized handling . . .

. . . An operational death wish seemed to overwhelm us, as we insisted on ascribing every aberration of the agent(s) to some sinister design of the enemy. Granted that

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we must always keep in mind the possibility of an agent's being under opposition control, as long as there is a change that he is genuine we should never let him become aware of our suspicions. We have missed some major operational opportunities by violating this rule.

In the Nosenko case, the problem lay not in our failure to make use of the psychologists/psychiatrists but in our gross misuse of them. CIA officials in charge of the Nosenko case until 1967 sought assistance of professionals from this field, as they did from similar people in other fields, only to help shore up certain conceptions.

For their part, the psychologist/psychiatric professionals were not of as much help as they could have been. They had become accustomed over the years to playing a subordinate support role to the operators and had developed a "you call--we haul" attitude that is inconsistent with the independent-mindedness legitimately to be expected of a professional. In addition, because of the doctrine of compartmentation, the knowledge that the Agency's psychological/psychiatric professionals have had to contribute has, at any given time, been much less than it could and should have been.

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## CHAPTER XI

### Methodology and Leadership

#### A. Lack of Counterintelligence Methodology

We accept without question the necessity for counterintelligence, as a category of the intelligence process concerned with the activities of hostile powers' covert and clandestine activities against the United States and our allies. But such a discipline, if it is to fulfill its purposes, must employ an orderly and systematic methodology. Unhappily, in the Nosenko case it did no such thing.

We are forced to conclude that, in the 1960s, when Golitsyn, Nosenko, and \_\_\_\_\_ contacted CIA, the Plans Directorate and its Clandestine Service were intellectually, technically, and procedurally unprepared to handle them. A useful study entitled [CIA] Counterintelligence Interrogation was published by CIA in July 1963, but the handling of Nosenko gives no indication that any of the Agency personnel directly involved had profited from it, if indeed they had read it at all. Insofar as we can ascertain, in respect to Soviet nationals the Directorate lacked:

1. Explicit written criteria to be applied in evaluating the bona fides of a defector or prospective agent.
2. Explicit written procedures for the collection, analysis, and evaluation of the counterintelligence product of a defector or prospective agent.
3. Explicit written procedures for psychological evaluation of a defector or prospective agent.
4. Any broadly-based systematic data base (or systematic written procedures for employing it, had it existed) regarding the relevant psychological characteristics of Soviet agents. There did exist some psychological data regarding defectors, but they had not been collated

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and analyzed, nor were they objectively applied to the cases of Nosenko and Golitsyn. The latter was himself never even tested.

B. Influence of Chief, CI on Methodology

The predominant influence in the counterintelligence field within the Agency until 1975 was the then Chief, CI.

His reputation for expertise rested on his purportedly unique knowledge of the KGB's worldwide covert political role. In truth, no one could compete with him as an expert on this subject. His analyses, based on fragmentary and often inapplicable data, were more imaginative than systematic and therefore neither easily comprehended nor replicated by his interlocutors. But unlike the Emperor and his imaginary clothes, Chief, CI's fantasies were never vulnerable to objective examination, simply because he surrounded such data as existed with a wall of secrecy. His "facts" were available in full only to a minimum number of trusted apostles; to the rest of the intelligence community, both American and foreign, he doled them out selectively--seldom in written form--to prove whatever point he was trying to make at the time.

Chief, CI's preference for oral over written communication is worth emphasizing. During his incumbency as its chief, the CI Staff, though it supposedly had in its possession information concerning a horrendous hazard to both the United States and its allies, never committed to paper any complete, written, documented report on the subject. Therefore, the threat could never be systematically analyzed and evaluated. Only when Chief, CI finally departed did dispassionate analysis of CI Staff's data holdings finally become possible, and these have consistently failed to support his central claims regarding the KGB's massive influence in world affairs.

C. Impact of Faulty Counterintelligence on Positive Intelligence Collection

There is an important interrelationship between counterintelligence, as it was conducted in the 1960s, and the collection of positive intelligence from human sources. Only if this relationship is spelled out can the full impact of the events we have been describing be comprehended.

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At the time CIA was established, the primary mission of what was later to become the Plans Directorate's Clandestine Service was conceived to be the collection of strategically-significant intelligence from clandestine human sources. How successful was the Clandestine Service in fulfilling this mission?

Agency claims of success in the human-source collection field have often been so phrased, whether intentionally or not, as to give the impression that our achievements stemmed largely from the process called "development and recruitment." The impression that we "recruited" our best Soviet and Warsaw Pact sources following a period of orderly development must be dispelled, before there can be meaningful discussion of previously described deficiencies. In most major Soviet cases prior to 1970, it might be more nearly correct to say that the sources "developed" the Americans. In the case of Penkovskiy, to cite an extreme example, US officials made even the latter process so outrageously difficult for him that he had to write a letter to both the Queen of England and President Eisenhower in order finally to achieve a clandestine working relationship with the British and American intelligence services.

If our most significant positive intelligence and much of our most significant counterintelligence from human sources have come from Soviet or other Warsaw Pact nationals who volunteered their services, why did we fail to systematize their handling more fully? Even more to the point within the framework of the present study, why would we not give such persons the benefit of every reasonable doubt rather than treat them with suspicion and, in the cases of Nosenko and [redacted] outright inhumanity?

D. What Went Wrong?

There are no easy or certain answers. Nonetheless, a retrospective glance at the intellectual preparation of those who led the Clandestine Service may shed light on the problem and permit the formulation of constructive recommendations for future action.

The leaders of the Clandestine Service in its first quarter century were, for the most part, people who had

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emerged from World War II, oriented toward action rather than contemplation. Chief, CI was almost unique in his interest in long-range analysis. Within the Clandestine Service, his generation was in general suspicious of theory and ill-prepared in most cases to cope with it.

On the other hand, the best of the Service's leaders --and there were many good ones--were successful because they possessed a difficult-to-define quality called common sense. Its value should not be underestimated. For example, when Penkovskiy was producing strategic intelligence that remains of value to this day, it was the common sense of these other leaders that led them to resist Chief, CI's allegation that Penkovskiy was a "disinformation agent."

Nevertheless, senior Clandestine Service supervisors of the period 1948-1970 had seldom themselves been trained in rigorous analytic techniques, and thus they seldom were in a position to demand high standards of analysis of their subordinates. Until the massive outflow of retirees in recent years changed the demography of the Service, most senior operational supervisors had received their higher educations before systematized analysis became routine even in such "soft" subjects as political science (for which a knowledge of inferential statistics is now required at most universities). Many, probably most, of these same gentlemen were also educated during a sort of interregnum in academe, when the study of classical logic had passed from vogue but had not yet been replaced by emphasis on scientific method. In the realm of technology, almost all senior executives in the Clandestine Service before 1970 had finished college before the first digital computer, an invaluable analytical tool, became commercially available about 1951.

There also have been, of course, a number of bright spots. Some of the Plans Directorate's divisions and staffs had subordinate components that specialized in substantive intelligence and built up great expertise on specific subjects over the years. From time to time there were also bursts of enthusiasm for the use of psychological evaluation techniques in the assessment of prospective agents. But these cases were exceptions; primary reliance within the Clandestine Service was on judgments that, though sometimes bolstered by impressive figures and arcane terminology, were nevertheless essentially intuitive and non-systematic.

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Such systems and criteria as did exist were largely in the heads of various individuals, and there is no evidence of any appreciable long-term consensus among the latter. Every defector case tended to be subject to the vagaries of the momentary line-up of CIA leadership. The existence of an Interagency Defector Committee, subordinate to the DDP, introduced some uniformity of approach, but its concerns were limited for the most part to superficial administrative and procedural formalities.

E. Summary

If we seem to have wandered far afield from the nature and validity of methodology of previous Nosenko bona fides studies, we have done so because the unfortunate handling of Nosenko was not an isolated event. Rather, it was symptomatic of some fundamental inadequacies of the Plans Directorate. What this means to us is that the long-needed improvement in our conduct of counterintelligence activity, now well underway, must be carried on within the framework of a searching reexamination of the analytical techniques employed by the Directorate and its Clandestine Service.

Whatever the course taken, however, we believe that the last quarter of this century is going to be even more exigent, though in a different way, than the past twenty-five years. We therefore sum up the implications of this chapter by posing a single question: How can we ensure that the upcoming generation of Clandestine Service leaders is better prepared intellectually to meet the challenges that face them than were those who ran the Service in the sixties?

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CHAPTER XII

Conclusions and Recommendations

A. The Letter of Instructions

General guidance for the preparation of this report was contained in a Letter of Instructions, signed by the Deputy Director for Operations on 8 June 1976. It assigned the following tasks:

You are tasked to write an analysis of the Nosenko case which will address the following matters:

[1]. The bona fides of Nosenko.

[2]. The value of Nosenko to the United States and allied governments.

[3]. The relationship and significance of Nosenko to other agents and operations.

[4]. The identification of unexploited Nosenko penetration leads and information.

[5]. The nature and validity of methodology of previous Nosenko bona fides studies.

We have interpreted the above responsibilities rather liberally, because the ramifications and implications of the Nosenko case have proven more far-reaching than we, and probably the framers of the above letter, anticipated. Nonetheless, we shall commence this concluding chapter with responses to the matters covered in sub-paragraphs a. through e.

1. Bona Fides

Doubts regarding Nosenko's bona fides were of our own making. Had the job of initially assessing him as a person, as well as of gathering and evaluating the intelligence he had to offer, been handled

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properly, he could have been declared a bona fide defector as readily as have many other Soviet intelligence officers.

This is not to say that we can be certain of the genuineness of any defector. It will always remain hypothetically possible that the Soviet government, acting through the KGB or some other instrumentality, will attempt to plant an intended "disinformation agent" or prospective penetration of our government on our doorstep. But the usefulness of the Soviets' doing so, in the manner ascribed to them in the Nosenko case, is probably as slight as is the feasibility. Soviet success in using native-born citizens of other countries to spy on their own homelands has been considerable. By contrast, there is no record of the USSR's successfully infiltrating the government of a major non-Communist power by use of an acknowledged Soviet citizen, least of all one whose career has been spent in a Soviet intelligence or security service.

We therefore conclude that Nosenko was from the beginning a bona fide defector.

2. Value of Nosenko

Nosenko's contribution has been summarized in Chapter IV. He has been of great value, but he probably could have been even more valuable had he been properly handled.

3. Relationship to Other Agents and Operations

As was made clear in Chapters X and XI, the Nosenko case, through no fault of the defector himself, had a most unfortunate effect on all clandestine operations in the Soviet field.

4. Identification of Unexploited Leads

We have not felt that this subject was one we could feasibly or properly investigate. To do so would have meant delving into the past and current operations of both the SE Division and the CI Staff to ascertain the extent to which there might have

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been "exploitation" of any of the hundreds of persons whom Nosenko identified by name. Time would not have permitted us to accomplish this task, nor would our doing so have been consistent with the principle of compartmentation.

5. Methodology

It has been made clear in Chapter XI that the variety of techniques used in handling Nosenko did not conform to any generally accepted sense of the term "methodology."

B. Recommended Action

Most of our recommendations for action have been previously stated or implied. In the following paragraphs, we recapitulate them, with such supplementary remarks as seem necessary.

1. Examination of the Role of Professionals

We recommend that the role that can properly be played within the Agency by members of the organized professions--medicine, psychiatry, psychology, law, and others--be given careful study, within the context of (a) ensuring that the Agency puts their skills to the best possible use, and (b) refraining from involving them in matters not properly within their professional purview.

2. Improvement of Intellectual Standards

We recommend that the Operations Directorate, and its Clandestine Service, take whatever steps are possible to ensure that the intellectual caliber of their personnel is equal to the exigencies of the future.

We realize that the present personnel selection system sets high standards for those entering on duty at the professional level, particularly as regards IQ and education. But the standards presently in force do not by themselves guarantee that future selections will possess independence of mind, analytical ability, and objectivity.

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In the case of personnel already on board, it should be kept in mind that we live in a rapidly-evolving, technologically-oriented civilization. Knowledge and intellectual skills adequate at this time may be inadequate a few years from now. For an intelligence organization, we define "inadequate" as anything that is less than the best.

We suggest that a board of expert consultants be established, drawn primarily from research institutions, high-technology enterprises, and the academic world to recommend a program of screening new entrants and improving the analytical skills of those already on duty, with the aim of achieving and maintaining a high level of intellectual excellence throughout the Operations Directorate.

3. Detection of Deception

We recommend that high priority be accorded a program to develop new methods of detecting deception.

Some steps are already underway in this regard, but they should be extended and given greater emphasis. Present methods, based mainly on the use of the polygraph, are clearly obsolete.

Specific criteria of bona fides will follow naturally from improved methods of detecting deception.

4. Psychological Aspects of Defector/Agent Handling and Personnel Selection

We recommend a multi-track program of psychological research, geared specifically to the Operations Directorate's needs, to develop a new generation of personality assessment techniques necessary for both defector/agent handling and selection of DDO personnel. This program should be under direct DDO control.

A surprising amount of relevant expertise now exists within the Agency, and some valuable research is underway, but it is not being geared to DDO's needs to the extent it could be. Instead, it is being handled by another directorate, which currently accords it a low priority.

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It is theoretically possible to establish, within the reasonably near future, certain measurable physiological correlates of a number of personality types.

It is also theoretically quite possible, though not yet demonstrated, that by establishing such physiological correlates we could take much of the guesswork out of personality evaluation. We would thus substantially reduce the threat that the employment of unstable or anti-social personalities poses for the Agency, and particularly for the Operations Directorate.

5. Psychological Assessment of Agents and Defectors

We recommend early, systematic psychological evaluation, by clinical psychologists using standardized measurement techniques, of all denied area agents, as well as defectors from the denied areas. We recommend against dependence on psychiatric examinations, unless the psychiatrists are willing to use the same standardized instruments as the psychologists would.

Although few, if any, of the Soviet or Soviet Bloc agents to whom we have had direct and continuing access have ever been tested as long as they remained in agent status, we do not accept as valid the reasons usually given for not testing them.

Implementation of this recommendation would, if the other programs above-recommended are also carried out, contribute substantially toward authentication of agent sources and information.

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